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Abstract 
This thesis is in two parts. In Part 1, sustainable development (SD) is 
defined as any development path where the instantaneous utility of a 
representative person is forever non-declining. This definition is applied to 
three models of economic growth based on privately-owned, non-renewable 
or expanding exhaustible resources, after an extensive debate of the 
appropriateness of such modelling frameworks. In the first, continuous-time 
model, the total resource stock has amenity value. The environmental 
policy which internalises this amenity value is shown to improve 
sustainedness, but to remain distinct from SD policy. The second model, 
also in continuous time, has no externalities. It shows that non-declining 
aggregate wealth does not guarantee SD, because wealth is measured at 
'unsustainable' prices; and that if the non-declining utility constraint bites, 
the SD path which maximises present value differs at all times from the 
conventionally 'optimal' path. Both models show that SD policies will be 
hard to carry out in the long run, since they must eventually use large 
subsidies in order to encourage more saving. 
The third model uses a discrete, non-overlapping generational structure 
to study intergenerational transfers of an expanding, exhaustible resource. 
It studies the effect of 'mating-bequest externalities' when children marry at 
random. It shows that such externalities can justify a collective SD policy, 
since parents may desire SD, but be unable to achieve it efficiently, or even 
at all, by increasing their individual bequests to their children. 
Part 11 explores a different question: How can market mechanisms of 
environmental policy be used to reduce the overall cost of pollution control 
in a heterogeneous industry in a politically realistic way? We first show that 
pollution charges and/or subsidies are fully symmetrical to marketable 
pollution permits, provided that symmetrical assumptions are made about the 
property rights built into both mechanisms. We then use this symmetry to 
show how the overall cost savings from market mechanisms can be divided 
among environmental users, taxpayers and polluters so as to give them each 
a strictly positive benefit, without losing either short or long run efficiency. 
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PREFACE 
This thesis deals with two distinct topics: the theory of sustainable 
development, and the political economy of market mechanisms of pollution 
control. Both topics are clearly part of environmental and resource 
economics, and they have some broad similarities. Both overlap with ethics 
and politics, because they involve questions of distribution: intergenerational 
distribution in the case of sustainable development, and intragenerational 
distribution in the case of market mechanisms. My treatment of both topics 
will, among other things, study the effect of taxes aimed at internalising the 
externalities caused by environmental resource stocks and flows, in order to 
achieve some social objective. And my study of market mechanisms will 
reveal important political limitations on the frequently recommended policy 
of using environmental taxes to make development sustainable, because of 
the effect that such taxes would have on intragenerational equity. 
However, at the detailed level of analysis, there is little similarity 
between my investigations of sustainable development theory and of market 
mechanisms. 'The former is dynamic, and assumes that both consumers and 
firms are uniform. The latter is comparative static, and assumes that both 
are heterogenous. There is very little overlap between the literatures on the 
two subjects. The thesis is therefore organised into two parts, each with its 
own introductory and concluding chapters: Part I on sustainable 
development, and Part 11 on market mechanisms. Such common ground as 




INTRODUCTION TO PART I 
1.1 THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (SD) AGENDA 
For nearly two hundred years, there have been prophets of doom caused 
by resource scarcity. Malthus (1798/1976) predicted that human population 
growth would outstrip food supply. Jevons (1865/1977) concluded that the 
rapid increase in coal consumption, coupled with the finite nature of the 
supply of coal, would cause progress to stop in the near future. The 
computer simulations of Meadows et al. (1972) predicted that diminishing 
natural resources and increasing pollution might well cause spectacular 
global declines in both population and living standards by the end of the 
next century. In their various ways, all these writers effectively claimed 
that the rapid expansion of human civilization occurring at the time they 
were writing would be unsustainable, because of the environmental resource 
limits imposed by a finite planet'. That is, they were not just concerned that 
there would be 'limits to growth'. They also feared that once limits are hit, 
growth will go into reverse. And in various ways they all felt that following 
an unsustainable growth path would be unfair to future generations; or in the 
economist's jargon, would be a violation of intergenerational equity. 
Yet, for various reasons, it was not until the publication in 1987 of Our 
Common Future by the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (WCED), that sustainability and especially sustainable 
development (SD) became the watchwords of concern about the adequacy 
of finite environmental resources to provide for the long term future of 
civilisation. Table 1.1 reveals the extent to which these words came into 
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Table 1.1 Changes in number of published journal articles and 
book reviews indexed in SSCI, 1984-1993 (1984 = 100) 
Year '84 '85 '86 '87 '88 '89 190 191 '92 '93 
sustain ... 100 98 127 123 123 215 252 344 438 550 Word 
in title industr ... 100 101 103 102 96 92 92 85 86 95 
I financ ... too 96 103 100 94 94 102 92 93 108 
academic fashion. It lists the annual numbers of journal articles and book 
reviews containing words starting with "sustain... ", with " industr... " and 
with "financ... " in their titles, that were logged by the Social Science 
Citation Index (SSCI) during 1984-1993. Note the quadrupling of 
publications on sustainability after 1987, as compared to little or no growth 
of publications on the other two topics. 
As well as simply reviving concern about the importance of 
environmental resources for the long term future, WCED (1987) (and the 
major public consultation exercise that preceded it) also shifted it in a major 
new direction. The 'limits to growth' debate of the early 1970s had mainly 
focused on the harmful effects of excessive per capita economic 
development, and its associated depletion of non-renewable resources, on 
the future of rich countries. Typical features of this problem were held to 
be the sheer exhaustion of mineral and energy resources, and the 
environmental pollution damage caused by the material flows of such 
resources. In contrast, WCED's main focus was on the harmful effects of 
inadequate per capita economic development (i. e., poverty), and its 
associated depletion of renewable resources, on the long term future of poor 
countries. WCED's analysis suggested that poverty typically causes 
renewable resources in the natural environment to be (a) very important to 
the economy; (b) protected only by common property management systems, 
which were breaking down into open access; (c) managed using shortened 
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time horizons; and (d) difficult to improve and protect because of the 
general shortage of investment funds. ' WCED therefore asserted that 
paying attention to the distribution of income - both within countries, and 
between countries - is a vital part of making development sustainable - 
This assertion is partly tautological, in that a more equitable income 
distribution is seen by many as one of the goals of development itself; but 
it also contains a testable hypothesis, that inequitable development is likely 
to be unsustainable. 
However, WCED's analysis is often far from rigorous. Reading it 
frequently raises fundamental questions about the economic theory of SD. 
In this thesis I will study seven of these: 
QI: What is the meaning of SD, particularly in comparison to the 
conventional economic concept of socially PV-optimal' growth? 
Q2: When are socially PV-optimal or free market development paths also 
SD paths? 
Q3: When they are not, what policiescan achieve SD, and how do these 
policies relate to environmental policies? 
Q4: In particular, what is the socially PV-optimal SD path, and what 
policies can achieve it? 
1. A neat summary of this view is given by the World Bank (1992, p2): "Without 
adequate environmental protection, development will be undermined; without 
development, resources will be inadequate for needed investments, and environmental 
protection will fail. 
2. Throughout the thesis the word PV-optimal rather than just 'optimal' will be used 
to describe the conventional objective of development or growth policy of maximising 
discounted present value (PV) over time. As shown in Chapter 2, this extra jargon 
is essential, since the thesis explores other goals of intertemporal social policy (such 
as PV-optimal SD in Q5) which one might wish to adopt. 
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Q5: Can a policy goal of achieving SD be justified in terms of personal 
preferences? 
Q6: Is there a simple indicator, based on currently available information, 
of when an economy is sustainable or unsustainable? 
Q7: How are the answers to Q2-Q6 affected if an economy's standard of 
living (i. e. consumption per capita, in my models) is historically 
given at the starting time? (I refer to any such effects as initial 
condition effects. ) 
However, I will not analyse these questions in the context of WCED's 
main agenda of renewable resources, poverty, and the alleged need to grow 
in order to protect the environment. I will consider non-renewable 
resources, and what I will at times call 'expanding' resources (to be 
explained below), but not genuinely renewable resources. I will ignore all 
questions of intragenerational distribution and equity, any effect of poverty 
on discount rates, and any possibility of investing to restore the 
environment, other than refraining from degrading it in the first place. I 
will not distinguish 'growth' from 'development', a distinction which is 
important in many contexts, as Daly . 
(1990, pl) rightly points out. My 
agenda is therefore more that of the early 1970s than the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. 
The historical reason for these choices is simply that they arose naturally 
out of studying the 1970s literature. But they are also choices which can be 
defended, as follows. Questions QI-Q7 are still relevant, although perhaps 
not topics of pressing popular concern, to non-renewable resource depletion 
in rich countries, as well as to renewable resource depletion in poor 
countries. Non-renewable resources are probably still more important than 
renewable resources in rich countries, at least for medium-term 
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sustainability, if not ultimate survival. The aftermath of the limits to growth 
debate in no way provided all the answers about sustainability and non- 
renewable resources. One reflection of this is that of recent articles on 
sustainability (again as indexed in SSCI) covering specific sectors, a good 
proportion cover sustainable energy, transport, cities and industry (even 
though these concepts may be loosely defined). Also, the literature on PV- 
optimal growth with non-renewable resources provides a striking example 
of unsustainable development (Dasgupta and Heal 1974, to be discussed at 
length in Chapter 3). 
Another reason for my choice is undeniably tractability. It is harder to 
model SD policy rigorously for an economy reliant on a renewable resource, 
other than in the simple case where the resource has no substitute. I explain 
this in more detail below. First, though, Section 1.2 tackles question Q1, 
and explains why SD is broadly defined here as non-declining well-being. 
It also notes that technical progress or capital-resource substitutability, are 
assumed, which means that non-declining well-being does not require non- 
declining natural resource stocks. Section 1.3 explains why I define well- 
being more precisely as the instantaneous utility of a representative person, 
and also notes the assumptions of an infinite time horizon and deterministic 
behaviour. Section 1.4 then discusses the avoidance of renewable resources 
in detail. Finally, Section 1.5 gives an overview of Chapters 2,3 and 4, 
which contain the substantive research results of Part 1. 
3.1 use 'capital' solely to refer to human-made, not natural assets; see footnote 
2 of Chapter 3 for more detail. 
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1.2 DEFINING SD, 1: NON-DECLINING WELL-BEING 
Sustainability and SD are concepts which are notoriously hard to define 
in a precise way that commands broad agreement. My review six years ago 
found dozens of different definitions (Pezzey 1989). Now, thanks to the 
explosion in sustainability writing shown in Table 1.1, there would doubtless 
be hundreds. But doing an exhaustive up-date of this review would serve 
little purpose, as few new issues have arisen since then. Instead I will 
explain the definition of SD used in this thesis, and compare it to some of 
its main rivals in three ways (in Sections 1.2.1,1.2.2 and 1.2.3 
respectively). Firstly, my definition is a single criterion, rather than many 
loosely linked criteria, Secondly, it does not require non-declining natural 
resource stocks. Thirdly, it is not the same as non-declining aggregate 
wealth. The first two comparisons can be rapidly explained here, but the 
third is not at all obvious and will be a major topic of inquiry in Chapter 3. 
1.2.1 A single criterion for SD is used, rather than several 
One of the main reasons why sustainability definitions are both prolific 
and frequently vague is, I contend, because many writers refuse to accept 
the existence of trade-offs between several desirable criteria which they 
would like to see SD achieve. In particular, both environmental protection 
and a more equal (intragenerational) distribution of income are popular 
policy aims in their own right, and also aims whose achievement nwy 
improve intergenerational equity. This leads many writers to use 
sustainability or SD merely to relabel an existing, conventional policy goal. 
As illustrated at the start of Chapter 2, many 'environmentally correct' or 
4 environmentally sound' policies for transport, energy, forestry, etc, have 
become relabelled en masse as policies for 'sustainable' transport, energy 
or forestry, withoutany real change in their content, apart from a greater 
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awareness that the problems to be addressed will probably get worse over 
time. 
Somewhat distinct from relabelling is the way that many writers rather 
vaguely define SD as 'containing', 'comprising', 'entailing' or 'being 
consistent with' intergenerational equity and environmental protection and 
intragenerational equity. This multicriteria approach was greatly boosted by 
the best known passage in WCED (1987, p, 43): 
"Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. 
It contains within it two key concepts: 
0 the concept of 'needs', in particular the essential needs of the world's poor, 
to which overriding priority should be given; and 
0 the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social 
organisation on the environment's ability to meet present and future needs. " 
But is a particular development path sustainable if, by achieving greater 
equality among nations in 2000, it decreases the availability of fossil fuels 
and minerals in 2100, and increases global warming and the destruction of 
the ozone layer then? Is development sustainable if it entails a massive 
expansion of renewable energy systems which makes life better in 2100, 
because of the fossil fuels that will be saved, but is bad for the environment 
because of all the windmills and dams that have to be built? A multicriteria 
approach cannot readily answer such questions, because it says little about 
how to make unavoidable tradeoffs among the two types of equity and 
enviroranental quality. 
To avoid both relabelling and multiple criteria, I focus on the 
intergenerational equity of SD, and define it solely as non-declining (per 
capita) well-being forever. 4 An environmental policy will then be an SD 
4. This is a mainly 'welfarist' approach. A 'resourcist' approach would define SD 
as a forever non-declining opportunity for well-being, irrespective of what future 
Chapter 1 
policy only insofar as it helps to achieve non-declining well-being (for 
example, because well-being depends among other things on environmental 
quality). The same would apply to a redistributive policy within the current 
generation, although for simplicity's sake, I ignore all questions of 
intragenerational equity throughout the rest of the thesis. 
The non-declining well-being approach is in line with a recent quotation 
from David Pearce (although as noted below and by Beckerman 1994, pp 
194-5 notes, earlier quotations by Pearce take a rather different line): 
"' Sustainability' therefore implies something about maintaining the level of human 
well-being so that it might improve but at least never declines (or, not more than 
temporarily, anyway). Interpreted this way, sustainable development becomes 
equivalent to some requirement that well-being does not decline through time. 
(Pearce 1993, p48) 
There is also an important technical distinction to make here between 
sustainability and SD. An economy is sustainable at a point in time if, 
given some level of well-being and endowments at a point in time, it can 
achieve non-declining well-being thereafter until the end of time. It is 
sustained or following a path of sustainable development over time if it does 
achieve non-declining well-being for all time. It is harmless to overlook this 
distinction in much general writing on the topic, but it is important for some 
aspects of the analysis in Chapters 2 and 3. For example, an economy may 
currently be sustainable, but embarked an unsustainable development path. 
'Sustainedness' and SD thus both mean non-declining well-being for all 
time, and all three terms will be used interchangeably below. Figure 1.1, 
where the economy follows a falling, then rising, then falling path of well- 
generations actually do with that opportunity at any instant (Dasgupta, 1990; Broome 
1992, Chapter 2). But note that a rigid constraint that well-being must not decline 
still falls short of a purely welfarist approach to SD. 
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being over time, shows why this makes sense. Suppose U1, well-being at 
time t,, is below U,, the maximum constant level of well-being which the 
economy can sustain from tj until the end of time, as shown. Then the 
economy is sustainable at t,, but not developing, since well-being is falling. 
And if U2, well-being at time t2, is above the maximum sustainable level U'2 
then, as shown, then the economy is developing but not sustainable at t2, i. e. 
well-being must eventually decline. If the whole path is feasible and never 
has declining well-being, i. e. is sustained, then it is an SD path. 
I will make the meaning of 'well-being' more precise in Section 1.3 (so 
far, the only thing clear is that it should measure some psychological state 
at a point in time), and I will discuss its moral and technical aspects in 
Chapter 2. First, though, I need to point out that because of assumptions 
I will make about substitutability, my definition of SD does not require non- 
declining envirom-nental resource stocks. It is also, for other, less obvious 
reasons, not equivalent to non-declining aggregate wealth. 
1.2.2 SD is assumed to be possible even with declining environmental 
resource stocks 
Many writers on SD assume that, below certain threshold levels, the roles 
that environmental resources perform in the economy are in practice non- 
substitutable. ' This in turn means that SD, defined as non-declining well- 
5. This is why I avoid the word 'welfare' here, and use it only to mean some 
aggregation of well-being over time. This avoids the serious confusion which 
Beckerman (1994) causes when he uses welfare to mean both well-being at a point 
in time, and its aggregation over time. 
6. The qualifier 'in practice' in the previous sentence recognises that one might have 
an economy with labour and resources being substitutable for one another in the 
production function, but if the labour supply is fixed, then there is no available 
substitute for declining natural resource inputs. SD would then require non-declining 
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being, amounts to a requirement that environmental resource stocks be 
preserved. For example: 
"... there are strong reasons to think of sustainable development as involving a 
further constraint, namely that the stock of environmental assets should not 
decrease. " (Pearce, Markandya and Barbier 1989, p48) 
"For the management of renewable resources there are two obvious principles of 
sustainable development. First that harvest rates should equal regeneration rates 
(sustained yield). Second that waste emission rates should equal the natural 
assimilative capacities of the ecosystems into which the wastes are emitted. ... 
... it is possible to exploit nonrenewable [resources] in a quasi-sustainable manner by limiting their rate of depletion to the rate of creation of renewable substitutes. 
(Daly 1990, pp2,4) 
Another related view is that in SD "the objective is to reach minimum 
divergence between acceptable and realised levels of relevant indicators [of 
sustainability] " (van den Bergh, 1993, p400), where the acceptable levels of 
relevant indicators would probably be related to thresholds of non- 
substitutability. By contrast, I assume throughout the thesis that SD is 
feasible even with declining resource stocks andlorflows, thanks to technical 
progress and/or increases in capital services which can substitute for 
declining resources. I must stress that this assumption is for the sake of 
analytical clarity, not because I believe that endless substitution possibilities 
do in fact exist for all resources. The substitutability of human-made for 
environmental resources in production and consumption is an important but 
highly complex empirical question (summarised in Pezzey 1992, pp 337- 
340). Ideally I would have wished to build limits to substitutability into 
some of my models, as noted in Section 3.3.2 of Section 3. But I do not 
resource stocks, as in the first model in Mourmouras (1993). Another semantic point 
is that one cannot describe non-substitutable natural resources as 'essential', since this 
word is reserved for other meanings - although there is in fact a conflict between 
the definitions of essentiality given in Dasgupta and Heal (1974, p25) and in Dasgupta 
and Heal (1979, p198). 
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subscribe to Daly's view that the substitutability question can be resolved by 
purely logical reasoning, as illustrated by: 
"So capital can substitute for resources in the limited domain of minimizing and 
recycling waste pieces of materials in process. But this substitutability is trivial 
compared to the overwhelming complementarity that must necessarily exist 
between that being transformed (resource) and the agent of transformation 
ý(capital). " (Daly 1990, p3; emphasis added) 
How can one know that substitutability is trivial, and overwhelmed by 
complementarity, without some attempt to measure it? 
1.2.3 Non-declining aggregate wealth does not guarantee sustainability 
In other places in the same book as cited above, Pearce et al are willing 
to assume that capital is substitutable for resources. They then usually also 
assert that non-declining aggregate wealth (the combined value of the stock 
of man-made assets and environmental assets) is a condition for achieving 
sustainability. For example: 
11 ... we can meet our obligations to 
be fair to the next generation by leaving them 
an inheritance of wealth no less than we inherited. Moreover, so long as each 
single generation does this, no single generation has to worry about generations 
far into the future. " (Pearce, Markandya and Barbier 1989, p35) 
This clearly describes non-declining wealth as a sufficient condition for non- 
declining well-being, but elsewhere Pearce describes it as a necessary 
condition: "Sustainable growth and development cannot be achieved if 
[wealth] is declining. " (Pearce 1993, p49). Elsewhere still, he is unclear 
about sufficiency or necessity, but generally one gets the impression that he 
regards the condition as both necessary and sufficient, so that non-declining 
well-being and non-declining wealth are equivalent. 
In Pezzey (1989, p19 and 1992, p342) I took this equivalence for 
granted, since not only Pearce but also Solow (1986) and Maler (1991) had 
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made this assertion. But my analysis in Chapter 3 will show that the 
sufficiency condition is not in fact true. One can have non-declining wealth 
and yet a level of well-being which is unsustainable, i. e. bound to decline 
in the future. Both theoretically, and for practical applications such as 
resource accounting and sustainability indicators, this is probably the most 
important result of the thesis. More details will therefore be given soon, in 
the preview of Chapter 3 in Section 1.5. First, however, let us define more 
precisely whose well-being when should be non-declining on an SD path. 
1.3 DEFINING SD 9 11: NON-DECLINING 
UTILITY OF A 
REPRESENTATIVE PERSON 
Suppose that the world comprises overlapping cohorts or generations, 
each comprising identical people, so that for simplicity, we can represent 
each generation by a single person who lives N+ 1 periods. We thus ignore 
population growth, inequity amongst people of the same age, and any 
differences in lifespan. Adapting the notation developed by Burton (1993), 
suppose that 
Ct a is the vector of consumption goods received by a 
person of age a in period t (a person has 
age 0 in the first period of her life) 
St is the vector of total environmental resource 
stocks in period t 
ýt ta 
(Cta, St) is the instantaneous utility perceived by a person 
of age a in period ý 
7.1 will shortly equate 'well-being' with measures solely based on a person's 
subjectively-perceived utility /i, In so doing I sidestep the important debate (in, 
for 
example, Anand and Ravallion 1993) about whether a more objective index of 
human 
development such as health or literacy is a better measure of 'well-being' than utility. 
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ut(AtO 
I Ati I*II ) At 
Aý is the net benefit to society in period t 
vt(At" At+ II,. .. Pt+Ný') is the "lifetime welfare" of a person born in 
period t 
(Unfortunately, I have had to interchange the meaning of Burton's U and V, 
so that I can use U in Chapters 2 and 3 for the instantaneous utility of a 
representative person, and thus be consistent with the standard notation in 
PV-optimal growth models. ) 
Such a formulation is already highly restrictive because it excludes any 
recognition that people's well-being is strongly influenced by relative 
variables, such as their consumption relative to what it was in earlier 
periods, or what their peers' consumption levels are now (see Pezzey 1992, 
pp 351-4 for a discussion of these influences). But even with such 
restrictions, there is an immediate question of whether the net benefit to 
society (0, or a new-born person's lifetime welfare (V), should be the 
'well-being' that is non-declining over time on an SD path. Since SD is at 
heart a concept of intergenerational equity, the latter measure is clearly 
more appropriate. Preventing falls in net benefit U may conceivably amount 
to preventing falls in people's instantaneous utilities at some stage of their 
lives. These falls might be part of those people's plans to maximise their 
own lifetime welfare V, and there is no obvious reason for considering such 
falls unfair to the next generation. But for V to fall from one value of t 
(which defines a generation) to the next clearly does raise a problem of 
intergenerational equity. 
I should therefore ideally like to have built an overlapping generations 
model, with SD defined as non-declining lifetime welfare V, The obvious 
function to use for V, would be the present value (PV) formulation 
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N 
Vt E [4t'l(l +6, )' where 6i >0 is the personal lifetime utility 
a=O discount factor 
Such a modelling framework would allow us to distinguish clearly between 
intertemporal self-interest, which may cause people to conserve resources 
over time so as to have something to trade for others' labour power when 
they are retired; and intergenerational altruism, which may cause people to 
conserve resources as if they were maximising an intergenerational social 





+ 6gy where 6g >0 is an intergenerational utility 
discount factor (assumed constant). 
This framework also reveals another problem of 'resourcism' versus 
4 welfarism': if lifetime welfare V, falls from generation to generation simply 
because the discount factor bi increases over time, can this be regarded as 
a problem of intergenerational equity? (Arguably not, but in effect I duck 
the problem by assuming a constant bi=bi for all t. ) 
However, in this thesis, I will ignore the age structure of the population 
alive at any time. I will instead represent the population by a single person, 
whose well-being is measured by an instantaneous utility function 
U(t) = U(ct, S), which has a constant functional form over time. 
Sustainedness is then defined as non-declining (instantaneous, per capita) 
utility U(t), henceforth NDU, and sustainable development is AD U for all 
time. In Chapters 2 and 3, time is continuous and the time horizon is 
infinite. One may then consider society as represented either by an infinite 
series of infinite s imally- I ived people, or as a single, immortal, infinitely- 
lived person. As Burton points out, this is equivalent to assuming a 
common factor 6j=6g=6 for both personal lifetime and intergenerational 
discounting. In Chapter 4, time is discrete and comprises an infinite series 
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/ 
of non-overlapping generations, each represented by a single couple who 
live for one period. Personal lifetime discounting then disappears 
altogether. In either the continuous or discrete time case, my representative 
person framework leaves out much realism and richness in economic and 
policy mechanisms, such as retirement, bequests, and all trades and transfers 
between contemporaneous young and old people. 
My primary reason for making this choice is, as with the decision to 
avoid renewable resources, to improve tractability. Tractability was also 
why I chose not to adopt the criterion in Riley (1980), which is effectively 
to define sustainedness as non-declining present value in an inunortal, 
continuous time framework, i. e. as non-declining f 
CO U[c(x), S(x)]e-"dx 
t 
over time t. At face value this criterion has neither much analytic 
simplicity, nor a clear identification of separate generations. A secondary 
reason why I define sustainedness as NDU is to produce results comparable 
with the well-known literature on exhaustible resource allocation over time. 
Almost always, this literature also uses the representative person framework 
to avoid the difficulty of working with overlapping generations. Such 
literature (mostly using continuous time and an infinite horizon) comprises 
not just the PV-optimal growth literature, such as the classic papers by 
Dasgupta and Heal (1974) and Stiglitz (1974) and the vast majority of PV- 
optimal growth models in journals such as the Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management, but also most of the intergenerational 
tequity" literature stemming from seminal papers by Solow (1974) and 
Hartwick (1977), and some recent technical literature on sustainability such 
as Klaassen and Opschoor (1991). 
8. This is in quotation marks because 'equity' normally suggests a wide range of 
notions of justice and fairness, but Solow and Hartwick restrict it purely to mean 
equality of consumption, and hence utility, over time. 
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Losing all age structure is nevertheless a major and rather disappointing 
methodological choice. It is therefore worth further illustrating the problem 
of tractability, by summarising what Howarth and Norgaard (1990,1992, 
1993), Howarth (1991a, 1991b, 1992) and Mourmouras (1991,1993) have 
and have not achieved with an overlapping generations approach to 
economic growth based on exhaustible resources. The main features of their 
papers are summarised in Table 1.2. This reveals that none of Howarth's 
papers considers SD policies as such. This appears to be because the 
complexity of the finite overlapping generations structure means that such 
policies are impossible to calculate, except by numerical solution of a 2- 
generation example with a logarithmic functional form for utility and a 
Cobb-Douglas production function. The infinite number of generations 
assumed by Mourmouras allows him to get somewhat further, and calculate 
analytic policies which do achieve constant lifetime utility across 
generations. But to do this he has to assume the same specific functional 
forms. He is also crucially reliant on assuming an exponentially growing 
rather than a strictly non-renewable resource, and (in the cases where he 
considers capital investment) a capital stock which decays completely in one 
generation. 
By using the greater tractability of the representative person framework, 
I will be able to show some more general properties of SD policies for 
exhaustible resources. For example, such policies can be different from 
environmental policies, they may not be needed all the time, and they may 
be difficult to carry out in the very long term. To best guide policy in the 
real world, results from both overlapping generation and representative 
person models will have to be used; neither of them has any clear overall 
superiority - 
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Aside from its avoidance of true intergenerational comparisons, there are 
several other moral and technical issues raised by defining SD as NDU. To 
avoid making this introduction too long, these will be discussed in the first 
substantive section of Chapter 2. But two other assumptions made for 
reasons of tractability in Chapters 2-4 are worth discussing briefly now. 
Firstly, the infinite time horizon used is unrealistic, since the Sun has a finite 
astronomical life. An infinite horizon leads to excessively gloomy results 
about the effect of finite resources on sustainability, as noted in Chapter 3 
(though other assumptions, such as substitutability, arguably lead to 
excessively cheerful results). A finite horizon would be preferable, but 
again this would add too much to an already difficult modelling task - even 
though problems of assigning terminal values would not arise, since every 
asset will have zero value at the end of the time horizon, since this is also 
the end of the world. Secondly, all relationships in the models are 
deterministic, with the representative person having perfect foresight. This 
means that interesting questions which occur in stochastic and/or incomplete 
information models, such as stability and resilience (see for example 
Perrings 1989, Common and Perrings 1992 and Perrings 1993) are 
unfortunately ignored. 
1.4 THE EXCLUSION OF RENEWABLE RESOURCES 
We have already noted the predominant modern view, dating at least 
from WCED (1987), that it is the finiteness of renewable rather than non- 
renewable resources that poses a threat to the long run sustainability of 
humankind. This view heightens the connection between sustainability and 
envirom-nental policy since renewable resources, being alive or forms of 
solar energy, generally tend to move around more than non-renewable 
resources. Renewables are therefore less likely to be owned and marketed, 
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and more likely to be the source of environmental externalities. One of the 
earliest exponents of the significance of material resource flows in the 
economy now states that: 
"The most important scarcities, in the emergent environmentalist world view, are 
largely outside the market domain: soil fertility, clean fresh water, clean fresh air, 
unspoiled landscapes, climatic stability, biological diversity, biological nutrient 
cycling and envirom-nental waste assimilative capacity. " (Ayres 1993, p 189) 
But it is more difficult to study sustainability in economies based on 
renewable substitutable resources than on non-renewable, substitutable 
resources. To see this, define a general exhaustible resource as one whose 
stock S(t) and rate of use R(t) are related over time by the equation 
ý= g(S) - R, (1.1) 
where g(S) is the natural growth function. One can then distinguish at least 
four types of exhaustible resource: 
(1) Non-renewable resources such as fossil fuels and minerals, where 
g(S) =0 on any realistic human timescale. 
(2) Living renewable resources such as fish and forests , where g(S) 
reflects the population growth of a biological species in a finite 
ecological niche. An example is g(S) = -yS(S - S) where S is 
some exogenously given carrying capacity (although this omits 
the notion of a minimum threshold below which a population 
is not viable). 
(3) Exponentially expanding resources, where g(S) = IPS, for some 
exogenous growth factor r, so that 
ý= rS-R (1.2) 
This could be an asymptotic representation of g(S) - -yS(S - S) 
when S<<S. However, no natural resource could follow 
growth path (1.2) forever, since it is unbounded if R=0. 
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(4) Replenishable resources such as fresh water, where an exogenous 
supply R (t) fills a finite reservoir of size S; for example, 
g(S)-[(1-es-s)1(1-e-s)]R. A variant on this would be a 
resource such as wind power where there is a maximum 
exogenous supply R (t), but no resource stock as such, so that 
resource extraction R 
There is unfortunately no standard terminology for exhaustible resources 
which reflects this taxonomy. Many writers confine 'exhaustible resources' 
to mean (1), whereas it seems more logical to me to include (2) and (3) as 
well. Some writers take 'renewable resources' to mean (3) and (4) as well 
as (2), whereas others do not. But irrespective of terminology, the 
importance of this classification for my argument is as follows. 
Firstly, it is obvious that the general dynamics of renewable, substitutable 
resources are less tractable than those of non-renewable resources, because 
renewables require at least two extra types of non-zero growth functions 
g(S) ((2) and (4)) to be considered, with no reduction in complexity 
elsewhere. True, in equilibrium there will always be a simple rule available 
(set R= g(S)) which ensures sustainable resource use. But this says nothing 
about whether or not this produces a sustained utility path, whether or not 
either situation is part of a conventional dynamic optimisation, and if not, 
what policies would achieve sustained utility paths in economies with 
renewable resources which start from disequilibrium. 
Secondly, although this is not shown by the above taxonomy, there are 
very few published models of the PV-optimal management of renewable 
resources which could be adapted for SD purposes. For even if there is no 
effective substitute for a renewable resource, it is ultimately the utility of the 
people who harvest the resource we are concerned about. 
20 
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dynamic optimisation models of non-renewable resources (such as Dasgupta 
and Heal 1979, Chapter 5, and Clark 1990) study the maximisation of the 
discounted harvest income. Since this ignores any changes in the marginal 
utility of income, such models are relevant to sectoral sustainability only 
(discussed further in Pezzey 1992, pp 347-350), which is not my purpose 
here. The only renewable resource model I know which maximises 
discounted utility rather than discounted income is Barbier and Markandya 
(1990). This reaches some interesting, albeit rather tentative, conclusions 
about phenomena such as PV-optimal self-extinction. So there would need 
to be further work on the PV-optimal, macroeconomic management of 
renewable resources, before one could analyse SD in such situations. 
Thirdly, if the meaning of renewable resources is taken to include 
meaning (3), then renewables are indeed explored to some extent in this 
thesis. The resource in Chapter 4 is exponentially expanding. And the 
equation of motion for cake-eating with exogenous, exponential technical 
progress that is used in a special case of Chapter 2: 
ý=- Ce-, where C is consumption, 
can be transformed, by writing Se"=E, the effective size of the resource 
base for consumption purposes, to 
-rE - C. 
This is equation (1.2) for an exponentially expanding resource, save for the 
distinction between consumption C and resource extraction R. Also, (1.2) 
is the continuous time version of the equation of motion that Mourmouras 
uses in his 1991 and 1993 papers, so his coverage of 'renewable' resources 
is no greater than mine. 
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I have now introduced my basic modelling framework. SD will be 
defined as the permanently non-declining instantaneous utility of a 
representative person with perfect foresight, in an infinite-horizon, 
deterministic economy based on non-renewable or exponentially expanding 
resources, which can be substituted for in both production and utility 
functions. I would stress again, in answer to critics of using this framework 
for modelling sustainability questions, its advantage in terms of 
comparability as well as tractability. Most of the neoclassical models, which 
for two decades have greatly influenced expert opinion on the significance 
of resource exhaustion and environmental degradation for the long-run 
economic future, have used the same assumptions. If SD modelling always 
avoids them, it will be in danger of remaining a separate sub-specialism of 
economics. Any of its pessimistic conclusions might then be dismissed by 
mainstream economists as being merely the product of their 
unconventionally pessimistic assumptions. This cannot be true for Chapters 
2-4 below, the highlights of which are now briefly surveyed. 
1.5 OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 2-4 
Chapter 2, "Sustainability, Intergenerational Equity and Enviromnental 
Policy", first explores some more of the ethical and analytical foundations 
of the NDU criterion. It then models the depletion of a non-renewable 
resource which is privately owned and essential for consumption (either 
directly and with technical progress, or as an input to the economy's 
production function, with or without technical progress). The total resource 
stock is also an environmental amenity for everyone. The main contribution 
of the chapter is that it is the first systematic exploration of policies to 
achieve non-declining utility, and of the effect of environmental policy on 
the rise and fall of utility over time. (Most PV-optimal growth models are 
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concerned only with what it takes to maximise the PV of utility, not with 
whether PV-optimal utility rises or falls). 
Unfortunately, hard and fast results are difficult to come by. One broad 
conclusion to questions Q2 and Q3 is that a conventional, social PV- 
maximising environmental policy makes utility more likely to rise over time, 
but not necessarily to the point of achieving SD. Another is that in an 
economy with reversible capital investment but no technical progress, it 
seems impossible to find a practicable SD policy for the very long term: the 
policy will usually have to become a large subsidy if it is to provide a 
sufficient asymptotic incentive to encourage saving. This is despite the 
assumed endless substitutability of capital for resources. We also go some 
way towards answering question (Q5) on how SD policies could be justified 
in terms of personal preferences, by finding a case where collective action 
achieves SD at less PV cost per person than SD action by one person acting 
alone would cost. 
Question Q4 on socially PV-optimal SD is also briefly addressed in 
Chapter 2, but only in a special case, and Q6 on sustainability indicators is 
ignored. Q7 is addressed, and we find an example where if the economy's 
initial consumption (and hence utility) level is given, it is possible for an 
exogenous increase in the initial resource stock to have the perverse effect 
of making an otherwise sustainable economy unsustainable. However, this 
example is based on living renewable resources, and it is hard to conceive 
of a similar example for non-renewable or exponentially expanding 
resources. 
The first main part of Chapter 3, "The Optimal Sustainable Depletion of 
Non-renewable Resources", addresses Q6 on sustainability indicators, using 
a simple model with capital accumulation and non-renewable resource 
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depletion, but no environmental externalities (so that the socially PV-optimal 
and free market development paths are the same) and no technical progress. 
As asserted earlier, non-declining aggregate wealth does not guarantee 
sustainability in this model, and so falls well short of the sustainability 
indicator we seek. The intuition behind this important result is as follows. 
Aggregate wealth is calculated by adding together the value of human-made 
capital and non-renewable resources. This addition must use prices to value 
resources relative to human-made capital. If relative resource prices are 
derived from market prices, then even iffull correction is made for all the 
conventional imperfections of those markets (such as imperfect competition 
and incomplete current- generation property rights for natural resources), 
such prices do not reflect any sustainability constraint. In particular, at a 
crucial stage in an economy's development, the prices of non-renewable 
resources in perfect markets are likely to be too low for sustainability. 
Natural resource depletion is then undervalued and can be outweighed by 
investment in human-made capital, giving the 'false positive' message that 
wealth is increasing, when in fact the economy's consumption level is 
unsustainable. 
The other main part of Chapter 3 takes up Q4 on PV-optimal SD (NDU 
at minimum PV cost), or 'opsustimality' as I have called it. The main 
contribution is to show that in general, SD requires a different development 
path to be followed right from the start, if the PV-optimal path is 
unsustained; and that the PV-optimal sustained path will comprise two 
phases. First there will be a phase of rising utility and no active policy 
intervention, as long as future intentions are credibly announced at time 
zero. Then there will be a phase of active policy intervention to achieve 
constant utility. But as in Chapter 2, such policy will again probably 
become impractical in the long run. 
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Chapter 4, "Concern for Sustainability in a Sexual World" again tackles 
Q5 on the justification of SD policy in terms of personal preferences. In 
Chapter 2, the environmental externality was used to justify collective rather 
than individual action to achieve SD. But what if, as in Chapter 3, there is 
no environmental externality? Does SD then have to be accepted ex 
cathedra as something that society ought to aim for, even though it appears 
to harm everyone's individual self-interest? If so, this would make SD 
unacceptable to many economists and politicians. But I believe that SD 
policy can respect individual interests, as long as one recognises an ever- 
present, but almost always ignored, sexual externality. I assume that sex 
results in people controlling only half of the bequests received by their 
offspring, as opposed to all of the bequests as happens if sex is absent. This 
then makes it inefficient, and perhaps impossible, for individual couples to 
achieve a sustained future for their descendants by their own actions alone. 
So provided that they value SD more than its cost in terms of PV, collective 
policy to achieve SD can be justified. Since bequests from parents to 
children are an essential part of reaching this result, Chapter 4 differs from 
Chapter 3 not just in having sexual rather than asexual agents, but also in 
modelling the representative person (or couple, in fact) as existing for a 
single, discrete time period, rather than for an infinity of continuous time. 
Chapter 5 draws together the main conclusions of Part 1. 
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26 Figure for Chapter I 
CHAPTER 2 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, INTERGENERATIONAL 
EQUITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY * 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
"The challenge of sustainable development is to promote ways of encouraging 
... environmentally friendly economic activity, and of discouraging 
environmentally damaging activities. ... A key objective of environmental and 
sustainable development policy is to [ensure] that environmental costs and 
benefits are properly and fully taken into account in public and private sector 
decisions. " (DOE 1994, p32) 
These phrases, from a chapter entitled "Principles of Sustainable 
Development" in Sustainable Development: The UK Strategy, show how 
blurred the difference between sustainable development policy and 
environmental policy has become in the mind of at least one body politic in 
recent years. The chapter mentions 'sustainable development' and 
cresourcesý only five times each, while 'environment' or 'envirom-nental' 
appears over fifty times. The whole report often gives the impression that, 
at least for rich countries, sustainable development (SD) requires no more 
than an extension of environmental policies to tackle cumulative, global 
and/or irreversible problems such as ozone depletion, global warming and 
species loss. A good proportion of other relevant publications on SD by 
governments, consultants and academics would give the same impression. 
*I thank Geir Asheim, Ed Barbier, Wilfred Beckerman, Sam Fankhauser, Richard 
Howarth, Jeff Krautkraemer, Geoff Lewis, Nancy Olewiler, David Pearce, Malcolm 
Pemberton, Joe Swierzbinski, Mike Toman, David Ulph and three anonymous 
referees for helpful comments on earlier versions. This research was funded by 
award no. L320-27-3002 of the UK Economic and Social Research Council's Global 
Environmental Change programme. The usual disclaimer applies. 
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Yet, although there is much overlap between a policy to take account of 
cumulative environmental problems and a policy to achieve SD, 
environmental policies and SD policies are distinct, at least in principle. 
There may be an embarrassing plethora of definitions of SD (Pezzey 1989), 
but it is clear that the ultimate goal of most of them is not that of 
environmental policy, which (at least in theory) is to achieve social PV- 
optiniality, i. e. the maximisation of the present discounted value (PV) of 
utility over time, taking into account the effect of environmental degradation 
on per capita PV. 
Rather, SD primarily aims to achieve a particular form of 
intergenerational equity: making sure that future generations have similar 
levels of well-being or utility as enjoyed by those before them, or at least 
the opportunity to attain such levels. (Note that this aims for more than the 
mere survival of future generations. ) I define SD here as non-declining 
utility (ADU) forever. In particular, an entire development path is 
'sustained' if the utility of a representative person in the economy never 
declines along the entire path. Basic details of this definition, and the 
tractability and comparability reasons why it was chosen in preference to 
non-declining lifetime welfare in an overlapping generations framework, 
were discussed at length in Section 1.3 of Chapter 1, and further aspects of 
NDU will be discussed shortly. 
But it is immediately obvious that as long as SD entails any form of 
intergenerational equity that is not included in social PV, achieving an SD 
path will generally require a different degree, or even a different type, of 
policy intervention than achieving an environmentally correct path does. If 
the current generation does not care much about the future, the future may 
be quite dismal, even though cumulative environmental problems have been 
fully 'taken into account', and even though this makes the future somewhat 
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less dismal than it would otherwise be. The danger in allowing 
sustainability and environmentalism to merge in the public mind is therefore 
that 'sustainable development' or 'sustainability' may become just a 
convenient relabelling of existing environmental policy goals, rather than a 
fundamental reappraisal of society's ethical attitudes towards the future. 
It may also lead to technical oversights. If capital accumulation and 
technical progress can continue to substitute indefinitely for environmental 
resources - which is an assumption I make throughout this thesis, in spite 
of considerable doubts as to whether it is true in practice - then it turns out 
that increasing an economy's overall savings ratio or rate of technical 
progress may be a more important way of achieving SD than direct 
incentives to conserve environmental resources. Yet savings policy receives 
scant attention in DOE (1994), or in most of the SD literature. 
The main purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the technical differences 
between SD and envirorimental policies. This is done by analysing the 
effect of an NDU constraint on two neoclassical growth models, based on 
Krautkraemer (1985). where population is large, uniform and constant, and 
depletion of a privately-owned non-renewable resource with social amenity 
value causes an environmental externality. Many alternative models could 
have been chosen, and those used here are meant to explore sustainability 
problems rather than answer them definitively. To explain what is new 
here, I first need to define SD and PV-optimality terminology more 
precisely, using Figure 2.1 for illustration. U(t), the utility of an infinitely- 
lived person representative of the whole population over all time t (which 
runs continuously from 0 to oo), is also used in the Figure to represent an 
entire development path of an economy (including its resource and capital 
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stocks) over all time. Ul'(t) is the free market path' which is chosen by an 
agent who maximises her PV while ignoring the social amenity cost of her 
personal resource depletion. U(t), the socially PV-optimal path, is what she 
would follow if this cost were to be internalised. ' The required 
environmental policy is (f(t), a vector of tax incentives with which the 
government induces individual agents to follow U rather than U". 
U(t) may or may not be a member of I Ut(t) 1, the set of all sustained or 
SD paths. 3 These are formally defined as paths with NDU forever, i. e. for 
which U(t2) ; -: ý U(tj) for any t,, t2with t2> tj ': ý!! 0. If utility is differentiable, 
a sustained path is one where U(t) ý!! 0 for all t( ý!! 0) , and for brevity we stay 
with this differentiable definition (the non-differentiable equivalent is easy 
to infer). An unsustained path is then one which is declining (0 < 0) at 
some time. Some writers use what I would call asymptotic SD (Iin-ý,,,. U is 
greater than some minimum level) as a definition of SD itself, but I do not, 
since policymakers care about the immediate as well as the distant future. 
As noted in Chapter 1, a path is then sustainable at time t if a particular 
sustained path exists that starts from the current capital and resource stocks 
and the current utility level at t; otherwise, it is unsustainable at t. I assume 
1. The emphasis is more on 'free' (from government intervention) than on 'market', 
since markets formally do not exist in some of the economies we consider. Where 
they do exist, they are assumed to be competitive. 
2.1 assume here that the necessary conditions hold for the existence and uniqueness 
of the PV-optimal path. 
3. When they both are used as qualititative descriptions of development paths, 
sustainedness and sustainable development (SD) continue to be treated as synonymous 
terms in this Chapter. However, later we also talk about sustainedness as if it might 
be quantified (as in 'to improve sustainedness'), in which case SD does not seem 
quite such an apt term. 
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that the economy is such that some sustained path does exist. ' 
Two sustained paths are of particular interest. I assume that SD policy 
has no desire for the hair shirt for its own sake, and ideally aims for the 
sustained path which has the highest PV, which I call the opsustimal path 
and denote as fft(t). However, the opsustimal path is rarely easy to 
characterise, and only in Chapter 3 where environmental externalities are 
absent can much progress be made. The sustained path which maximises 
[mi%1I ", 0 U(t)] is called the (initial) nwximin path, labelled UO. ' Except for 
trick cases, this is also the maximum constant utility path. As for policies, 
{41)t(t)l is the set of all SD policies which convert Uu(t) to paths in {Ut(t)j. 
Of these policies, (D (t) and (DO(t) respectively convert U"(t) to the opsustimal 
A 
path ffý(t) and the initial maximin path U', (t). U(t) is the general policy path 
which a private PV-optimising agent follows in response to a general policy 
ID(t) - 
What I attempt to do here, by modelling the depletion of a non-renewable 
resource with social amenity value, is to compare the free market path U11, 
the socially PV-optimal path U, a sustained path U% and the environmental 
and SD policies 4f and V which respectively transform the first path into 
U and W. Some of the questions which will be addressed are: When does 
envirom-nental policy convert an unsustained free market path <0 
sometime) into a sustained one (U 0 always)? If it does not (U <0 
4. Cass and Mitra (1979) gave the general conditions for sustained, strictly positive 
consumption to exist, but this says little about the existence of non-declining utility 
in the presence of an environmental amenity. Discovering the general conditions for 
this latter case (which is relevant to this chapter) remains for further work. 
5. The qualifier 'initial' distinguishes UO from U,,, the current maximin path that 
maximises [minal, t, U(t)], which is explored further in Chapter 3 and (although they 
did not call it such) by Bishop and Woodward (1994). 
1 
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sometime), what is the minimum that SD then costs (what is 
PV(U) -Pv(ffý))? What are the best instruments to use as part of 
enviromnental policy 4) and SD policy V? 
It is this formal comparison of SD and environmental policies which is 
new to the literatures on intergenerational equity and/or dynamic 
externalities in resource economies. For although Dasgupta and Heal (1974) 
and Stiglitz (1974) effectively showed that the PV-optimal path of a capital- 
resource economy with no externalities will be unsustained if respectively 
the marginal productivity of capital or the rate of technical progress is too 
low, they did not treat this as a policy problem. Solow (1974) showed the 
conditions for a non-zero constant utility path UO to exist in a Cobb-Douglas 
version of the economy, and recognised (p36) that policy intervention would 
be needed to achieve it, but he did not analyse what form the policy (bm(t) 0 
should take. Hartwick (1977) derived his famous rule of investing all 
resource rents in order to achieve constant utility. But like Solow, he did 
not identify any policy which could motivate PV-maximising agents to 
6 
achieve this level of investment, and policy analysis is rare in the literature 
he inspired. 
One exception is Dasgupta and Heal (1979, p291), who showed how a 
constant income tax rate can achieve constant utility, but only if the 
government is the sole investor. This seems of little relevance to a market 
economy where the bulk of resource depletion and investment is controlled 
by private agents. ' Becker (1982) went further, and described maximin 
6. As discussed in Section 2.2, it may well still be rational for such agents to 
support a government which pursues an SD policy. 
7. For example, during the 1980s the UK private sector typically accounted for 
more than three-quarters of gross domestic fixed capital formation, and more than two 
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policies 4)0(t) operating on both capital and environmental markets in an 
economy with externalities, but he discussed neither environmental nor SD 
policies. Schulze (1974), Sweeney (1977) and Krautkraemer (1985) all 
effectively showed how an environmental policy which internalises an 
externality from non-renewable resource depletion can shift resource 
extraction from the present to the future. These papers thus suggest that 
environmental policy makes utility less likely to decline over time, but none 
of them considered intergenerational equity. In this paper I adapt 
Krautkraemer's models for analysing SD, because they explicitly model the 
socially PV-optimal utility path U in general equilibrium (i. e. in a whole 
economy, albeit a single-sector one, where the resource demand is 
endogenous), unlike the Schulze and Sweeney models which are partial 
equilibrium. In the recent sustainability literature, Van Den Bergh and 
Ni kamp (1991) and Klaassen and Opschoor (1991) surveyed techniques of 
modelling SD in the presence of environmental values, but did not develop 
the NDU criterion as such. Finally, in one of the overlapping generations 
models noted in Chapter 1, Howarth and Norgaard (1992) developed a 
model with cumulative pollution rather than resource degradation as the 
source of the externality. ' They defined SD as non-declining generational 
utility, and described the environmental policy and showed the effect of the 
utility discount rate on PV-optimal utility growth U, but they did not discuss 
SD policies per se. 
thirds of total investment (defined as fixed capital formation and all expenditure on 
human capital, i. e. education) (GSS 1993, pl-12). 
8. Cumulative pollution and non-renewable resource depletion are analytically 
equivalent if there is a strict upper threshold for pollution, beyond which the economy 
collapses; but Howarth and Norgaard do not include such a threshold. 
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We could now proceed to the formal analysis of our two growth models. 
However, in view of continuing controversy about the NDU constraint, it 
is worth using Section 2.2 to set out some arguments for studying NDU as 
a goal of public policy, and some alternative criteria of intergenerational 
equity, all within the context of continuous time, infinitely lived, 
representative person models. Section 2.3 then analyses SD and 
environmental policies in a general model of cake-eating with technical 
progress, and in two special cases. Section 2.4 extends the analysis to a 
productive economy with capital-resource substitution, where measures to 
increase saving can then be distinguished from measures to conserve 
resources. Section 2.5 investigates some special effects caused by having 
a fixing starting level of consumption, and hence utility. Section 2.6 
concludes. 
2.2 SD AS NON-DECLINING UTILITY (NDU) 
I do not claim here that NDU is the 'right' or 'best' definition of SD, 
or results in a 'better' allocation of wellbeing over time than unconstrained 
PV-optimality. I aim merely to show that it deserves proper economic 
analysis. My approach towards NDU closely parallels that of Solow (1974) 
towards maximin utility. Both he and I are saying in effect: "Here is an 
interesting criterion of intergenerational equity, proposed or popularised by 
an influential source (in our case WCED 1987, in his case Rawls 1971) and 
much debated since. Let us analyse it with formal economic techniques, 
thereby learning more about it both normatively (What are its strengths and 
weaknesses from a political or philosophical point of view? ) and positively 
(Is it feasible? When it is, how can it be achieved? ). In so doing, we hope 
to advance the debate about the choice of criterion; but we do not say that 
this is the correct choice for society to make. " 
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As noted in Chapter 1, there are technical reasons for choosing NDU in 
preference to three other criteria of intergenerational equity. It has been 
chosen in preference to non-declining lifetime welfare in an overlapping 
generations model, for reasons of tractability. It has been chosen in 
preference to a condition of non-declining natural resources ('natural 
capital'), in order to avoid relying on assumptions that resources are non- 
substitutable beyond some threshold. It has been chosen in preference to 
non-declining aggregate wealth because, as explained in Chapter 3, the latter 
does not guarantee NDU. 
NDU has also been chosen for study because of its sheer popularity. 
Once one has translated NDU into popular language, one finds an enormous 
volume of statements in its favour in academics' and (especially) 
policymakers' pronouncements on intergenerational equity. NDU is implicit 
in at least half of the dozens of written definitions of sustainability and SD 
collected in Pezzey (1989), and five years later governments far and wide 
have proclaimed their commitment to achieving SD. The contrast with the 
maximin criterion is striking. Any proposal to ban future increases in 
human wellbeing, which is the 'poverty trap' implied by the maximin 
(Solow 1974), would attract little support from current governments or their 
electorates. This is surely because most of them expect to be around to 
enjoy some of the future, and do not consider a rising utility path to be 
automatically unfair to the current generation. 
To go further than political economy, and 'justify' NDU as an ethically 
valid criterion for intergenerational equity, involves making a choice 
between different value systems, and in my view the debate about this 
choice can never be resolved. It can be clarified in the manner of Asheim 
(1991), who effectively reduced NDU to yet more fundamental principles. 
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He showed that any 'just' consumption paths must have NDU, where a just 
path is one which cannot be overtaken by any other path in terms of both 
total undiscounted consumption, and the equality of the allocation of 
consumption over time. But proponents of PV-optimality could point out 
that Asheim's definition of justice is almost bound to conflict with a 
discounted criterion like PV, but that does not prove the former to be 
ethically superior. 
Indeed, some 'PV-optimalists' accept that intergenerational equity is a 
valid concern, but claim that the correct choice of (utility) discount rate in 
the PV calculation is one way of taking care of it (Beckerman 1994, p199). 
This does happen in some special cases of models with exponential technical 
progress in this chapter, where the PV-optimal path is sustained as long as 
the discount rate is low enough. In other models with sub-exponential or 
zero technical progress, however, for any positive discount rate the PV- 
optimal path declines to a level of misery, even though unbounded utility 
growth is feasible. Such an outcome runs contrary to many, maybe most, 
people's notions of intergenerational equity. The PV-optimalist response 
would probably be that technical progress will never be subexponential, but 
this is an empirical belief that many do not share. 
A related PV-optimalist criticism is that an NDU policy does not respect 
individual preferences, whereas PV-optimality does, since individuals do 
generally discount the future. How can it be logical for individuals (say) to 
have a utility discount rate which causes an unsustained PV-optimal path, 
and yet vote for a government which enacts policies which effectively lower 
this discount rate? ' Why do they not instead change their personal discount 
9. In this we assume that environmental policy has already internalised the 
resource) s social amenity value, but that the resulting utility path is unsustained. 
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rate to achieve individual sustainedness? Similar questions arise with a 
maximin criterion, although they remain largely unaddressed in the 
literature. 
One answer is to assume that "the Economic Man and the Citizen are for 
all intents and purposes two different individuals" (Marglin 1963, p98), Le. 
that individual and social preferences are simply separate. A more 
satisfying answer would follow from Conjecture 2.1 in Section 2.3.2 below. 
This is based on both intuition and special cases of cake-eating economies 
there and in Chapter 4, and speculates that whenever there are externalities 
from cumulative resource depletion in the economy, and when the socially 
PV-optimal path is unsustained, SD is partly a collective good. That is, 
because of the harmful effect of total resource depletion on an individual 
agent's utility, it will cost her more PV to achieve SD through her 
individual resource conservation effort (assuming that no one else makes any 
effort to achieve SD) than the PV cost to her of a collective SD policy. We 
refer to this later as the cost of individual SD being greater than the cost of 
social SD. 
Two further supposed drawbacks of an NDU constraint turn out to be 
illusory, provided that the economy is 'productive' as defined by Asheim 
(1991, pp. 357-8). This essentially means that an SD path exists, and that 
one can always transform an unsustained path into an SD one by saving 
before any time of declining utility, and transferring the saving to the later 
time to 'iron out' the decline. Consider Figure 2.2, which plots alternative 
feasible paths of utility over time, none of which are necessarily optimal in 
any way. It might seem that an NDU constraint would choose the non- 
declining path PI in preference to the everywhere- superior, but partly- 
declining path P2. But if the economy is productive, one can modify P2 by 
following some constant utility segment such as the dashed line abc (by 
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saving between a and b and dissaving between b and c) without changing 
the rest of the path. PV-optimal SD would then prefer the modified path 
PT to PI, thus avoiding a clearly inferior choice of development path. 
A similarly mistaken argument is that NDU would prefer PT to the 
initially-declining path P3 (which represents some initial investment phase 
which is highly productive later on), even though P3 might have much 
higher PV than PT. Again, if the economy is productive, a constant utility 
segment de must be feasible which 'irons out' the dip at the start of P3 to 
produce the sustained alternative P3' with (say) much higher PV than 
P2 f. 10 
The only genuine drawbacks of an NDU constraint are firstly, that it will 
of course reduce PV if it is binding. Indeed, one could define a (social) 
cost of SD in this case as PV(P3) - PV(P3'), 11 and choose the SD path P3' 
in preference to P3 only if this cost is outweighed by some finite value of 
SD arising from the fact that P3' has NDU. It would therefore be helpful 
to find out more about the PV cost of SD, but unfortunately it can be 
calculated only in the first special case of the cake-eating model. Secondly, 
NDU may also force a drop to a lower initial utility level (shown by the 
drop from f on P3 to d on P3' in Figure 2.2). This matters in a more 
realistic model of policy-making where, as discussed in Section 2.5, an 
initial utility level is inherited from history, and where rapid utility declines 
below this level cause adjustment costs. 
10.1 thank Geir Asheim for pointing this out to me. 
11. It is only a cost of SD, because a natural definition of the cost would be 
PV(U) - PV(ýft), where 
Ut is the opsustimal path. This cost would be the Lagrange 
multiplier associated with the NDU constraint, but we will see in Section 2.3 that this 
cannot be calculated using general optimal control techniques. 
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Two types of alternatives to NDU exist as criteria of SD. The first type 
still treats SD as a side constraint on PV-optimality, but changes the variable 
that must be non-declining over time t from utility U(t) to one of the 
following: PVffl), the maximum PV available from time t onwards (this 
might allow P3 to be judged both sustained and better than P3'); PVt(ff')7 
the PV of the opsustimal path from t onwards; or just Ut, the maximum 
constant utility level attainable from t onwards (whether or not measured on 
a PV-optimal path). " Or, one could look for the maximin of these 
variables, rather than just require that they are non-declining. 13 
The second type of alternative criteria follows the suggestion of Broome 
(1992, p40) and extends the present value calculation to include some finite 
weight for intergenerational equity, thus creating a more general form of 
intergenerational. social welfare function (ISWF). " The simplest option 
would be to follow the previous paragraph but one and add a discrete 'value 
of SD' into the PV integral; or one could add in a continuous function of the 
equality of utility among different times; or one could add some constant 
multiplied by the asymptotic utility level, as suggested by Beltratti, 
12. As noted in Chapter 1, Riley (1980) investigated some of the properties of a 
non-declining PV(O criterion, under fairly restrictive technological assumptions. 
Non-declining U, ' is the 'resourcist' criterion in Bishop and Woodward (1994), who 
focused on the opportunity set bequeathed to the future, rather than the level of 
welfare achieved, which can be affected by changes in the efficiency of resource use 
as well as in opportunity. In my models below the level of efficiency is unchanging. 
13. The maximin PV path, which maximises min,,, [ jwU(x)e`dx)1, was S 
investigated in great detail (in its discrete time version min, ý2jEj'=sUj/(l+6)'-s]) by 
Asheim (1988). He showed that it allows for initial utility growth when investment 
is very productive, thus avoiding the maximin 'poverty trap' mentioned above. 
14. See also the discussion of ISWFs in Toman, Pezzey and Krautkraemer (1995, 
forthcoming). 
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Chichilnisky and Heal (1993); or one could abandon discounting in the PV 
integral altogether, and substitute inequality aversion as the intertemporal 
weighting factor, as in a novel approach by Collard (1994). Any of these 
options would tend to modify the PV-optimal utility path to one with less 
tendency to decline in the long run. For the sake of political reality alone 
there is much to be said in favour of these 'weighing' or 'valuing' criteria 
of intergenerational equity. But the technical properties of all the above 
alternative criteria are complex and, apart from in the papers noted here, 
mostly remain for further research. Any final choice between them will 
certainly be helped by knowing more about of the basic NDU criterion, 
which is our purpose here. 
2.3 CAKE-EATING PLUS TECHNICAL PROGRESS 
2.3.1 The general cake-eating model: comparison of SD and 
environmental policies 
A slight generalisation of Krautkraemer's first model is as follows. For 
the moment, the analysis is from the viewpoint of society as a whole, but 
when we come to analyse the policy path later we will also take the 
viewpoint of one of the millions of identical agents that comprise society. 
The social problem is: 
00 
MAX fo e`U[C(t), S(t)]dt =: PV, the present discounted (2.1) 
{R(t)j value of utility, where 6>0 
is the utility discount rate 
subj ect to: 
Qt) = A(t)R(t) = -A(t)ý(t); 
ýffl>O, all t; (2.2) 
S(O) = So > 0; R(t), S(t) ýý 0, all t; (2.3) 
where U, C, R and S are instantaneous utility, consumption, resource 
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(depletion) flow and resource stock respectively. A(t) is an exogenous 
technical productivity factor (=e' in Krautkraemer) and we assume by 
suitable choice of units that A(O)=l. " The arguments in the utility 
function U(C, S) respectively capture the materialistic value of consumption, 
and the amenity value of the 'environment', i. e. the total resource stock. 
U is assumed to be strictly increasing, strictly concave and twice 
differentiable in both of its arguments, with the marginal amenity value 
rising as consumption rises, and the marginal utility of consumption being 
unbounded as consumption falls to zero, i. e. 
Uc>O and UCC<O; Us>O and USS<O; Ucs>O; (2.4) 
and Uc ---> oo as C --> 0. (2.5) 
Ucs >0 in (2.4) means that, as in Krautkraemer, a higher standard of 
living increases the marginal valuation of the environment. The solution of 
(2.1)-(2.5), fully characterised in Krautkraemer for A= e", is the socially 
PV-optimal path U(t). The path that also satisfies the NDU (i. e. SD, i. e. 
sustainedness) constraint 
0(t) 
-ý CUc - RUs = (ýUc - 
(CIA)Us *: ý! 0, for all t (2.6) 
is the opsustimal (PV-optimal sustained) path W(t). A constant consumption 
(C > 0, (ý = 0) path is shown later to be not PV-optimal. Nor is it sustained, 
by (2.4) and (2.6). Strictly rising consumption is necessary for SD, both 
here and in the capital-resource economies considered in Section 2.4. 
Can the constraint (2.6) give useful results when added to the usual 
optimal control framework? The undiscounted Hamiltonian of (2.1)-(2.6) 
15. We do not consider A0 (no technical progress) here because pure cake-eating 
is unsustainable; but we do consider it in Section 2.4, because pure capital-resource 
substitution can be sustainable. 
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is 
H= U(C, S) - 7rs(t)R + 
ýýRWR + Xs(t) S+X u(t) 
0 
which from (2.2) is 
H= U(C, S) - 
[7rS(t) - XRICIA + XsS + Xu(t)[(ýUc-(C1A)Usl 
where rs(t) is the undiscounted shadow price of the resource stock in terms 
of utility and ýýRý Xs and Xu are Lagrange multipliers belonging to the non- 
negativity constraints (Chiang 1992, p279). Using the maximum principle, 
the first order and complementary slackness conditions are respectively 
alllaC = 05 alllaS 7rs +6 7rs 
and 
XR, Xs, Xu-: 2: 0, XRR, XsS, XuO = 0. 
As in Krautkraemer, the fact (from (2.5)) that the marginal utility of 
consumption is unbounded as consumption approaches zero means that PV- 
optimal R and S must be strictly positive. But there is no similar marginal 
condition to prevent the SD constraint binding (0=0), so we cannot ignore 
Xu in deriving the first order conditions for the PV-optimal path, which are 
Uc - -xslA + Xu[lýUcc-(Us+CUcs)1A] =0 (2.7) 
Us + Xj(ýUcs -(CIA)Uss] 7rs + 67rs (2.8) 
The next step would normally be to differentiate (2.7) with respect to 
time and then substitute for rs from (2.8), but this leads to impenetrable 
algebra involving third derivatives when Xu>O. In any case, the solution 
will be different when Xu=O, so the complete solution path will generally 
have distinct phases. This severely limits our ability to describe the 
opsustimal path, except when exact solutions are available in steady state 
cases, and we have to adopt a more ad hoc approach. We drop SD as a 
formal constraint with a characterisable Lagrange multiplier, and instead 
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study what interventions (if any) are both feasible and necessary to make U 
zero, when otherwise it would be negative. From (2.7) and (2-8), the 
socially PV-optimal growth rate of consumption can be shown (see 
Appendix 2.1) to be a slight variant on Krautkraemer's equation (10): 
C= [A1A-6+(Us-CUcs)1UcA1C1-q(Q (2.9) 
where -q(Q=-CUcc1Uc is the elasticity of the marginal utility of 
consumption. From his Lemma Al, with -xs= UcA, the transversality 
condition is 
liml, 3ý) (ÜcA e -'(S) = (2.10) 
The corresponding utility path, here and later, is derived from inserting the 
consumption path (here (2.9)) into (2.6): 
U= [(AIA-6)Uc + UsIA - (CUcs+-qUs)IA]CI-q(C) (2.11) 
The UsIA term is isolated in (2.11) to aid comparison with later variants of 
this equation, and it shows that if Us > CUcs + -q Us for all C and S, then the 
existence of the resource amenity improves the sustainedness of the PV- 
optimal path. " By this we simply mean that there is a positive impact 
effect on the expression for the rate of change of utility; and to worsen 
sustainedness means to have a negative impact effect on the expression for 
the rate of change of utility. An 'improvement in sustainedness' is thus a 
useful but slightly deceptive shorthand, since it tends to suggest that some 
measure of the overall sustainedness of a path is increased. But (2.6) 
defines sustainedness only as a discrete condition, not as a continuous 
number. One could perhaps say that the sustainedness of any U(t) path is 
16. Note that this is a stricter condition than Krautkraemer's Us> CUcs condition 
for the resource amenity to lead to higher PV-optimal consumption growth; the extra 
Us term represents the direct effect on utility of a degrading environment. 
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c 
improved if an integral like f[min(U, O)]dt is increased for all t, but I have 0 
not investigated any such formal measure. So we know little about what an 
'improvement' in sustainedness means for 0 at any particular time. We do 
not even know that the initial level of 0 is lower on an 'improved' path. 
This is because the improvement in sustainedness may be the result of a 
policy which converts a non-PV-optimal path into a PV-optimal one which 
may strictly dominate the former at all times. 
Assuming that Us > CUcs + -q Us, (2.11) shows that technical productivity 
A has an ambiguous influence on sustainedness. An increase in the rate of 
progress 4/A improves sustainedness by making people want to defer 
consumption to the future, but a higher level of productivity A worsens 
sustainedness by reducing the resource flow needed for a given consumption 
level, and hence reducing the amenity motive for conserving resources. 
We now calculate the policy path of the economy, where we consider the 
economy from the viewpoint of the private, PV-maximising agent, as 
influenced by government policy. We assume that, in a market economy, 
policymakers can influence private agents' consumption and resource 
depletion only by fiscal incentives, rather than by direct regulatory control. 
Given the immortal, representative person format here, it is impossible to 
model the intergenerational asset transfers suggested by Howarth and 
Norgaard (1992). However, since future generations have little legal status, 
one could argue that such transfers usually amount to fiscal or regulatory 
control of the current generation's consumption and resource depletion 
anyway. The most obvious incentives are: 
I 
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0a revenue-neutral consumption tax (or 'fee') charged at a rate of 
ý5c(t) (which, since C=AR, has the same potential as a resource 
depletion tax); 
0a revenue-neutral resource stock tax charged at a specific rate OAt), 
which we expect to be negative, representing a subsidy. (Since a 
stock is usually harder to measure economically than a flow, Os is 
probably the less practical instrument of the two. ) 
Since the rate of technical progress is assumed to be exogenous, we cannot 
model policies to increase it, but if such policies did exist, their likely 
benefit will be evident in what follows. Revenue-neutrality with Oc and q5s 
is achieved by lump sum rebates 0. If the incentive is a subsidy, 0 is a 
lump sum tax, which would pose severe political problems in the real world 
where people are far from economically identical, as the recent British 
experience of lump-sum local taxation (the 'poll tax') has shown. 
The PV-optimality problem of a private agent with an initial resource 




MAX e-ötu[c(t), S(t)]dt s. t. 




where u, s, c (= -As) and co are respectively per capita utility, resource 
stock, consumption, resource depletion and lump sum rebate. Each agent 
externalises the impact of her resource depletion on the total resource stock 
S (and hence on its amenity value us) when computing her utility, but treats 
her private resource stock s as under her control when computing her budget 
constraint. For brevity's sake we can represent the amenity externality 
simply by using the society-level variables U, C and S in the undiscounted 
Hamiltonian 
H= U(C, S)-7rs(t)[C(1+(ýc)IA+4)sS-01 
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and omitting any terms in Us which would normally appear. We then do 
not need to consider the individual as such any further: a privately PV- 
optimal resource depletion path will satisfy the first order conditions: 
alllaC = Uc-7rs(l +oc)IA =0 
alllaS 7rs + 6-7r, 7rSOS 
(2.12) 
(2.13) 
By taking the time derivative of (2.12) and substituting from (2.13), it can 
be shown (see Appendix 2.2) that consumption and utility on the path 
followed by an agent maximising her PV in response to policies Oc(t), (ýs(t) 
are: 
A^AA 
C= [A1A-6+(b-CUCS1UcA]C1-q (2.14) 
AAAAA 
and U= [(AIA-6+(D)Uc-(CUcs+-qUs)IA]CI-q, (2.15) 
where (b(t) := -ýClo+oc)-os (2.16) 
measures the effective overall strength of policy intervention at any time. 
(2.14) and (2.15) reduce to the free market solution if there is no policy 
intervention ((b = 
bt = [, 41A - 6- C" Ul' / UM] C"I-q cs (2.17) 
Oiu = [(AIA -6)UPc-(C"UPcs+-qUts')IA]C"Iq (2.18) 
Examining first the free market solution, from (2.4) the - (O'Ucý's + -q Us") 
term in (2.18) is negative. So whenever the technical progress rate A/A 
falls below the discount rate 6 (which is eventually bound to happen if 
progress is less than exponential), the private outcome is unsustained. The 
converse is not necessarily true, though. Another feature of (2.18) is worth 
highlighting as: 
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REMARK 2.1: The more highly the environment is valued, the worse 
sustainedness will be on the free market path of development. 
By this we simply mean that the larger are the alaS terms in (2.18), the 
more negative the utility increase will be, other things being equal. As 
noted above, this is a somewhat vague result. Other things are not equal, 
and other endogenous variables in (2.18) will be affected by any change in 
the alaS terms, so that 6u may not decrease at every point in time. I have 
not investigated what happens to any formal, continuous measure of the 
sustainedness of the overall development path. However, it is interesting to 
observe that environmental concern in (2.18) worsens sustainedness for two 
distinct reasons. The - C" U`4 term (<0, by assumption) shows the 'active' CS 
(or what might be called the 'live now, pay later') effect. Because agents 
value consumption more highly when the non-renewable 'environment' S is 
less degraded, they shift their consumption and hence resource depletion 
towards the present, making the future even worse by comparison. The 
--qUýs' term shows the 'passive' effect that resource depletion inevitably 
reduces each agent's amenity value. 
Comparing (2.18) and (2.11) shows that the environmental policy adds 
UsCIA-q (> 0) to 0, and thus improves sustainedness. This is also worth 
highlighting as: 
REMARK 2.2: An environmental policy in a market economy with non- 
renewable resource amenity value will 'improve sustainedness' (so if thefree 
market path is sustained, the socially PV-optimal one certainly is); and may 
achieve a sustained path as a side-effect, but this is not guaranteed. A 
socially PV-optimal path may be unsustained, in which case additional 






Comparing the socially PV-optimal and policy paths (2.11) and (2.15) 
shows that the required environmental policy must at all times be 
UsIAUc >0 
So the environmental policy often ends up involving subsidies, with the 
associated financing problems in practice already noted above. If the sole 
policy instrument is a resource stock 'tax', this is always true (since ý7c=O 
4)s < 0, i. e. a stock subsidy). A similar result holds if the sole tax is on 
consumption, but for this we first need: 
LEMMA 2.1: If - ý/(I + 0) is always positive and bounded away from 
zero, then limt--acOO = -1. 
PROOF: The subsidy rate has to be less than 100% at any one time, i. e. 
0>-1, or else an individual's desired consumption would be unbounded. 
This in turn means that ý<0, to get the right sign of - 0/(l + 0). So 
limt->coO =-l+z for some finite zýý! O, and lirn,, (,. 
ý= O. But then 
and is positive by assumption. 
Therefore, z cannot be non-zero. 
A 
Applying this to a consumption tax Oc on its own (i. e. with Os=O), if 
lim, 
00 
UsIA Uc = 0, the tax must approach a constant value (possibly, but not 
necessarily negative); whereas if lim, UsIA Uc > 0, the tax must approach 
-1ýi. e. approach a 100 % subsidy on consumption. 
;I 
An SD policy (bt(t) will be any policy which attains U ý!! 0 for all t. 
must be substantive (i. e. not zero all the time) when the free market path is 
declining (Ul' < 0), so it overlaps with the environmental policy as noted in 
;I 
Remark 2.2. To achieve Uý!! O with minimum loss of PV, the opsustimal 
policy 4P must be non-zero only when utility is constant: 
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AAAA 
4)t = -Ztt It ) cl(l +; 
ýf 
c6 AIA + (CU + -q Us)l UcA if U= 0; s cs 
0 otherwise. 
However, the implicit nature of the first equation (U and C are 
themselves functions of 41)t) makes it hard to deduce the general properties 
of any SD policy, let alone the opsustimal one. For example, to address 
one of Krautkraemer's concerns, there is no general result that an SD 
constraint causes permanent preservation of a positive amount of the 
resource bounded away from zero. We now consider two special cases of 
cake-eating economies which illustrate different aspects of the above results. 
2.3.2 Special Case 1: A multiplicative utility function and exponential 
technical progress 
We assume a multiplicative utility function and exponential technical 
progress: 
U(Cl S) = CVS'E and A(t) = e" 
where 0<P, E, P+c- <1 and 6> -rv. 
U(. ) here satisfies the marginal conditions (2.4) and (2.5). Since a larger 
E means that the resource has more amenity value, E will be called the 
g environmental concern'. The restriction P+ c- <1 stops it being PV-optimal 
to consume all the resource stock at time zero. The restriction 6> -rP 
ensures that a PV-optimal path exists (if 6< -rP, delaying consumption to the 
future at any time increases PV). Insertion of (2.19) into (2.9) and 
manipulating can be shown (see Appendix 2.3) to give the socially PV- 
optimal consumption path: 
[-T-6+E(1-v)C1PSe"IC, (2.20) 
hence T-6-E(l-v)kPS- (2.21) 
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The only solution of this which satisfies the initial condition (2.3) is 
S(t) = Soe-o' where 0 (2.22) 
At first it might seem odd that solving the second-order equation (2.21) did 
not produce two unknown constants of integration (0 and one other), which 
were then determined using the terminal (i. e. transversality) condition (2.10) 
as well as the initial condition. But C=O is technically a solution of (2.20), 
which accounts for the missing degree of freedom. We can also check that 
(2.10) does hold, for the growth rate of Uce(7- 
- 
B)ýS_ is 
[(P - 1)(r - 0) - (c- + 1)0 + 7- - 6] t= (-rv - 6)tl(l - P) <0 from (2.19). This is 
sufficient to establish the optimality of the solution path (2.22) (Leonard and 
Van Long 1992, pp 288-9). From (2.22) and (2.19) the utility path is then 
U(t) = ff(O) e (2.23) 
so the socially PV-optimal path is either sustained (if -r ý!! 6) or always 
declining (if -r < 6). An SD policy will thus be needed either never, or 
always. However, this simple dichotomy is clearly a special feature of this 
case; as is the fact that sustainedness is unaffected by the environmental 
concern c- , which stems 
from the coincidence that Us = CUcs + -q Us here. 
From (2.18), the free market path has a utility growth rate 
U/U = (2.24) 
and so is sustained if -r > 6(l + c-/P). In accordance with Remark 2.2, this is 
a more stringent condition for SD than -r >6 for the socially PV-optimal 
path. There are thus three possible outcomes for the overlap of 
environmental and SD policies in Special Case 1: 
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(i) If &! ýýTl(l+c-lv), 011ýý! O, i. e. the free market path is sustained, so no 
SD policy is required per se. 
If 7"/(l + C-/V) < 6:! Eý 7", then 014 <0 but U ý!! 0, so environmental policy 
intervention will at the same time make the economy sustained. 
If 6> -r, both 01" <0 and 0, so environmental policy is not strong 
enough to achieve SD; the latter requires a stronger policy incentive, 
which can be justified only by some more egalitarian ethic of 
intergenerational equity than PV-optimality. Or, if one wished, one 
could regard -r as the maximum ethically permitted level of the 
utility discount rate. 
Note also: (i) a(OL'/ Ul")IaE =- (6 - -rp)l(l -v- E)' < 0, illustrating Remark 
2.1 that a stronger environmental concern makes the free market solution 
'less sustained'. (ii) The above results are consistent with the overlapping 
generations results of Mourmouras (1993, p255) who effectively assumes 
c-=O. Such consistency suggests that not too much is lost by using the 
representative person framework in this paper. 
The actual enviromnental or SD policies in this case are two constant 
levels of (1) Ocl(I+oc)-(ýs. One, the environmental policy (f, makes the 
resource depletion rate equal to 0; the other, the SD policy V, makes utility 
constant. Both can be computed by letting the resource depletion rate in 
response to a general (D be an unknown ý((D), and then noting that 
S= Soe-ýt =: > C= ýSoe(-'-O)t =* U= iVSO"e 
[P(T- ý) - EO]t 
. 
The general policy path (2.14) then gives 
e1C = (-Eý+-r-6+4))l(l -P) = -r-ý from (2.25) 
- (t5--TP)/(l-v-¬). 
From (2.22), the environmental policy defined by ý(4f) =0 is 
(2.25) 
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(P = c-(b - 7-P)/(v + c-)(1 - v) > 0, (2.26) 
and from (2.25) an appropriate SD policy (assuming 6> -r so that one is 
necessary) is defined by always, whence 
-rPI(P+E) >0 =* ý(V) = -rPI(P+E) =: K, say. (2.27) 
This V can also be shown (see Appendix 2.4) to be the opsustimal policy 
in this case. From (2.26) and (2.27), both environmental and SD 
policies must be stronger when the utility discount rate 6 or the amenity 
value c- increases, or when technical progress -r decreases. And since 
ý(4P) < ý(4$) if 6> -r, we then have ý(O) < ýý(O), so that correcting 
unsustainedness does require a reduction in initial utility, as anticipated in 
Section 2.2. 
Still assuming 6> -r, it is possible to compute directly from (2.1) the per 
capita PV costs of social sustainedness (where everyone acts together to 
reach W) and of individual sustainedness. The latter is the PV that an agent 
would forgo (compared to the social maximum PV) if she were to achieve 
sustainedness while all other agents deplete their resource stocks at the 
socially PV-optimal rate 0. To do this she would deplete her stock at rate 
ý such that her utility is constant. From (2.19), this means that ý=T-C-01P, 
which is feasible as long as T> c-0/P (=: ý -r > 6/ [1 + P(l - P)/c-]), which it may 
well not be. (In saying that "individuals clearly cannot provide for the 
climate of their offspring acting individually", Howarth and Norgaard 1992 
have in mind a case where individual sustainedness is infeasible. ) If 
-r > eO/P, the PV of the individually sustained path is strictly less than the PV 
of the socially Oust) sustained path because ý<K= ý(V) (see Appendix 2.5); 
so the cost of individual sustainedness is more than the cost of social 
sustainedness. This leads to an important general conjecture, which I think 
almost every proponent of SD policy makes: 
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CONJECTURE 2.1: In an economy with cumulative, irreversible 
externalities, social sustainedness costs less than individual sustainedness 
(which may be infeasible), so collective action to achieve SD might be 
justified on standard cost-benefit grounds. 
If each individual values her own sustainedness by an amount 
commensurate with PV and lying between the per capita costs of social and 
individual sustainedness, then she will not act alone to achieve 
sustainedness, because she would lose. PV; but a collective sustainedness 
policy would increase everyone's PV. But if individual sustainedness is 
feasible and is valued more highly than its cost, individuals will take action 
to achieve sustainedness anyway, and policy intervention is unnecessary. 
The same conjecture is made in Chapter 4, where we consider the 
externalities that arise from intergenerational bequests in a world with 
different sexes. 
2.3.3 Special Case 2: An additive utility function and quadratic 
technical Progress 
This case illustrates the implication in (2.11) that a sub-exponential rate 
of technical progress can result in unsustainedness, and that SD policy 
intervention to counteract this may not be needed all the time. The utility 
and technical progress functions are: 
U= PlogC + ElogS, and A= (1 + -rt)' (2.28) 
where P, E>0 and -r > 0. 
17. Although U=vlogC+c-logS is only a monotonic transformation of U=CIISE, the 
utility function in Special Case 1, it does make a difference since dynamic utility 
maximisation assumes the intertemporal comparability of utility at each time. 
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Substituting this into (2.9) and using the initial condition'9(0) = So can be 
shown (see Appendix 2-6) to give the unique socially PV-optimal path 
S (2.29) 
2plog(l + -Tt) - 6pt + constant 
The same remarks about not needing to use the transversality condition 
to find the unique solution apply here as in Section 2.3.2; and the 
transversality condition does hold, since UcAe-'ýS- = e-"(P+c-)16 --> 0 as 
t --> co. Note from (2.29) that the socially PV-optimal path is always 
unsustained, since U= [2-rl(l+-rt)-6]p = (AIA-b)p, which eventually 
becomes negative even if 2-r >6 so that utility is initially rising. The root 
cause of unsustainedness here is clearly the failure of the technical progress 
rate A/A, the incentive to conserve the resource, to keep ahead of the 
constant utility discount rate 6, the incentive to consume it now. 
From (2.14), if 4) =-ý cl(l + Oc) - Os is constant, the policy path can be 
shown (see Appendix 2.6) to be: 
, Aý 
S Se-(-)' (2.30) 
A U 2plog(l + -Tt) - (v+E)(6-(b)t + constant 
On the free market path (i. e. with policy strength 4b = 0), utility growth 
Oýt = [2-rl(l + -rt) - 6] v- 6E falls over time, again giving a decay from a rising 
path (if 2-r > 6(1 +E/P)) to an eventually declining one. The extra -6E term 
makes utility growth lower on the free market than on the socially optimal 
path, in accordance with Remark 2.2. Comparing (2.29) and (2.30) shows 
that environmental policy in this model is (f = 6/(1 + vlc-), which has to 
become stronger as either the utility discount rate 6 or environmental 
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concern c- rises. 
As for sustained paths, a maximum, constant, positive utility path does 
exist and can be shown (see Appendix 2.7), by directly differentiating 
(2.28), to be: 
sm 
0= 
SO(1+7-t)-v1(P+E) (no longer an exponential decline) 
Umo = (P + E)IOgSo + PlOg[P/(P + C-)] 9 
There is no simple expression for a general constant utility policy here, 
since for S in (2.30) to have the same time dependence as YO', (D could not 
A 
be constant, but that would invalidate the derivation of S. If 2-r > 6(1 + c-/P) 
so that the free market path is initially rising, the PV-optimal SD 
(opsustimal) policy will have two distinct phases, attaining constant utility 
only after some finite period of rising utility. If 
2-T:!! 
-ý 
6(1 + E/ v), the 
opsustimal path will be (2.31), and one might hope to be able to compute 
the cost of sustainedness 
f "O(U- MO)e-"dt. Unfortunately we cannot 
01 
because f [2plog(l + -rt) -6vt+ Plog5]e-'tdt has a log(I +7-t) term in it. 0 
2.4 CAPITAL-RESOURCE SUBSTITUTION 
In a cake-eating economy, there is no difference between choosing to 
consume rather than save and invest, and choosing to deplete the resource 
rather than conserve it. In a productive economy, where accumulated 
capital or technical progress can be substituted for the resource as an input 
to production, these two choices are distinct. Consumption taxes and 
resource taxes therefore have different roles as SD policies, with the 
potential of the latter being severely limited by the finiteness of the non- 
renewable resource, as we shall see. Section 2.4.1 analyses SD and 
environmental policies in a general economy with a resource amenity, 
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capital-resource substitution and exogenous Hicks-neutral technical progress 
(we model no other type of technical progress here). Section 2.4.2 further 
assumes Cobb-Douglas utility and production functions, and derives an exact 
solution for the steady state. In all the models in this section, there is no 
explicit capital market, so that saving is automatically assumed to be 
invested. 
2.4.1 The general model 
The model is as set out in Section 2.3.1, except that a capital stock K(t) 
and production function F(K, R) now enter the relationship between 
consumption C and resource depletion R: 
C(t) = A(t)F(K, R) -k where 
K(O) = Ko >0 and K -:: -ý 0 for all t. 
(2.32) 
The production function F(K, R) is assumed to have diminishing returns to 
each of its separate inputs, and to be twice continuously differentiable and 
linearly homogeneous. " It can therefore be written in the intensive form 
F(K, R) =Rf (x), where x =KIR is the capital/resource input ratio. In addition 
we make the crucial, pessimistic assumption that the marginal productivity 
of capital is ultimately less than the utility discount rate: 
lim,. F x-(-f 
'(x) (2.33) 
As we shall see, this may cause the PV-optimal paths to be unsustained, 
depending on the technical progress rate 4/A. The resource is assumed to 
be 'optimally essential' in the sense of Dasgupta and Heal (1974, p15ý 
18. As discussed in Chapter 3, assuming constant returns in just K and R, as 
opposed to in K, R and labour L, is mathematically important but physically 
questionable. The special case below shows that assuming diminishing returns instead 
may result in environmental policy having a different effect on the interest rate. 
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footnote), in that either F(K, 0) =0 or limR--, OFR= oo, so that R>0 always on 
a PV-optimal path. " We adopt the same ad hoc technique as in Section 
2.3 and do not attempt to include the SD constraint (2.6) in the formal 
optimisation. The equivalents of Krautkraemer's equations (2.20) and (2.21) 
for an interior solution of the socially PV-optimal path can be shown (see 
Appendix 2.8) to be (2.34), effectively the Ramsey rule for socially PV- 
optimal saving, which with (2.6) gives the utility path (2.35); and (2.36), 
effectively the Hotelling rule for Pareto-optimal resource depletion: 
Cl C= (Af '- 5 -R UCS1 Uc)l-q where ff '(x), etc; 
hence U= [(Af'-b)UcC-R(CUcs+-qUs)ll-q 




where a is the elasticity of substitution between capital and resource inputs. 
The socially PV-optimal path is then determined by equations (2.34) and 
(2.36), the transversality condition, and the initial stocks of capital and 
resource. Note that there is no Us term in (2.34). Concern for conserving 
the social resource amenity (as opposed to the 'live now, pay later' Ucs 
effect of declining resource amenity on consumption) enters through the 
Hotelling (ýIx) equation for optimal resource depletion, and then only in the 
19. The essentiality of consumption follows from (2.5). Krautkraemer implicitly 
assumes resource essentiality when he looks (p159) for an interior solution. 
20. An intermediate version of this is that 1ýR=FFR- Usl Uc on an efficient resource 
depletion path. Using this it can be shown (see Appendix 2.9) that if there is no 
technical progress and the amenity value of the resource is internalised into the 
competitive resource price FR, the form of Hartwick's rule is unchanged in this 
economy, i. e investing resource rents (k=RFR) results in constant utility forever. 
Intuitively, if the resource is correctly priced, k=RFR means zero aggregate 
investment, which maintains constant aggregate wealth and hence constant utility in 
the absence of technical progress. 
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socially PV-optimal case. This also means that the Us (as opposed to 'q Us) 
term that was in the cake-eating utility equation (2.11) is no longer present. 
In the capital-resource model, technical progress (, 4 > 0) therefore plays an 
indispensable role in making the socially PV-optimal path sustained: 
PROPOSITION 2.1: In the capital-resource substitution model with no 
technical progress, the socially PV-optimal path is unsustained. 
PROOF: 
From Krautkraemer's Lemma A3, limt--..,, 
Ox= oo on the socially 
PV-optimal 
path. So if productivity A is constant (= 1), from (2.33) the first term and 
hence the whole right hand side of (2.35) is asymptotically negative, 
resulting in permanently declining utility after a finite time. (This is untrue 
if there is technical progress, since then Af' may stay greater than 6. ) 
Policy instruments considered are specific taxes 4)c(t) on consumption and 
Os(t) on the resource stock as before, and now also taxesOR(t) on resource 
depletion and 4)K(t) on the capital stock. It can be shown (see Appendix 
2.10) that these give the following equations for the paths of consumption, 
utility and the capital/resource ratio: 
;, &A 
Cl C --ý:: Of 6+ (')C- OK-RUcsIUc)l-q 
A /, AAAAA 
U= [(Af'-b+(Dc-OK)UcC-R(CUcs+-qUs)]I-q 
,ý&^AAAAA 
XIX = [A _ (AIA+o K 
)If ']Orf IX - (DXIX2(_f it) 
where ff '(x), etc, 
A 





Similarly to the socially PV-optimal case, (2.37), (2-39), the transversality 
condition and the initial stocks then determine the path. 
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Comparison of (2.34) and (2.36) with (2.37) and (2.39) respectively 
shows that an environmental policy will always be needed, and 
4tC-OK =0 and (D,, = Usl UcA >0 
form the required policy. While a non-zero capital tax 
ýK is technically 
consistent with this, it is hardly worth introducing it only to cancel it with 
a non-zero o$ýc. So in the capital-resource substitution model, regardless of 
whether or not there is technical progress, either a positive but decreasing 
resource depletion tax, or a resource stock subsidy, or a combination of the 
two, form the appropriate enviromnental policy; while consumption and 
capital taxes play no part in it (i. e., 4$ýC = 
ýK 
=: 0) ' 
The impact effect of (Dx >0 is to make x rise more slowly. Since 
f" (x) < 0, this suggests that environmental policy raises the interest rate 
f'(x) and (from (2.38)) also the rate of change of utility. However, this is 
not guaranteed because other terms in (2.37) and (2.39) will also be affected 
by the policy (D, And we see below that environmental policy can lower 
the interest rate if there are diminishing rather than constant returns to K and 
R. 
As for SD policies, SD will not be achieved without adequate levels of 
saving and investment. This has long been recognised in the theoretical 
literature on Hartwick's rule (and recently stressed by Solow 1993), and 
recent empirical work such as Pearce and Atkinson (1993) shows how 
variations in savings rates are important in explaining international variations 
in sustainedness. But neither type of literature has studied how policies can 
achieve the required levels of saving in market economies; Solow (p171) 
merely says that the "concrete translation of sustainability into policy leaves 
a lot of questions unanswered. " Some of these questions can be addressed 
by the above models, where there is a sharp contrast between the power of 
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resource taxes and the power of a consumption or capital tax. 
The effect of resource taxes on sustainedness is indirect and ambiguous, 
since the taxes act through both the interest rate f'(KIR) and the resource 
flow R and stock S. At any given time, to encourage more saving, the 
interest rate needs to be raised, which means (for any given capital stock) 
increasing the resource flow. But to reduce the harmful effect on utility 
growth of the amenity-related term -R(CUcs + 77 Us), resource flow needs to 
be decreased and the stock increased. This gives the intuition behind: 
PROPOSITION 2.2: In the capital-resource substitution model with no 
technical progress, resource taxes cannot achieve SD. 
PROOF: 
By (2.38), if the technical productivity factor A is constant, the only way 
that resource taxesORor Os might achieve SD is by keeping x bounded such 
that Af'(x) > 5. But since the resource is finite and non-renewable, 
limt--*ooR=O. Bounded x (=KIR) then means that limtOOK = lim, >O. 
F = 
limt--ý-ooC = 0. But limt-->ooC =0 contradicts the deduction from (2.6) that 
consumption must rise on a sustained path. 
This insufficiency of resource taxes to achieve SD is a noteworthy result 
(although, because they can achieve social PV-optimality, such taxes are 
probably necessary to achieve SD at minimum cost). In contrast, because 
a consumption or capital tax acts directly on the consumption- saving 
decision, even if A is constant, it is always theoretically possible to find 
'; I such taxes such that U=O, namely: 
A AA AAAA 
tt= R(CUcs+-qUs)lUcC +6- Af T/O +OCT) - OK C 
which from (2.38) will achieve constant utility. But, with constant A and 
hence limt--). c)oAf < 
6, C/ -0ý 
(1+0Ct')-OKtMUst be asymptotically positive, so 
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either 0ý must again (by Lernma 2.1) approach a 100 % subsidy, or (ýK must C 
become a capital subsidy. Either subsidy would in practice cause the 
political problems of lump sum taxes, as previously noted. So in the 
absence of technical progress, practical SD policies are still hard to find, 
even given unlimited substitution of capital for natural resources. 
Intuitively, achieving constant utility is bound to be difficult in the long 
term, once capital has been piled up and resources eaten away to the point 
where PV-maximising individuals want to consume capital, rather than 
accumulate more of it for an inadequate return. 
No exact solutions for the socially PV-optimal or maximum constant 
utility paths appear to be possible. Attempting a solution with both 
production and utility functions being Cobb-Douglas (F = K'R'-" and U= 
CvSe) leads to insoluble differential equations. However, one can at least 
establish the feasibility of sustained utility in this case when U>0.5, 
following Solow (1974). Consider the path: 
K=Ko+ht, h>O; R=b(Ko+ht)-c('-z)'('-c); O<z<2-1/a, b>O 
C= F(K, R)-k = KR'-'-h = b'-O'(Ko+ht)o'z - h. 
Total resource depletion 10 Rdt is bounded on this path, and less than the 
initial stock So if the constant b is small enough, so lim, r. 
S > 0. Provided 
the constant h is also small enough, C(O) >0 so that consumption is positive, 
rising and unbounded, and hence U= CY is eventually rising and 
unbounded, which means a sustained path must be feasible, by the 'ironing- 
out' argument set out in Section 2.2. 
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2.4.2 Steady-state solutions in a Cobb-Douglas case with technical 
progress 
Following Stiglitz (1974), we can find exact expressions for the PV- 
optimal, asymptotic, steady-state paths in our capital-resource economy 
when there is exponential technical progress and both production and utility 
functions are Cobb-Douglas: 
Q(K, R) = e"KR'-, 0<a<I) (2.40) 
U(Cý S) = CPS f0<P, E, P+E< 
6> -Tpl(l -a) to ensure that PV converges. 
It can be shown (see Appendix 2.11) that the socially PV-optimal growth 
rates are then: 
(I -P)CIC ae"lx'-"' 6 c-RIS 
x1x (e" - -rx -'Va)x - c-CIPSe"a(l -a)xo' 
Q1 Q= aKIK + (1 - a)RIR + r. 
Now define 
aQlaK =: r(t); klK =: ý(t), QIK =: r(t)la, RIS =: -y(t) 
(2.41) 
Since the economy is assumed to be competitive, r, the marginal product of 
capital, is also the interest rate. In the asymptotic socially PV-optimal 
steady state, CIC, KIK and QIQ all tend to the same constant, say P, while 
QIK tends to some constant r*la and RIR tends to some constant it 
can then be shown (see Appendix 2.12) that 
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= [ô -rv/(1 -a)]/(1 -v---¬) 
- 
¬*/a_*)*a/p(1 -a)(1 __)* 




P-C E'-Y* 7"V/(1-CI) - (P+C-)7*. (2.45) 
Trying to eliminate r* and P from the first three equations gives a 
complicated quadratic in -y*. Rather than solving this explicitly, note that 
on the free market path, the fact that agents ignore the effect of their 
resource depletion on amenity eliminates the second term on the right hand 
side of (2.42). This makes the equations linear, with solution: 
(2.46) 
-rl(l -ce) 
So asymptotically, " the free market resource depletion rate -y'A* rises and 
sustainedness 0, "*/ UI'* worsens as either technical progress falls, or the 
discount rate rises, or environmental concern strengthens (since 
a[U*['1U*A]1ac- < 0). For the free market path to be sustained requires a 
minimum level of exogenous technical progress (-r > 6(1 + c-/ P) (1 -a)); or as 
with the first cake-eating special case, allows a maximum, ethically 
acceptable utility discount rate, if one prefers to view it that way. The fact 
that the interest rate rl'* is independent of both the discount rate and 
21. To save repetition, the 'asymptotic' or 'steady-state' qualifier applies to the 
appropriate variables throughout the rest of this section, unless otherwise stated. 
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envirom-nental concern is a quirk of this special case, as will be shown later. 
Since we require Q>K and therefore r*loz > for a meaningful solution, 
the E term in (2.42), which represents the effect of environmental policy, is 
negative. Therefore, unsurprisingly, environmental policy slows resource 
depletion (ý <, yl"*). In turn, this means from (2.43), (2.44) and (2.45) 
respectively that environmental policy raises the interest rate (Tý > r"), the 
growth rate of production, consumption and investment (P > ý"*), and lastly 
sustainedness (OV U` > Ut'*1 
UIA) 
- 
As for environmental or SD policies, from (2.37)-(2.39) the privately 
PV-optimal path in response to tax policies 4)c=-ýc1(1+0c), OK and 
OR - 
(ýR + OS + OKORYe" can be shown (see Appendix 2.13) to have the (DX =f 
following rates of resource depletion, interest, consumption growth and 
utility growth (which (1)C = OK=: (D., -O reduces to the free market equations 
(2.46)): 




No expression for the required environmental policy is given here since 
(2.42)-(2.45) were not solved explicitly. From 
6*10% if -rp<6(1 -a)(P+E) 
the SD policy is formally 
(bt + (bt/(I-coýa =6- cxx 
which is similar to (2.27) in the cake-eating case. Policy must be stronger 
as the discount rate or envirom-nental concern rises, or as the technical 
progress rate falls. But the consumption tax Oc again has to tend to a 100 
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subsidy to raise utility growth; and the asymptotically zero multiplying 
factors P, lle" and 11x' in ýý)(I-a)x.. mean that a capital subsidy, 
resource depletion tax and/or resource stock subsidy would have to grow 
without bound to be effective. So even when technical progress -r > 0, it is 
still remarkably difficult to find effective instruments of SD policy. 
The model parameters and policies affect the asymptotic interest rate in 
A 
quite a different way to r* in (2.47) if one assumes diminishing rather than 
constant returns. If the production function includes a third, constant input 
such as a constant labour force L: 
Q(K, R) = e"KRL'--' 0<a, 7r, a+ 7r (2.48) 
it can be shown (see Appendix 2.14) that the asymptotic interest rate on the 
privately PV-optimal path with a consumption policy of strength (Dc, a 
capital subsidy of (-OK) and a conservation policy of strength (D., which 
improve sustainedness (though it is not possible to compute the correct level 
of (D. required for social PV-optimality), is: 
r= {(ö-IC+cK)(l-a-7r) + r(l-¬-v) + [ir(1-)-c(1-a)]} 
/ [(1 -6)(1 -U) --7rV] (2.49) 
Both the discount rate 6 and the enviroDmental concern E affect the 
interest rate here. Using a consumption tax or capital subsidy as an 
envirom-nental and/or SD policy (i. e. choosing 4)C-OK>O)wilI lower the 
interest rate, whereas using a conservation policy ((D. > 0) will lower or 
raise the interest rate, according to whether 7r(I - P) is less or greater than 
c-(l -a). This lack of simple connection between the interest rate and 
environmental or SD policies should not be surprising since, at least in 
theoretical growth models, the interest rate is not a policy tool, but an 
endogenously-determined price which balances the supply and demand of 
funds for capital investment. 
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An asymptotic steady state will be of little interest to real policymakers 
if it takes decades before the economy is close to it. The question of what 
happens on the (PV-optimal) approach to a steady state is therefore very 
important. Unfortunately, even if a particular steady state (whether 
privately or socially PV-optimal) is sustained, this is no guarantee that the 
approach to that state will also be sustained (see Appendix 2.15 for detailed 
discussion); but there is little more that can be said apart from this. We also 
cannot say anything about the cost of sustainedness, since equations (2.41) 
for the approach to the steady state have no exact solution. Even if 
parameter values are chosen specially so that the socially PV-optimal 
solution starts at the steady-state equilibrium (and is unsustained), the 
constant utility solution would then be starting away from its steady-state 
equilibrium, which requires different parameter values. 
2.5 INITIAL CONDITION EFFECTS 
In defining the PV-optimal or opsustimal path of development, there has 
so far been no constraint (other than non-negativity) on the initial level of 
consumption, QO) (which also determines the initial level of utility, 
U(O) = U[ C(O), So]). But the real world does have a history, which in 
practice might well constrain the initial levels of consumption and utility to 
be CGand UG = U(CG, SO), say. There might also be unexpected changes in 
the initial resource stock So (e. g. through new discoveries). What effects 
might these extra or altered initial conditions have on our analysis? We can 
distinguish at least four important questions of interest. Unfortunately these 
are all analytically quite difficult questions, and I give only some 
preliminary thoughts on how to answer them. 
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(i) If UGis sustainable but above the opsustimal starting level of utility, 
what is the PV-optimal sustained path starting from UG? 
This is a well-defined question, but given our earlier difficulty in finding the 
general opsustimal path when there is no constraint on initial consumption, 
the answer will not be any easier when there is a constraint. Suppose, for 
example, that the (unconstrained) PV-optimal path has growing utility 
forever, and is therefore also the opsustimal path. It is not obvious whether 
having to start from a higher than opsustimal initial utility level results in a 
constrained opsustimal path which first has constant utility, and then grows 
at the unconstrained opsustimal rate; or instead has a lower growth rate 
throughout. In the exponential steady-state cake-eating case of Section 
2.3.25 it is not even possible to calculate analytically a constant utility path 
starting from a general CG, since the resource stock S(t) generating this path 
would need to satisfy both the non-linear differential equation 
P(S IS - -r) + ESIS =0 and the initial conditions S(O) = So, S(O) =- CG' 
(ii) If UG is unsustainable, what is the best development path starting 
from UG? 
This is not a well-defined question without some measure, like an 
adjustment cost formula, of the effect of declining utility (which is inevitable 
at some stage, since UGis unsustainable) on intertemporal social welfare. 
Without this we do not know what is meant by the 'best' development path. 
The analysis of maximising social welfare which includes dynamic 
adjustment costs is left as a challenging and important subject for further 
research. 
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If UG is sustainable, is it possible for a rise in the initial resource 
stock So (e. g. through new resource discoveries) to harm 
sustainability? That is, could the initial utility level U(CG, SO) ever 
Un rise faster than the maximum sustainable utility level no(CG, SO) as 
So rises, and thus move from a sustainable to an unsustainable value? 
The answer is Yes in the case of renewable resources where there is a finite 
carrying capacity S and where the harvest is consumed directly (so R Q. 
Figure 2.3 plots resource harvest against resource stock in such a case, with 
OADES as the bell-shaped resource growth function. An example would 
be equation (1.1) where S is the carrying capacity and -yS(S - S) -C is 
the equation of motion of the resource stock. The curves convex to the 
origin are the indifference curves of the utility function U(C, S). Point A 
with consumption C* and stock S* attains the maximum sustainable utility 
level. An exogenous increase in initial stock So from S* at A to SGat B, 
while retaining the given initial consumption level C*, would therefore push 
the initial utility to the unsustainable level U(C*, SG) . But a higher initial 
stock would not always harm sustainability. For example, if the given 
initial state of the economy was originally at E for some reason, an increase 
in initial resource stock represented by a move to F would neither harm nor 
help sustainability (though it would increase PV). The economy could move 
along the indifference curve FD by gradually increasing the harvest. It 
could thus eventually reach the maximum sustainable utility point A, which 
it could do anyway from E. 
However, the effect of a higher So can be very different with the non- 
renewable or exponentially expanding resources which are the subject of this 
thesis. For example, with the cake-eating special case of Section 2.3.2, the 
maximum sustainable utility level is proportional to Soe"', and thus increases 
faster with So than initial utility would if consumption is historically given 
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as CG, since then U(O) is proportional to So". However, obtaining a general 
proof that higher So helps sustainability in the non-renewable resource case 
would be very hard, because we know so little in general about the 
maximum sustainable utility level as a function of the initial resource stock; 
for example, we do not know it in the special Cobb-Douglas case of Section 
2.4.2. But since the notion of carrying capacity does not exist for non- 
renewable or expanding resources, it is hard to see intuitively how an 
increase in initial resource stock could harm sustainability. One might also 
argue that, in practice, sudden discoveries of resource stocks are less likely 
if the resource in question is on the earth's surface and gives amenity value 
via the utility function U(C, S), rather than if it is say an underground 
mineral which is of uncertain extent but is unlikely to have amenity value. 
(iv) Could the present value of the opsustimal path, PV[Ut(KO, SO)], ever 
be decreasing in the initial resource stock So? 
The answer here is obviously Yes, even with non-renewable resources. 
This is simply because having a given initial consumption level different 
from the initial opsustimal level is an extra constraint which cannot possibly 
increase the PV of the opsustimal path, and will generally reduce it. The 
latter is certainly true for the cake-eating case of Section 2.3.2, where if 
-r>b the PV-optimal path has rising utility and is unique, so that any 
feasible path constrained to start from a different level of utility will have 
lower PV. 
2.6 CONCLUSIONS 
The widespread modern acceptance of sustainable development (SD) as 
a policy goal logically entails three beliefs (after Pearce et al 1993, p 11): 
(i) SD is a form of intergenerational equity which should be achieved if it 
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can be; (ii) it may well not be achieved if current development paths are 
followed; but (iii) policy intervention can achieve it. This chapter has 
shown that defining SD as forever non-declining utility (NDU), and treating 
it as a constraint on rather than some kind of alternative to PV-optimality 
produces no self-evidently absurd results, and several useful ones such as 
avoiding the well-known poverty trap of the maximin criterion. But we 
have not tried to justify belief (i) philosophically, or beliefs (ii) and (iii) 
empirically. The emphasis has been on using neoclassical theory to reach 
positive conclusions about what causes declining utility during development, 
and what policies can prevent it. 
To do this we analysed two perfect- fore sight, neoclassical growth models, 
in both of which representative agents deplete their private stocks of a finite, 
non-renewable, essential resource, whilst deriving amenity value from the 
total resource stock. In the first, cake-eating, model the resource was 
directly consumed, and in the second, capital-resource, model it was an 
input to production. The models gave some useful general insights into SD 
defined as NDU, albeit ones which are often hard to prove precisely. 
Two such insights were that a higher resource amenity value (i. e. a 
stronger private concern for the environment) makes utility 'more declining' 
and so 'worsens sustainedness' on the free market path of the economy 
which ignores the social amenity cost of resource depletion; and that the 
environmental policy which internalises this cost makes utility 'less 
declining' and so 'improves sustainedness' in the models. In general, 
though, we do not know when, or by how much sustainedness will improve, 
or when unsustainedness (actual declines in utility) will happen or will be 
avoided. (We also do not know whether the interest rate will rise or fall, 
highlighting the fact that interest rates are not policy instruments in 
equilibrium growth models. ) Contrasting special cases showed a range of 
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sustainedness behaviours: sometimes the free market path has falling utility 
always, sometimes it has rising utility always, and sometimes utility at first 
rises, but must eventually fall. Much the same range of behaviour is 
observed when environmental policy is applied. But this range does at least 
show that SD policy, contrary to the way many policymakers talk about it, 
is conceptually distinct from, and may have to go further than, 
environmental policy. 
Technical progress (here assumed to be exogenous) plays a crucial role 
in SD. It provides the sole incentive to save rather than consume in the 
cake-eating model. Assuming that the marginal productivity of capital 
eventually declines below the utility discount rate, environmental policy 
cannot achieve SD in the capital-resource model if there is no technical 
progress. And variations in the level and time path of technical progress 
explain the range of free market sustainedness behaviours noted above in the 
special cases. 
In the simplest cake-eating special case, SD policy can be justified on 
conventional cost-benefit grounds because individuals care about their own 
future being sustained, but cannot achieve this efficiently, or perhaps at all, 
through individual action. An important, unproved conjecture is that a 
similar justification exists in more general economies, wherever externalities 
arise from cumulative depletion of non-renewable resources. 
The analysis of SD policies in the capital-resource model shows that a 
resource stock or flow tax plays quite a different role from a consumption 
or capital tax (in contrast to the less realistic cake-eating case where all the 
taxes play an equivalent role). Even though resource taxes improve 
sustainedness, they may be powerless, and are certainly less effective than 
a consumption or a capital tax, in achieving a sustained path. Secondly, and 
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discouragingly, SD policies in all models eventually become subsidies 
(sometimes 100% subsidies asymptotically). The lump sum taxes then 
needed to restore revenue neutrality would in practice (to depart from the 
standard but unrealistic assumption of identical agents) be politically 
unpopular for reasons of intragenerational inequity. One policy not 
modelled here, reducing taxes on investment income, also involves a loss in 
revenue, and in practice would also have an adverse effect on 
intragenerational equity. Neither of these results should be surprising, since 
attaining constant utility is inevitably difficult in the long term, if the return 
on investment is such that PV-maximising individuals wish to consume 
rather than save once capital has been accumulated and resources depleted 
beyond some point. 
A natural direction for further work in this area would be to explore the 
many alternative assumptions that could have been made in the growth 
models above, and which may generate fairly different conclusions about SD 
and environmental polices to those reached here. For example, one could 
assume uncertainty rather than perfect foresight; endogenous rather than 
exogenous technical change; inequalities in income and wealth rather than 
identical agents; and different types of envirom-nental features, such as a 
renewable rather than a non-renewable resource, a flow rather than a stock 
externality, or cumulative pollution rather than resource depletion. Criteria 
of intergenerational welfare which trade off sustainedness with present value 
maximisation using some finite weighting scheme should also be explored, 
since they may be politically more credible than using a rigid NDU 
constraint regardless of its PV cost. But to the extent that the finiteness of 
natural resources reduces the return to capital investment over time, finding 
acceptable incentives to save which are not pure subsidies, and are not 
overly harmful to intragenerational equity, seems likely to remain a central 
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problem for SD policy -a problem which should therefore be as much a 
part of the debate on SD as concerns about global warming or tropical 
rainforests. 
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APPENDICES TO CHAPTER 2 
All superscripts for different paths ( -, AIt5 *) are dropped here for 
brevity - Equation numbers from the main paper are used where 
appropriate. Derivations of 0 from e using 0= Uce-RUs are simple and 
therefore omitted -A useful general result from (2.2) is 
Oc = Ucc(ý + Ucs(-R) =- ilUc&C - CUcs1A 1) 0 Al 
We ignore the degenerate solution C=O of many of the differential 
equations, which is why we end up needing only one boundary condition to 
give a fully-determined solution to a second-order equation. 
Appendix 2.1 General cake-eating modek Derivation of socially 
PV-optimal path (2.9) 
When Xu=01 (2.7) and (2-8) respectively become 
Uc 7rsIA =0 
US 7rs + 67rs 7rs + 6A Uc 
Using (A2.1), the time derivative of (A2.2) is 
nUCCIC _ CUCSIA _ XSIA+ 7r 
/A2 =0 
which with (A2.2) and (A2.3) becomes 
-qUcCIC - CUcs1A + (Us-bAUc)IA + UcAIA =0 
[(CUcs-Us)IA-(ý41A-6)Uc]l(--qUcIC), hence 
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Appendix 2.2 General cake-eating model: Derivation of the policy 
path (2.14) 
Taking growth rates of (2.12) and using (A2.1) gives 
[--qUcbC-CUcs1A]1Uc = WS17rs +0 cl(l + Oc) -A 1A 
which with (2.13) gives 
[-qUcÜIC+CUcslA]lUc = ÄIA -ö- Os - ýcl(l+Oc) 
(ý = [, 41A-6+4)-CUcs1UcA]C1-q, where (2.14) 
(D (t) :=- OC/G + OC) - OS. 
Appendix 2.3 Special Case I of cake-eating model: Derivation of 
socially PV-optimal and free market paths (2.20)- 
(2.24) 
U= C"S61 A= e" in Special Case 1; hence 
uc=pc,, -, s6, us=c-cvsc--l ý uCS=v6Cv-1Sf-I 
US/ uc =CCIPSI UCS1UC=E1S, UCC=P(P-j)CP-2Sf 
-q =1-P, A 1A = -r 
From (2.2), 




= V(§/ý+T) + EkS 
Together (A2.4) and (2.9) give the socially PV-optimal path 
(1-v)(ý = [-r-6+e(1-P)C1PSeqC, 
With (A2.5) this becomes 




Try a solution S= Se-", which satisfies the initial condition. Inserting it 
into (2.2 1) it gives 
(1-v)(r-O) = r-6-c(l-v)(-O)/ 
hence 
0= (2.22) 
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Next, (2.22), (2.19) and (2.2) =* S= Soe-ot =* C= Moe(`O)t 
=> U= O'So"e 
[TV - O(P + f)]t 
= O'So(`)eEp("-')'('-)3t (2.23) 
since -rv - O(v + C-) = [-TP(l - v)(v + C-) - P(b - -rv)(P + C-)] + C-)] 
= [-rp(l - P) - P(b - -rv)] / (1 - P) = P(-r - 6)/(l - P) I 
Now start from the general equation for the free market path: 
C" = [A1A-6-Cl"Ulcls1Uý4]C, "1-q. 
With (A2.4) this gives 
C (7- 
-6- Cc-ISA) CI(I - P), which with (A2.5) gives 
§/ý + 
Inserting S= Soe-Ot. which satisfies the initial condition, then gives 
-+r = (r-ô-c)/(1-v) 
== r[1--1]-ô 
= (ô-Tv)/(l---v-¬), 
which with (A2.5) gives 
0/ U= P[ - (6 - -rP)I(l -P- C-) + T] - E(b - 7-P)/(l -P- C-) 
= [-(5-rv)+r(l---e)--¬(ô-iv)]/(l-v-e) 
= [-v6+ri. '-eôJ/(1---c) 
(2.17) 
= (2.24)11 
Appendix 2.4 Special Case I of cake-eating model: Proof that 
(2.27) is an opsustimal policy 
The resource path corresponding to (2.27) is Sý=SOe-[-rv1(v+E)lt, hence 
[-rvl(v + E)]Soe[-rc-I(P+E)jt and 
Pv(W) = [-rvl(v + C-)]Psov+EI6. 
The only way that this path can be perturbed without causing a decline in 
utility (which would break the sustainability criterion) is for consumption to 
start out lower than C(O) and grow faster than C for some time. So look 
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at a perturbed path (denoted P) defined by 
SP 
- 
Soe - (ic - a)t 
, 0!: -: ýt<b, where Ký: ýTVI(V+c-) and 0<a, b << 1; 
= Soe a'e - ", b:! Eý t< oo . 
The PV of this path is 
PV(UP) = (K-a)vSO"[1-e- [6-a(p+, E)]b 11[6-a(p+, E)] 
K'So""e- 
[6-a(v+c-)Ib 16 
aPV(UO)Iab Oc+ (K-a)"e- [6-a(p+e)jb _ [6 - a(p+ E)]K"e- 
[6-a(p+e)jb 16 
oc+ (i -alK)p - [1-a(P+E)161 
== 1- valK -1+ a(v + E)/6 for a small 
oc+ - (V + E)/7- + (V + E)/6 <0 
(since we assume 6> -r for there to be a need for sustainability policy in 
the first place). Since the PV of the perturbed path thus decreases as the 
length of its perturbed path increases, the PV of the original unperturbed 
path is the maximum that can be attained. 11 
Appendix 2.5 Special Case I of cake-eating model: Proof that 
social sustainability costs less than individual 
sustainability 
Here we distinguish between the individual's resource stock s (which 
determines her consumption c) and the social resource stock S (which 
directly enters her utility function u=cW). On a socially just sustained 
path, the individual resource stock is st = soe- 
Kt 
whereK ý(V) = TVI(P + E) 
- Kt from (2.27) and the social resource stock is St = Soe so from (2.1) and 
(2.25) ý 
ut == (Ksoe 
(T - K) ý"(S,, e 
- KýE 
= KPSOPSof and PV(ut) = Kpso'SO'16. 
On the individually sustainable path (denoted i), individual resource stock 
and consumption are (with ý= -r-EOIP): 
77 Appendices to Chapter 2 
St. = soe- ýt =* cl .= ýsoe(r- ý)t 
but the social resource stock is the socially PV-optimal -S, so utility is 
(ýsoe(-r-ý)"(Soe-'ýc- = ýrso, 'So% 
Pv(ui) = ýWsovsofm 
PV(Ul)-PV(U) Oc+ ýr-Kv. 
Now ý= -r-, EOIP = [-rv(l - P) - (6 - T)E]I(l - P)(v + e) 
so 
= (7--b)E/(l-v)(P+c-)<O since 6>-r by assumption and O<P<l. 
Hence PV(u) < PV(u). 11 
Appendix 2.6 Special Case 2 of cake-eating model: Defivation of 
socially PV-optimal and policy paths (2.29)-(2.30) 
U= Plog C+ ElogS and A= (1 + -rt)' (2.28) 
gives Uc=PIC, Us=EIS, Ucs=O, O=PbC+c-kS, -q=l, (A2.6) 
OclUc--&C, &C=2-r1(l+-rt)+j1ý, AIA=2-rl(l+-rt) ) 
From (2.28) and (2.2), the undiscounted Hamiltonian is 
H =U(C, S) + TSý = U(CýJ(') - 7rSCI(l +, Tt)2 
with a first order condition allla C == Uc - -xsl(l 
+Tt) 2=0, which gives 
-7rS = (I +, rt)2UC (A2.7) 
Taking growth rates of (A2.7) and using (A2.6) gives 
-7rsl-xs = 2-rl(l+-rt) + UclUc = 2-rl(l+-rt) - CIC = -SIS (A2.8) 
On the socially PV-optimal path, 
S => 7rS/ 7rS =6-U S17rS =6-U 7rS+67rS =U alllaS S1(j +, Tt)2UC 
which using (A2.8) and (A2.6) gives 
-SIS 
6- CCIVS(J+, rt)2 + (JEIV)SIS 
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Try S Soe-ýt 
=ý ý=- Eý/P, ý= 6pl(p+, E), and 
S Soe- 
6Vtl(V + E) 
(2.29) 
C (I + Tt)2[bVI(V + c-)]Soe-6ptl(p+') 
U Vlog[(1+7. t)25VI(V+C)] + (V+C)Iog [Soe-6'tl(P+E)l 
= 2plog(l +7-t) - 6vt + Plog[6v/(P+E)l + (P+c-)IogSo 
U= 2TPI(1+-rt) - 5v 
Inserting (A2.6) into the general policy path gives 
C= [AIA -6+ 4) - CUcsl UcA] Cl-q (2.13) 
6C = 2-rl(l +7-t)-6+41) = 
27-/( 1+ 7-t) + 
S Soe-('-')' is the solution, by inspection (2.30)11 
=> C (I + Tt)2(6 
(6 - 
- (1)) Se - 
=* U= 2plog(l +, Tt) + Plog(6-(D) + (v+e)logSo. 
Appendix 2.7 Special Case 2 of cake-eating model: Defivation of 
constant utility path (2.31) 
Set U from (A2.6), to zero: 
U= P[2-Tl(l+-Tt)+SISI + c-kS 
Try S SO(l +Tt) 






v [2T-(ý+I)TI - czýT =0 
S= SO(I+Tt)-P1(p+, ý) 
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Appendix 2.8 General capital-resource model. - Derivation of 
socially PV-optimal path (2.34) - (2.36) 
The derivation closely follows Krautkraemer (p159). The undiscounted 
Hamiltonian for an interior solution of the maximisation problem (2.1) 
subject to conditions (2.2)-(2.5) and (2.32) is 
H= U(C, S) + 7rK[AF(K, R) - Cl - -xsR 
where 7rK(t) and 7rs(t) are the undiscounted shadow prices of the capital and 
resource stocks respectively. We will use the linear homogeneity of the 
production function to write it in the intensive form, F(KIR, I) = f(x), 
whence (see Dasgupta and Heal 1974, p1l) 
FK: --f f, F -xýf ", F (A2.9) R ý:: -- 
f- Xf AJýR ý-- R: 7--- 
f- xf axff 11 If f 
where a is the elasticity of substitution. The first order conditions are 
alllaC =0 => -xK= Uc (A2.10) 
alllaR =0 7r = 7r AF UcAF (A2.11) sKRR 
alllaK =- 7rK + 
67rK 7rKAFK => 7rK = (6 -AFK) Uc (A2.12) 
alllaS 7+ 67rs Us 7rs = bUcAF - Us (A2.13) sR 
Differentiating (A2.10) with respect to time and equating with (A2.12) gives 
(5 -AFK) Uc == UccC - UcsR 
(Uccl Uc) C= AFK- 6- R(Ucsl Uc), 
e1C = [Af -6-R(UcsIUc)1177 (2.34) 11 
There is no Us term in (2.34), so it holds for both social-PV and private-PV 
cases, and the expression for the rate of change of utility over time is 
0 =- Uce - UsR = UcC(Af'-6)1-q - R(CUcs+TlUs)l-q (2.35)11 
Taking growth rates over time from (A2.11) gives 
7rsl-7rs = 7rKI irK+ AIA + FRIFR 
Substituting from (A2.10)-(A2.13) in the socially PV-optimal case gives 
(bUc, 4FR- Us)l UcAFR =6 -AFK+, 41A + 
IýRIFR 
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Usl UcAFR = -AFK+ AIA + 
FRIFR (A2.14) 
which with (A2.9) gives 
Usl UcA (axff " If ') =- Af '+ A/A + xýf "I(Orxff IfIf f) 
Usl UcA orxff "= -A + AlAf '+ x1af, hence 





which reduces to (2.21) in Krautkraemer (1985) when A=1.11 
Appendix 2.9 General capital-resource model. - Derivation of 
footnote 20 (Hartwick's Rule) 
If there is no technical progress (A= 1), the modified Hotelling Rule for 
Pareto -efficient resource depletion (A2.14) reads as 
- Usl Uclý =- FK+ F IF RRR 
R Uc, ý F Us U Cý KR (A2.15) 
Combined with the Hartwick Rule, k== RFR, this gives constant utility: 
U Uc(dldt)(F-K) - RUs using (2.32) 
Ujdldt)(F-RFR) - RUs using k=RFR 
Ujlý - 
&R) 
-R(UcFKFR- Us) - RUs using (A2.15) 
Ujlý - &R-kFK) using (A2.15) and 
RFR=k 
= 
Appendix 2.10 General capital-resource model: Derivation of the 
policy path (2.37)-(2.39) 
To save tedious repetition, we omit the hat (A) overscripts here. Specific 
taxes are paid (in units of the consumption good) at a rate Oc on 
consumption, OKon the capital stock, Oc on resource depletion and (ýs on 
the resource stock, and revenue-neutrality is achieved by lump sum refunds 
0. From the point of view of the individual, the output budget constraint 
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now includes tax payments as 
C+ k+ OcC+ OKK + ORR + OsS - Q. 
The undiscounted Hamiltonian for the policy problem is then 
H =U(C5 ý) + 7rK[AF(K, R)-(1+0c)C-4)KK-ORR - OsS + 0] - -xsR 
with first order conditions 
alllaC =0 : =* 7rK(l +0 C) = 
UC 
alllaR 0 7rS = 'rK(AFR - OR) = UC(AFR-OR)I(l +OC) 
alllaK - 7rK + 
67rK = 7rKýAFK - OK) 
7rK = (6 + OK-AFK) UCI (1 +0 C) 





(Us is the external amenity cost of resource depletion, and therefore 
ignored by a private agent in arriving at (A2.19)). Taking the time 
derivative of (A2.16) and using (A2.18) and Oc =- -qUc&C - CUcs1A 
gives 
--qUcbC - RUcs -- 7rK('+OC) 
+ 7rK'OC 
(6 + OK-AFK)Uc + UcOcl(l+Oc) 




[AFK-b-Ocl(l +OC) -OK- R Ucsl Ucl 
and (2.38) for U follows from (2.37) and (2.6). 
The growth rate of (A2.17) gives 
7rSl7rS = 'KK17rK + (AFR+AFR - 
ORWAFR - OR) 
which with (A2.17), (A2.18) and (A2.19) gives 
(2.37) 
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1rKýb '::: ý Ö+ OK- AFK+ (, 4FR+AIýR-ýR)1(AF SI WS OR) R 
0 I(AF SR- OR) 
AFK+ (AFR+Ai'ýR R OK 
ýRWAF 
- OR) = OSI(AFR-OR)- 
Substituting FK=f', FR=f -xf', JýR= -xxf " and 
FR=f 
-xf '= -oxff,, If' 
where a is the elasticity of substitution (see Dasgupta and Heal 1974, p 11) 
gives 
OK- Af '+ [A(f -xf ') +A(-xýf 
")-ýR-OSFIAV 
-Xf 1) - OR] : --": 0 
-Af')[A( -xf') a fI 
Aýlx:: 
-ý 
(OK - OR] IX2f It + 1-14 f 1Xf I- 
ýRIX2f OSIX2f I 
(OK- Af ')A af Ixf I(OK-Aff)OR+ýR+OSI1X2f ff - 
AOrf1Xf I 
xlx [A -(, 
41A +OK)lf II orfIX + ýpx/X2f 11 (2.39) 
where 4)x : =f 
I0R-(ýR+OS+OKOR)1A* 11 
Appendix 2.11 Special case of capital-resource model. - Derivation of 
socially PV-optimal growth rates (2.41) 
From (2.40), 
A=eTt, Ä/A=: 7-, f(x)=: xcz, or=i, f1= cexot- 19) (A2.20) 
_X2 f 11=U(1-U)Xal ar = a, 4x01-1 = Af' 
Inserting this and (A2.4) into (2.34) and (2.36) respectively gives the first 
two equations of set (2.4 1). Taking growth rates of (2.40) gives the 
third. 
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Appendix 2.12 Special case of capital-resource modek Derivation of 
socially PV-optimal growth rates in steady state (2.42)-(2.45) 
Inserting 
bC=k1K=O1Q=ý, QIK=rla, R1S=-kR=-y (A2.2 1) 
x1x = kIK-kR +, y 
ertlx'-' KR'-e`1K = QIK = r1a 
ClSe'tx' (Q-k)R1Se`xc-'K = (ra-g)-y1ra 
into (2.41) gives 
(1 - P) ý=r-6- cy (A2.22) 
ý+-y =r- -r1a - [c-1pa(l-cz)](ra-jt)-ya1r (A2.23) 
czý - (1 -a)-y + -r, giving (A2.24) 
-TI(l - a) - -Y (2.44) 
which with r= (1 - P) ý+6+ cy from (A2.22) gives 
(2.43) 
(A2.23), (2.43) and (2.44) together give 
7 : --: 16 -- c-(r1a-ý)-ya1v(l-u)(1-v-E)r (2.42) 
and (2.40) and (2.44) give 
0/ U= Vý - E'Y = TPI(l - a) - (P + E)'Y - (2.45)11 
Appendix 2.13 Special case of capital-resource model: Derivation of 
policy path in steady state (2-47) 
Inserting (A2.20) and (A2.4) into (2.37) and (2.39), and merely copying the 
last equation of set (2.41) respectively gives 
(1 - P) &C= e'ux'-' -6+ (DC - 
OK - ERIS 
xlx = [e'-(-r+(ýK)1cex'- 
lixa-1 
- (1) X/a(l - 
U)X' 
ýIQ = ak1K + (1 - u)kR + -r. 
Inserting (A2.2 1) and (A2.4) into these then gives 
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=r-6+ 4) C- OK - E-y and 
(r--r-OK)la 
- (D)ce(l -a)x; and 
-rl(l - cz) - ^y is unchanged, from (2.44). 
These are three simultaneous linear equations in -y, r and ý, with solution 
(2.47) 
r -a) + OK + (Dx/(' - C')Xc' 
and from the first equality in (2.45), 
O/U = 11 
Appendix 2.14 Special case of capital-resource model, with 
diminishing returns: Derivation of interest rate in 
steady state (2.49) 
The Ramsey rule for the steady state policy path of the diminishing returns 
economy can be obtained from (2.37) to give the same equation as in the 
constant returns to scale case: 
(I -P)ý =r-6+ (DC - OK 
From (2.48), the steady state growth accounting relationship is different 
from the constant returns case, being 
ý= -T + ceý - -X-Y --=> (I - U)ý + -X-Y = -r 
The Hotelling Rule in its basic form (the rate of interest equals the return 
to holding the resource as its competitive price rises) applies to the free 
market path where the resource's amenity value is not reflected in its price. 
A conservation policy such as a declining resource tax or resource stock 
(not the same as ýD, since (2.39) does subsidy, say of overall strength iD. 
not hold in this case), will add to the return of holding the resource. The 
modified Hotelling Rule for the policy path is then, using (2.48): 
r --'::: --":: '- + 0ýý + (7r-')(-'Y) + qýE ' 
ýRIQR + (I)E --- 7 
As in Appendix 2.14, we have now three simultaneous linear equations in 
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r and ý, whose solution can be computed as 
rW- (k + OK) 0- cl - 70 + 7"(1 (2.49) 
/ [(1-c)(1-c)-irv] 
ý :' '_ 7( 
1- 6) - 70 C+ 
OK - (k) 1 [(1 _, E)(1 7rp], and hence 
OIU 
= {7'P-(6-(ýC+OK-('ýE)[7rp+'E(1-0ý)II 
so 6_4)C+OK_(1)E <0 improves sustainedness. 
Appendix 2.15 Special case of capital-resource model: Approach to 
steady state 
In the non-environmental model in Stiglitz (1974), one could conclude 
that the combination of a sustainable steady state and hence UýIU* 
> 0), and an initial endowment of capital and resource which is "capital- 
poor" (or "resource-rich", which is the same thing) relative to the steady 
state, would guarantee that the PV-optimal approach to the steady state 
would be sustained. This is because from (2.41), PV-optimal utility growth 
in Stiglitz' model is 
UIU = PCIC = P[e`a(R1K)`ý`-6]1(1-P) 
and resource-richness means a higher k/kduring the approach than at the 
steady state, and hence a higher rate of interest and utility growth. But 
equations (2.6) and (2.41) for socially PV-optimal growth in our double 
Cobb-Douglas case with a resource amenity give 
UIU = v[e"'a(R1K)'--6-c-R1S]1(1-v) - c-RIS 
_-: I - 
and resource-richness means lowerk1k (and hence higher UIU) again, but 
also higher kl-S (and hence lower UIU-). The net effect on UIU is 
ambiguous, so unsustainability can-not be ruled out on any PV-optimal 
approach to a steady-state equilibrium, and a complex (non- asymptotic) 
policy intervention might be required to achieve a sustained path. 11 
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Figure 2.1 Description and notation of development paths 
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Figure 2.2 Resolution of two apparent problems with the non- 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE OPTIMAL SUSTAINABLE DEPLETION 
OF NON-RENEWABLE RESOURCES * 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
"Of course, later generations (should they exist) suffer incredibly as a result of 
the initial profligacy under the Utilitarian programme. They are far worse off 
than they would be under the maxi-min policy. " (Dasgupta and Heal 1979, 
p299) 
it ... the maxi-min criterion 
is at the mercy of initial conditions. An economy 
wedded to it is imprisoned in poverty should it have been unfortunate enough 
to have inherited low stocks of capital and resources from the past. " (Dasgupta 
and Heal 1979, p310) 
What is a fair and sensible way to use up the finite, non-renewable 
resources of the natural world over time? Should we maximise the 
Utilitarian objective of the present discounted value (PV) of utility? Or 
should we maximise the utility of the worst-off generation? The above 
quotations highlight the dilemma that society faces if it has to choose solely I__ 
between the Utilitarian criterion (hereafter called PV-optimality) and the 
maximin criterion, in an economy where output can be maintained only by 
substituting an ever-increasing stock of human-made capital for ever- 
*I particularly thank Mike Toman for helpful discussions at all stages of this chapter, 
and I also thank Geir Asheim, Geoff Lewis, Malcolm Pemberton, Joe Swierzbinski, 
David Ulph and Cees Withagen for many useful conversations and comments. All 
remaining errors and omissions are mine. I am grateful for research funding under 
award no. L320-27-3002 of the U. K. Economic and Social Research Council's Global 
Environmental Change Research Initiative. 
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declining inputs of non-renewable resources. 1,2 By many people's 
standards, the 'incredible suffering' that PV-optimality can visit on later 
generations is not fair. But neither is the maximin criterion very sensible, 
because it bans any development which can raise welfare over time, even 
when initial generations would gladly consume less in order to make the 
necessary investments (Solow 1974). So would an alternative criterion for 
intertemporal equity, namely to maximise PV subject to a sustainedness 
constraint, 3 resolve this somewhat? One expects that this would allow early 
development, while protecting distant generations against suffering, and so 
may offer a useful compromise between the PV-optimal and maximin 
criteria. 
1. Despite considerable doubts about whether the world economy can be run on a 
litre of oil, I assume throughout this chapter that capital is endlessly substitutable for 
any natural resource in the production process. 
2. In recent years the rate of speciation of terms in resource economics has greatly 
exceeded the rate of extinction, and the resulting terminological diversity requires me 
to make my meanings clear. Where possible I use ca ital only for durable, 
productive assets produced by people, resources for durable, productive assets found 
in nature, and wealth for the combined power of the two to give utility. This follows 
the dominant definition of capital as "a factor of production produced by the 
economic system" (Pearce 1992), and suits my purposes better than the corresponding 
terms 'human-made capital', 'natural capital' and 'aggregate capital'. But the latter 
do make sense if one takes the broader view that "The essence of capital, therefore, 
is that it represents deferred consumption" (Bannock, Baxter and Davis 1992). 
Investment here refers solely to changes in capital net of depreciation, while 
aggregate investment means the inner product of the rates of change of all capital and 
resource stocks with their respective prices. Aggregate wealth is the time integral of 
aggregate investment. 
3. Recall that sustainedness is a synonym for sustainable development (SD) in this 
thesis. For no particular reason, the former phrase is mainly used in this Chapter, 
whereas the latter was mainly used in Chapter 2. 
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A major purpose of this chapter is to see if these expectations are correct, 
using a formal definition of sustainedness as a future in which a 
representative member of society has permanently non-declining utility 
(NDU). I have discussed the political and philosophical basis of this 
definition at length in Pezzey (1989,1992) and in Chapters 1 and 2. My 
conclusion from those discussions is that while by no means ideal, NDU is 
a criterion of intergenerational equity with fewer drawbacks and more 
advantages than commonly supposed, and is therefore worth exploring. 
Chapter 2 also explored some of its implications in models quite similar to 
the one used here; but the main emphasis there was on the distinction 
between sustainedness and environmental policies in the presence of 
cumulative externalities. Here we abstract from any externalities, and focus 
on the properties of the PV-optimal sustained path, which I call the 
opsustimal path. Utility is an increasing function of consumption alone, so 
sustainedness can be equated with either non-declining utility forever or non- 
declining consumption forever, whichever is more convenient at the time. 
Opsustimality is, however, not the only issue considered in the chapter. 
An informal introduction to and motivation for what follows is given by 
Figure 3.1. ' We will assume a competitive 'capital-resource' economy, 
defined as one with reproducible capitals and finite, non-renewable 
resources where agents take prices as given; and three farther assumptions 
about this economy are built into the Figure. (1) The PV-optimal path of 
utility in the economy will follow a single-peaked time path like U(t), which 
4. Some of the notation in the Figure may seem a trifle excessive at this stage, but 
it is used for consistency with what appears later. Also, some of its defining features 
will not be needed for the first four propositions derived below, which are true more 
generally. 
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rises to a peak at time T5 , and declines thereafter. (2) The structure of 
production and utility in the economy allows a level of constant utility above 
some minimum tolerable level to be sustained forever. (3) The initial PV- 
optimal utility level U(O) is sustainable because it is less than Uon, the 
maximin (i. e. maximum sustainable) utility level starting from time zero. 
To achieve a sustained path in such an economy, it will clearly be no use 
waiting until the peak time Tp when utility actually starts declining before 
intervening with policy action, as Pearce (1993, p48) effectively pointed out, 
since the peak utility level U(Tp) is obviously unsustainable. To see this, 
define Upn, the current maximin utility at Tp, as the maximin utility level 
starting from the capital and resource stocks existing on the PV-optimal path 
at Tp. Then Up' must be below U-(Tp), or the falling path of U after Tp 
could not be PV-optimal. Section 3.2 therefore addresses the question: How 
can we tell if the current PV-optimal utility level is still sustainable? In 
particular, assuming by continuity that the latest time when it is sustainable 
is TL, the time when the current maximin utility level UL' equals PV-optimal 
utility QTL), is there some measurable condition or predictor of 
sustainability, such as non-declining aggregate wealth in the economy, which 
will be positive before TL and negative after TL? 
These questions are interesting in their own right. Answering them 
obviously provides examples of sustained paths, such as staying at UO' 
forever, or following U(t) to TL and then staying at ULI forever. But this 
tells us little about the opsustimal path. Neither, at first blush, will Section 
3.3, which backtracks to find the conditions for the single-peakedness and 
initial sustainability properties of Figure 3.1 to hold true. But it turns out 
5. A single-peaked path is rising for a finite time and then always falling 
(declining). 
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that these conditions greatly help the analysis of opsustimality in a 
Dasgupta-Heal economy, which I define as an economy with one capital 
stock, one non-renewable resource stock, and no technical change (as in the 
first model in Dasgupta and Heal 1974, hereafter DH74). Section 3.4 takes 
the analysis of opsustimality in a fairly general Dasgupta-Heal economy as 
far as possible, and Section 3.5 finds further results (both analytic and 
numerical) for a special case where the PV-optimal path can be calculated 
analytically. Section 3.6 briefly reviews what policies might achieve a 
sustained path in the general Dasgupta-Heal economy, following the 
methods established in Chapter 2. Section 3.7 concludes. 
This analysis draws heavily on the classics of the resource economics and 
national accounting literatures: on DH74, who showed how the PV-optimal 
depletion of a non-renewable resource can lead to the asymptotic misery 
shown on Figure 3.1; on Solow (1974) , who showed the possible existence 
of a constant, positive consumption path which would be selected by the 
maximin criterion; on Weitzman (1976), who showed that net national 
product (consumption plus aggregate investment) equals the consumption 
level which, if held constant, has the same PV as the PV-optimal path; on 
Hartwick (1977), who showed that zero aggregate investment (that is, 
diverting all the rents from resource depletion into capital investment) 
achieves constant consumption; and on Solow (1986), who effectively 
claimed that if an appropriate measure of aggregate wealth 6 is non-declining 
now, then declining utility can be avoided forever. I have also recycled, 
6. There is no entirely suitable term for this concept, which is formally defined 
below as an integral of aggregate investment. Solow (1986) used 'appropriate stock 
of capital', Solow (1993) used 'total stock of capital', 'broad stock of capital' or 
gaggregate capital'; Pearce, Markandya and Barbier (1989) simply used 'wealth'; and 
Pearce et al (1993) used 'aggregate capital stock'. I prefer 'wealth' to 'capital' for 
reasons explained in footnote 2. 
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independently discovered, and/or extended several results from Asheim's 
(1988,1994) work on intertemporal resource allocation, and on net national 
product as an indicator of sustainability. 
3.2 AGGREGATE WEALTH AND SUSTAINABILITY 
This section takes up the question: How can we tell if the current level 
of utility in the economy is sustainable? In particular, does non-declining 
aggregate wealth in the economy guarantee sustainability? Owing to a 
confusion that has arisen in the literature on national income accounting, 
particularly from the seminal contributions by Weitzman (1976) and Solow 
(1986), many practical measurements of sustainability assume that it does. 
But in fact it does not. There is a simple intuitive reason for this, already 
mentioned in Chapter 1. To calculate aggregate wealth, we use relative 
prices, adapted in some way from current market prices, to value the 
contribution that different physical assets in the economy make to wealth. 
A general, or even a PV-optimal development path is not subject to any 
sustainability constraint. So there is no reason why relative prices - in 
particular, the prices of natural resources relative to human-made capital - 
on such a path should tell us anything about sustainability. This is true even 
if the prices are adapted to include non-marketed envirom-nental values, 
since (as Chapter 2 has shown at length), environmental correctness and 
sustainability (i. e., NDU) are different concepts. 
More formally, I show below that the PV-optimal path of a single- 
peaked, initially sustainable economy is bound to go through a period when 
aggregate wealth is rising but the economy is unsustainable. To reach this 
result, I first need to recapitulate portions of Asheim (1994), and also of 
Weitzman's paper on the welfare interpretation of net national product. 
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Then in Section 3.2.2 1 discuss what the national income accounting 
literature has to say about sustainability, and how the confusion referred to 
above has arisen. The extent of my contribution is reflected in the 
attribution of the six main propositions that are proved along the way. The 
first four propositions are quite general and apply to any economy with 
sufficient smoothness and convexity, not just to a single-peaked capital- 
resource economy. 
3.2.1 Derivation of the main results 
We assume an economy similar to that described by Dixit, Hammond and 
Hoel (1980), hereafter DHH, and Asheim (1994), with perfectly competitive 
firms and consumers, perfect information and complete markets, including 
all forward markets. Population is constant, consumers are identical and 
ageless, so they can be represented by a single, infinitely-lived consumer. 
She derives instantaneous utility U(C) from scalar consumption C, I and 
seeks (so we assume) to maximise TV", which we define as the present 
discounted value of utility using a constant, positive utility discount rate 6: 1 
MAX PV f U[ C(t)] e-'tdt, 6>0 
c 0 
(34) 
Let F, be the vector of all stocks of human-made capital and natural 
resources in the economy, with an initial endowment 1; (0) =2; 0. Feasible 
choices available at any time are all vectors (C, E, t) E II, the smooth and 
convex production possibilities set. Note that 11 has no time dependence. 
7. DHH worked with multiple consumption goods and labour in the utility function, 
but we assume a fixed labour supply and this greater generality is not relevant here. 
8. As is clear from DHH, p552, it is a basic axiom (though perhaps a questionable 
one) that consumers maximise present value. DHH and Asheiiin, often use a general 
discount factor X(s) rather e-". But since we are specifically interested in the effects 
of the latter form, it is more convenient to define TV" as we have done here. 
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As Weitzman (p157) says, this assumes that "all sources of economic 
growth have been identified and attributed to one or another form of capital, 
broadly defined", i. e. there is no exogenous technical progress. Added to 
the other assumptions made in this section, this defines what we shall call 
a Weitzman economy, of which a Dasgupta-Heal economy is a special case. 
We assume that growth in the economy is sufficiently bounded for a 
solution to the problem (3.1) to exist, called C-(t), f(t), the PV-optimal paths 
of consumption and assets over time. Then by the maximum principle there 
also exist supporting current value prices ý(t) and ; ý(t) in terms of utility, ' 
such that 
for each t, {Eý(t) I 1; (t), I; (t)J maximizes instantaneous profit 
subject to (C, I;, I; ) E H, 
for each t, eý(t) maximises U(C) -C over all C. 
We also assume that the PV-optimal path satisfies the transversality 
condition, so that the path is 'regular' and we may use Asheim's results: 
(iii) as t--->co 
The current PV of any development path U is its PV from time t 
onwards, f U(s) e -'('-)ds , denoted PV, (Eý. The equivalent constant utility tt 
level of the path is 6[PV, (O], which is the hypothetical level of utility that, 
if held constant forever, would have a PV equal to PV, (O - Contrast this to 
the current tnaximin utility U', defined above as the maximum constant 
utility level that an economy actually can sustain forever from time t to CO, 
starting with the capital and resource stocks existing at t. Except at time 
zero, these stocks are path-dependent, so the current maximin is also path- 
dependent, and hence is denoted U, on the PV-optimal path. We frequently 
is related to the present value utility prices q which Asheim uses by -x = e"q - 
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use the well-known fact that the current maximin is Pareto-efficient, and 
also the distinction drawn in Chapters I and 2 between sustainedness over 
time (0 ýý: 0 for all t) and sustainability at time t (the existence of a sustained 
A starting from U(t) and the capital and resource stocks existing at t). it 
is trivial to show that an economy is sustainable at t if and only if 
U(t):!! ý U't, and unsustainable at t if and only if U(t) > Ptn. 
Now define net national welfare Z on the PV-optimal path as 
Z(t) U(t) + -x (t) -E (t) (3.2) 
where. From Asheim (1994, p260), in my notation: 
d(e-'tZ-)Idt 
-:. 1 (3.3) z= 6(Z- U) 
I: _ - -1 Z= 67r. 1; (3.4) 
or bf 
T 
U(s) e- "ds (3.5) 
t 
Assume as above that the PV integral (3-1) converges, and also that 
limt -bt- 
--3.. c)oe x. 
l; =O (i. e. Asheim's regularity conditions), so that 
sl,; 7 "MT- e- Z(7) = 0. Now let T---> oo in (3.5) and manipulate to get 
Z(t)16 = 
ft"o U(s)e-'('-t)ds = PVt(U) (3.6) 
This is Weitzman's 'main proposition' in utility units, which we number as: 
PROPOSITION 3.1 (Anon, after Weitzman): In a Weitzman economy, Z(t), 
net national welfare on a PV-optimal utility path, equals 6[PVt(ff)J, the 
equivalent constant utility level of the path. 
This Proposition does not say that utility level Z- is feasible forever, for 
an important corollary (noted in passing by Asheim's 
Section 111, but 
deserving greater prominence in my view) is: 
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PROPOSITION 3.2 (Asheim/Pezzey): (i) On the PV-Optimal path of any 
Weitzman economy, current maximin utility U-m is less than or equal to net t 
national welfare 2(t). (ii) In almost all such economies, Um < Z(t). t 
PROOF: 
(i) Assume to the contrary that Umt>Z(t). Then by Proposition 3.1, 
PV, (U) = U' , /6 > PV, (U). But this contradicts the PV-optimality of U. 
(ii) The PV-optimal utility path is unique, and for 'almost all' economies 
it is not constant over time. (That is, although one can think of a one- 
sector, non-resource economy which PV-optimally starts and remains in a 
steady state with constant utility, such a special case is of no interest here. 
Throughout the rest of Section 3.2, this will be the precise meaning of the 
phrases almost all or almost always. ) So any feasible constant utility path 
such as the current maximin, has strictly lower PV than the PV-optimal 
path. That is , U, /b<PV, (U). But PV, (U)=Z(t)/6, from Proposition 3.1, 
so U', <Z(t). 
Next, note that7r. t represents a measurement in utility units of aggregate 
investment, i. e. investment in reproducible capital minus the sum of resource 
rentals in the absence of extraction costs. If r. t=O (Hartwick's Rule in 
utility units), then consumption (and hence utility) is constant, (ý=O=O 
(Hamilton 1994). The time integral of aggregate investment will be called 
aggregate wealth T: 




-x. t <0 is thus declining aggregate wealth measured atprices P. Aggregate 
wealth is a backward-looking measure of what the economy has 
accumulated, in contrast to net national welfare divided by 6, which is an 
instantaneous measure of wealth, and PV, which is a forward-looking 
measure of what the economy will enjoy between t and oo. Then from (3.4) 
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and (3.7): 
z= (3.8)0 
so that the increment in net national welfare on a PV-optimal path can be 
seen as the 'interest' (at rate 6) on the increment in aggregate wealth 4-f. 
Since both Z and 6f are continuous (the former follows from an extension 
of Lemma 3.5 in Appendix 3-3), have the same value at t==O by (3.7), and 
have the same derivative for all t ýýt 0 by (3.8), they are equal: 
PROPOSITION 3.3 (Pezzey, after Solow): Net national we4fare Z on the 
PV-optimal path of a Weitzman economy equals the utility discount rate 
times aggregate wealth if. 
Another simple but important result regarding aggregate wealth is: 
PROPOSITION 3.4 (Pezzey, after Solow and Pearce): In a Weitzman 
economy, declining aggregate wealth on the PV-optimal path E< 0) 
implies unsustainability (U' <U (t)). t 
PROOF: 
From (3.2), 7r <0 
3.2(i), this gives UM t 
Z(t) < U(t). Together with Proposition 
Of course, if an economy is not on its PV-optimal path, net national 
welfare (defined simply as U+ -x. t) could be below ýý, and so could be the 
same as U' , but this would be a mere coincidence. 
10. Another measure of wealth is the current utility value of all stocks in the 
economy. Call this gross wealth and denote it by 0: = 7r. E. Then 
6= 7r. 1; + 7r. 1; , so 
that within an additive constant, 0 equals aggregate wealth plus stock appreciation 
(the time integral of 7r. E). But by (3.4) and (3.6), Q could be rising while the 
equivalent constant utility level 6PV is falling, which is why we focus on aggregate 
wealth ir instead. 
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Next, one can find a counterexample where rising aggregate wealth 
coincides with unsustainability. Asheim (1994) claimed to have found one, 
but as noted in Section 3.3 below, his argument was incomplete because it 
used an unproved assertion borrowed from Dasgupta and Heal (1979), 
hereafter DH79. In Appendix 3.2 1 do find a counterexample, using the 
Special Case of Section 3.3, but in fact a more striking, general result can 
be shown: 
PROPOSITION 3.5 (Pezzey, after Asheim): In any Weitzman economy 
where the PV-optimal path is single-peaked and initially sustainable, there 
will be a finite time period during which the economy is unsustainable but 
aggregate wealth is rising. 
PROOF: 
We use a slightly informal graphical proof to make the basic reasoning 
clear. We assumed a smooth and convex production function, so the PV- 
optimal utility, net national welfare and current maximin curves will be 
smooth and continuous. Figure 3.2 shows the single-peaked PV-optimal 
utility path U with a peak at time Tp. The assumed initial sustainability 
means that UO > U(O) as shown, and Proposition 3.2 Z(O) > UO, as 
shown. 
Since the equivalent constant level of a declining path must always be less 
than the current value on the path, by Proposition 3.1, ýý< U after Tp, as 
shown. By continuity of ýý between 0 and Tp, there is at least one time 
TH 
(say 'Hartwick's time') with 0< TH< Tp when Z == U and hence 0 
(aggregate investment is zero); and it is unique since by (3-3), 
Z=6(Z-U)<O between TH and Tp, but U>0 then. Also, from 
Z=6(Z-U) it can readily be proved that Z is single-peaked with its 
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maximum at T, as shown. 
Likewise, at t=0 the current utility maximin U' > U- by assumption, and 
after t= Tp, U' < Z- <U (by Proposition 3.2 and the start of this paragraph). 
So by continuity there is a time TL between 0 and Tp when Um = U. TL is 
-- --: I --: I also unique, since U' <U =* U:! Eý 0 (For if V>0, one could strictly 
dominate U' starting from any given time t by following U- instead for a 
short while till some t+E, and then dropping down to the constant utility 
level U'(t + E) > ff'(t). But ff'(t), being a maximin level and therefore 
efficient, cannot be so dominated, giving a contradiction. ) By Proposition 
3.2 and the continuity of U, TL < TH. So during the finite time interval 
TL<t<TH, <U (the PV-optimal path is unsustainable) but ýý > 
7r. Y, >O =* Ik>O (aggregate wealth is rising). 
Intuitively, and as already noted in Chapter 1, rising aggregate wealth 
coincides with unsustainability in the above example because wealth is being 
measured at 'unsustainable' prices. On the PV-optimal path, non-renewable 
resources are being used up too rapidly for sustainability, which means that 
their prices must be lower. This reduces the negative (resource depletion) 
components of aggregate investment 7r. t, yielding a 'false positive' value, 
which conceals the fact that the true 'sustainability' cost of resource 
depletion is more than the value of capital investment at that time. 
Finally, we can use Proposition 3.5 to calculate the effect of an 
4 unanticipated constant utility policy at TH', i. e. a set of unanticipated policy 
incentives which start at THand somehow achieve r. t=0 (and hence 
0= 0) 
from THonwards. (We drop the tildes here because constant utility is not 
PV-optimal. ) We then have: 
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PROPOSITION 3.6: If PV-optimal consumption in a Weitzman econorq is 
single-peaked and initially has rising aggregate wealth, and the economy 
follows the PV-optimal path until an unanticipated constant utility policy is 
introduced at THwhen aggregate wealth is at a maximum, then 
T> 6PV H ý* Umt-, U(t) 'ýý Z(t) :: ýý 6*(t) t(u); 
t=TH. - U(t) and Z(t) are discontinuous downwards, while 
Um ty 6T(t) and 6PV(t) are continuous; 
t>TH =* U" = U(t) = Z(t) = bpvt(U) < 6T(t). 
PROOF: 
Since the policy is unanticipated, all current or backward-looking 
measures on the economy's actual path take PV-optimal values before TH, 
as labelled in Figure 3.3. Hence tr, U(t) < Z(t) = 6NIf (t) for t<T ,, 
from 
the PV-optimal results above. But the forward-looking measure PVt(U) (not 
shown on the Figure) is less than aggregate wealth T, because U is not PV- 
optimal after TH. 
At TH, the economy jumps to what is labelled the 'policy path', in 
response to the constant utility policy. As marked by the small arrows, 
utility Ujumps downwards from the PV-optimal level at H to the current 
maximinatJ. Since -x. t=O both just before and just after TH, net national 
welfare Z= U+ r. t=U before and after TH, so Z also jumps down from H 
to J at TH. In contrast, aggregate wealth 1P, being the integral of -r. E, is 
continuous. 64f therefore remains on a level with H, giving 6T >Z after TH. 
By the assumption that utility is at the maximum sustainable level after TH, 
actual utility U (=Z) and current maximin utility U' are equal to each other 
then, and also to 6[PV(Lý] (not shown on Figure 3.3). 11 
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3.2.2 Comparison of the above results with the existing literature 
In comparing the above results with the literature on national income 
accounting, we face the immediate problem that Weitzman (1976), Solow 
(1986) and many other authors assume that the economy acts as if to 
maximise 
f 00 C(t)e-dt, the present value of consumption (rather than utility) t 
using a constant interest rate r (rather than utility discount rate But on 
a PV-optimal development path ,r= 6-CUcclUc = 6+(C1Q-q(Q (DH79, 
p293). That is, the PV-optimal interest rate is constant only when the PV- 
optimal growth rate of consumption is constant and the utility function is 
isoelastic, or when the marginal utility of consumption is constant (=ý 
Ucc=-q=O). When we are specifically concerned with rising and then 
falling consumption, the first circumstance is excluded, so we have to 
assume Ucc=O. In this case it is not at all certain that a well-defined PV- 
optimal path exists! However, this is a standard problem that I leave to 
investigation by others; in any case, changes in net national product do have 
the correct sign as the change in welfare. 
If Ucc=O (i. e. utility is a linear function of consumption, say without loss 
of generality that U(C) =C and Uc= 1), then many of the above variables in 
the economy can take on a different name, without changing the validity of 
the above results: 
utility-based prices 7r become consumption-based prices, say p; 
net national welfare Z becomes net national product (NNP) Y, now 
defined as C+p. t; 
aggregate wealth T becomes what Solow (1986) defines as 
t VW =I Y(O) / 61 + 
fo p. E, called 'aggregate consumption wealth' here; 
PV becomes PVC, the present value of consumption; 
the utility discount rate 6 also becomes the interest rate r. 
The results then become: 
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If the marginal utility of consumption is constant and the PVC-Optimal path 
exists: 
PROPOSITION 3. V: In a Weitzman economy, Y(t), NNP on a PVC- 
optimal path, equals r[PVC, (Q], the equivalent constant consumption level 
of the path. 
PROPOSITION 3.2': (i) On the PVC-optimal path of a Weitzman economy, 
Eýn 
current maximin consumption t :! ýý NNP 
Y(t). (ii) In almost all" such 
economies, ýýt < i; (t). 
PROPOSITION 3.3': NNP Y on the PVC-optimal path of a Weitzman 
economy equals the interest rate r times aggregate consumption wealth 
PROPOSITION 3.4: For all Weitzman economies, declining aggregate 
consumption wealth on the PVC-optimal path E< 0) implies 
unsustainability (Eý, < C(t)). 
PROPOSITION 3.5: In any Weitzman economy where the PVC-optimal 
path is single-peaked and initially sustainable, there will be a finite time 
period during which the economy is unsustainable but aggregate 
consumption wealth is rising. 
PROPOSITION 3.6': If PVC-optim-al consumption in a itzman economy 
is single-peaked and initially has rising aggregate wealth, and the economy 
follows the PVC-optimal path until an unanticipated constant utility policy 
is introduced at THwhen aggregate wealth is at a maximum, then 
11 - Recall that the meaning of 
'almost all' was defined in the proof of Proposition 
3.2(u). 
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t<Tjl =* Ct, C(t) < Y(t) = rV(t) > rPVC, (C); 
t=TH: C(t) and Y(t) are discontinuous downwards, while 
Cm , rV(t) and rPVC(t) are continuous; 
t>TH =ý Cm = C(t) = Y(t) = rPVCt(C) < W(t). t 
To compare the above, consumption- rather than utility-based results with 
the national income accounting literature, it also helps to have a clear, 
undisputed definition of income. But the author of perhaps the most famous 
definition (which we will analyse shortly) warned us that this may not be 
easy: 
"We have seen eminent authorities confusing each other and even themselves, by 
adopting different definitions of saving and income, none quite consistent, none 
quite satisfactory. When this sort of thing happens, there is usually some reason 
for the confusion; and that reason needs to be brought out before any further 
progress can be made. " (Hicks 1946, p 17 1) 
A recent explanation of this confusion is that a single definition is inherently 




business cycles, comparing prosperity among nations, observing 
industrial structure, measuring factor shares and so on. ... real 
income may be 
interpreted as a family of concepts, each member of which is best for some 
particular purpose. " (Usher 1994, p 124) 
These different purposes have given rise to a number of controversies, 
such as on the use of net versus gross measures of national product in 
accounting for economic growth. " Hulten (1992, p9) argues that "gross 
product is the correct output concept for estimating the structure of 
production, while net product is the correct concept for measuring the 
12. The difference between net and gross product is basically the amount of capital 
depreciation. The difference between income and product is basically the income 
from net foreign assets, which will not exist here because the economy is closed. 
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welfare consequences of economic growth" - However, this is not a thesis 
on national income accounting as such, so I shall ignore this issue and study 
only parts of the accounting literature that touch on sustainability. I start 
with two concepts of income in the context of constant interest rates: 
Il: maximum sustainable income, defined as the maximum scalar C such 
that 'consumption C(t) =C for all t' is feasible, but 'consumption 
C(t) = C+ e for all t' is infeasible for all c- > 0; that is , the current 
maximin consumption C', as defined earlier. t 
12: income as consumption plus aggregate investment on a PVC-optimal 
path, i. e. the optimal NNP Y(t), by our earlier definition. Recall 
that by Proposition 3.1' (the main result in Weitzman 1976), this is 
also the interest rate r multiplied by maximum wealth, where in turn 
wealth is defined as present discounted value of future consumption. 
Even though Hicks ends up advising us (p177), "... to eschew income and 
saving in economic dynamics. They are bad tools, which break in our 
hands. "- definitions 11 and 12 will serve to clarify a good deal of 
confusion. 
For one thing, they are clearly different concepts. By Proposition 
3.2'(ii), maximum sustainable income is almost always strictly less than 
consumption plus aggregate investment on a PVC-optimal path. However, 
I will now argue, using lengthy quotations which should enable the reader 
to form his own opinion, that the two concepts have become badly confused 
in the literature. Some confusion is purely semantic, and arises because 
someone chooses to define NNP as maximum sustainable income rather than 
as PVC-optimal consumption-plus- aggregate- investment, while 
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acknowledging that the latter two are different. 13 But more commonly, 
some authors seem to think that NNP, maximum sustainable income and 
PVC-optimal consumption-plus-aggregate-investmentare always equivalent, 
which is incorrect. 
My first quotation is the famous one, which it is important to give in full: 
"The purpose of income calculations in practical affairs is to give people an 
indication of the amount which they can consume without impoverishing 
themselves. Following out this idea, it would seem that we ought to define a 
man's income as the maximum value which he can consume during a week, and 
still expect to be as well off at the end of the week as he was at the beginning. 
Thus, when a person saves, he plans to be better off in the future; when he lives 
beyond his income, he plans to be worse off. Remembering that the practical 
purpose of income is to serve as a guide for prudent conduct, I think it is fairly 
clear that this is what the central meaning must be. " (Hicks 1946, p 172) 
Although Hicks then goes on to show (p176) "how very complex [this 
central meaning] is, how unattractive it looks when subjected to detailed 
analysis", in considering how changes in the interest rate can affect this 
definition of income, he also offers (p174): 
"... definition of Income No. 2. We now define income as the maximum amount 
the individual can spend this week, and still expect to be able to spend the same 
amount in each ensuing week. " [italics added] 
The italicised phrase here gives a much clearer idea of what Hicks meant on 
his p172 by being "as well off at the end of the week", at least in the 
simplified world of a Weitzman economy. It surely means that we should 
equate Hicks' central meaning with definition 11, i. e. maximum sustainable 
income, and not with definition 12, the interest on maximum wealth. And 
why else would Hicks be concerned with 'prudent', rather than 'optimal', 
13. An example is Asheirn (1994, p257, emphasis added) who argued that "NNP 
should equal the maximum per capita consumption level that can be sustained", 
although he then went on to show that the consumption-plus-investment definition of 
NNP cannot (except in trivial cases) equal this. 
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conduct on his p 172? Why else would he be concerned with avoiding future 
'impoverishment', which DH79 (p299) showed can well occur on a wealth- 
maximising path? Scott (1990, p1173), Eisner (1990, p1180, who also 
quotes Hicks from p174) and Asheim (1994, p257) would all agree with this 
formal interpretation of Hicksian income. 
Historically, the confusion I allude to seems to have started from the 
following passage contained in, but not central to, Weitzman's classic paper 
on the welfare interpretation of NNP: 
"Even granted that consumption is the ultimate end of economic activity, the 
national income statistician's practice of adding in investment goods to the value 
by weighting them with prices measuring their marginal rates of transformation 
might still be defended as a measure of the economy's power to consume at a 
constant rate. After all, a standard welfare interpretation of NNP is that it is the 
largest permanently maintainable value of consumption. If all investment were 
convertible into consumption at the given price-transformation rates, the maximum 
attainable level of consumption that could be maintained forever without running 
down. capital stocks would appear to be NNP as conventionally measured by 
C+p. l;. " (Weitzman 1976, p159, using my notation) 
This passage is arguably inconsistent. For Weitzman explicitly noted (p159) 
that NNP defined as C+p. 1; is "just the Hamiltonian for a general [PVCI- 
optimization problem". He mentioned no extra conditions which would 
make the economy's PV-optimal time path of consumption constant in 
general. Proposition 3.2' therefore holds, and maximum sustainable income 
is almost always less than NNP. So if one interprets Weitzman's "the 
largest permanently maintainable value of consumption" and "the maximum 
attainable level of consumption that could be maintained forever" as 
maximum sustainable income (definition Il above) - and this is surely a 
natural interpretation - then neither of these concepts can be generally 
interpreted as NNP, contrary to what he said. True, he went on to doubt 
in his next paragraph that maximum sustainable income would be less than 
NNP if investment is not "convertible into consumption at the given price- 
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transformation rates ". But even if investment is thus convertible, NNP 
(definition 12) would still not generally equal maximum sustainable income 
(definition 11). 14 
Maximum sustainable income certainly was a central issue of debate for 
Solow (1986), and even more so for the many people who have cited him. 
However, it is easier to see his complete argument by quoting a later paper: 
"Something interesting happens when these two propositions are put together. One 
of them tells us that NNP at any instant is a measure of the highest sustainable 
income achievable, given the stock of capital available at that instant. The other 
proposition tells us that NNP at any instant can be represented as that same stock 
of capital multiplied by an unchanging discount rate. Suppose that one goal of 
economic policy is to make investment and depletion decisions this year in a way 
that does not erode sustainable income. Then those same decisions must not allow 
the aggregate capital stock to fall. To use a Victorian phrase, preserving 
sustainability amounts to maintaining society's capital intact. " (Solow 1993, p169) 
(Solow's 'aggregate capital' is the same, albeit in consumption rather than 
utility units, as my 'aggregate wealth'. ) There is a nice resourcist flavour 
to the "stock of capital " argument here, which bears further thought, as 
noted in Chapter 1. Perhaps we should care only whether or not the 
opportunity for sustainable consumption is declining, not whether 
consumption (and hence utility) actually is declining. In either case, to 
interpret the full quotation we first need to know what Solow meant by 
NNP. The following shows that he does mean consumption-plus-aggregate- 
investment, evaluated at the 'right prices': 
14. Two further points arise here. First, precisely this convertibility assumption is 
made by the common linear production function F(K, R) =K+ C used in scores of 
growth models (e. g. by DH74, p9). Second, the instantaneous production possibility 
frontier in (k, C)-space illustrated by Weitzman (p160) is not well-defined in a 
resource economy, because the instantaneous resource flow rate R, which is one 
factor of production, remains undetermined. But these are side issues. 
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it ... properly 
defined net product, calculated with the aid of the right prices. ... The economy's net product in any year consists of public and private consumption 
and public and private investment. ... The components of investment, including 
the depletion of natural resources, have to be valued. That is where the 
'rightness' of the prices comes in. ... The right prices will make full allowance 
even for the distant future, and will even take account of how each future 
generation will look at its future. " (Solow 1993, ppl68-9). 
But it is not clear whether Solow's 'right prices' were the prices on the 
maximum sustainable income path (call them p), or the prices on the PVC- 
optimal path (ji) - or even whether Solow recognised that the two sets of 
prices are almost always different (which they are, by Proposition 3.2'). 
This is the ultimate source of the confusion arising from Solow's papers. 
If he meant that PVC-optimal prices are 'right', and if we make a natural 
interpretation of his 'highest sustainable income achievable' as maximum 
sustainable income (definition 11), then the first quotation would be 
incorrect: NNP would not be the highest sustainable income, and 
maintaining intact society's capital as measured at PVC-optimal prices will 
not preserve sustainability. 
If, on the other hand, by 'right prices' Solow meant 'sustainable' prices 
(p'), then his argument would hold. However, there is no way of 
measuring sustainable pricesfrom. the national income accounts, unless the 
government has already introduced an explicit policy to preserve 
sustainability; this was the main conclusion of Asheim (1994). As we shall 
see later in the Chapter, this does not necessarily mean that some 
4sustainability tax' must already be in effect, but it does mean that the 
government must have made a credible announcement that such a tax will 
be introduced when it is needed. Solow did not seem to recognise this. On 
p146 of his 1986 paper, he defined his prices as the shadow prices on a 
PVC-optimal path (i. e. as p(t) in my notation). 
(in my notation): 
ill 
But then on p147 he said 
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"Now suppose that p(t). E(t) =0 from some date on. This is Hartwick's rule. 
Let us call this date T. Three things must happen at T, none of which 
Solow mentioned: (1) the government policy is credibly announced; (2) 
prices respond by jumping from p (T-), the PVC-optimal prices holding just 
before T, to p'(T+), the 'sustainability 1 prices holding just after T-, (3) NNP 
jumps from k(T-) to Tý'(T+), " and hence there is a 'spike' in its 
derivative k at T. 
This last explains the technical flaw in Solow's 1986 result. His 
contribution on pp147-8 was to point out that Weitzman's equation 
Y=r(Y-C) (equation (3.3) translated into consumption units) could be 
integrated in a different way. Weitzman integrated this forward from t to 
oo to produce 
Y(t) = rlt 
00 C(s) e -'('-')ds, 
the interpretation we have already seen of NNP as the interest on the present 
value of future consumption. Solow instead integrated Y= rp-. Y', -, - (the 
consumption-unit version of (3.4)) from 0 to t to give 
Y(O) + rf 
t--: 1 
0 p(s). E(s)ds = Y(O) + rV(t) 
which allows 
"the increment in NNP since t=O [to be] representable as interest on the 
accumulation of capital value since t=O, in an inclusive sense that records the 
decumulation of the stock of exhaustible resources. " (Solow 1986, p147) 
15. An example of this jump calculated for a specific functional form can be seen 
on Figure 3.3, albeit in utility rather than consumption units. Time TH, when an 
unanticipated constant utility policy is introduced, happens to be when aggregate 
wealth measured at PV-optimal prices is at a maximum, but there would 
be a 
downward jump in net national welfare for any other such time T. 
112 Chapter 3 
This is fine as long as we are on the PVC-optimal path, but not once time 
t extends after T, as Solow clearly intends it should do. For although 
k=rp. ý is still true after T when Hartwick's rule holds (for both sides of 
the equation are zero, since aggregate investment is zero and consumption 
is constant), simply integrating this equation past T ignores the spike in ý 
(i. e. the discontinuity in 1) caused by the policy announcement. So 
although some measure of aggregate wealth is constant after T, because 
aggregate investment p. E is zero, it is not aggregate wealth measured at 
PVC-optimal prices. Hence non-declining aggregate wealth at PVC-optimal 
prices does not guarantee sustainability. 
Does this confusion about NNP, maximum sustainable income and the 
'right prices' to use in measuring aggregate wealth, that I have shown exists 
in Weitzman (1976) and Solow (1986) - both famous papers, each with 20- 
30 citations during 1981-94 logged by SSCI - actually matter? Have 
people been misled by it? And what will happen if people are no longer 
misled? 
It does matter, because measuring aggregate wealth has much less 
predictive power for sustainability than many people have assumed. 
Proposition 3.4/3.4' means that falling aggregate wealth, measured at PVC- 
optimal prices, does imply unsustainability - but also that it is already too 
late to stop it. Conversely, finding that aggregate wealth is rising may give 
a false positive message, as noted before. We may be reassured about 
sustainability because the PV-optimal resource price is 5 and k- 5R > 0, 
when in fact we should be alarmed because the 'sustainability' price of the 
resource is actually 7, and K- 7R < 0. 
And people have been misled or confused. The quotations below, 
followed by my comments, show this. (Asheim 1994 noted the claims by 
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Maler and Hulten, but not the others. ) Some of the papers quoted are 
mainly concerned with issues other than sustainability, such as how correctly 
to reflect pollution damage and clean-up expenditures in the national 
accounts, but we will focus solely on what the papers say about NNP and 
sustainability. We start with quotations from Pearce and his school, who 
are very influential, and have made valiant efforts in the heroic task of 
measuring sustainability and influencing policy with these measurements. 
"Hartwick [1977] showed that a society with an exhaustible resource, such as oil, 
could enjoy a constant stream of consumption over time provided it invested all 
the 'rents' from the exhaustible resource. (A 'rent' is the difference between the 
price obtained for the resource and its costs of extraction. ) What Solow [t986] 
shows is that the Hartwick rule is formally equivalent to holding the overall 
capital stock constant. The constant stream of consumption is then viewed as the 
interest secured on that 'patrimony'. " (Pearce, Markandya and Barbier 1989, p50; 
italics in original). 
"... reinvestment of the total 'rent' from exhaustible resource exploitation will 
secure a constant stream of consumption over time, which is thus 
'intergenerationally fair'. Solow (1986) demonstrates that such a fairness rule is 
formally equivalent to keeping the stock of all capital constant. 11 (Barbier, 
Markandya and Pearce 1990, p1260). 
"Unless there are special reasons for singling out one form of capital, the 
requirement for sustainable development then becomes one of passing on to the 
next generation an aggregate capital stock no less than the one that exists now 
(Hartwick, 1978; Solow, 1986). " (Pearce et al 1993, p15) 
it 
- we adopt a neoclassical stance and assume the possibility of substitution between 'natural' and 'man-made' capital .... 
in the sense described by Victor (see 
Solow 1986). We then assert that an economy is sustainable if it saves more than 
the combined depreciation on the two forms of capital. (Pearce and Atkinson 
1993, p 104) 
The above quotations show that Solow's lack of clarity led Pearce et al to 
ignore altogether the importance of using sustainability prices to measure 
rents and thus 'overall capital', 'all capital' or 'aggregate capital' (that is, 
aggregate wealth). Even though they are well aware that "Valuation 
problems, especially with functions such as contributions to reducing future 
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[environmental] catastrophes, are formidable" (Pearce, Markandya and 
Barbier 1989, p44), they do not recognise that PV-optimal prices and 
sustainability prices are different, even when there is no critical positive 
level of the resource below which catastrophe occurs. 
Another much-cited paper is by Maler (199 1), who was mainly concerned 
with the theory of how environmental damages and clean-up expenditures 
should be reflected in the national accounts. But in so doing he states: 
"The present value of the constant utility stream H* is thus equal to the maximum 
present value of the utility stream. Thus H*(t) is the maximum current utility that 
can be sustained forever, that is, H* (or NWM=H*) is a measure of sustainable 
income (in utility terms). " (Maler 199 1, p 11) 
On p5 Maler defines H* as the Hamiltonian of an optimal control problem, 
which is Weitzman's definition of NNP Y. Whether this is a PV-optimal or 
PVC-optimal problem is not clear, since although Maler claims to work in 
utility units, he uses a constant interest rate to discount utility, and nowhere 
allows for diminishing marginal utility. Whichever it is, if we make the 
natural interpretation that his "maximum current utility that can be sustained 
forever" is the utility derived from maximum sustainable income (definition 
11), then Maler is almost always incorrect: if H* could be attained as a 
constant utility path, then this path would have the same PV as the (time- 
varying) PV-optimal path, contradicting the latter's uniqueness. 
Less influential papers with similar confusions are: 
"Solow (1986)... [has shown] that an intertemporal society that invests in 
reproducible capital the competitive rents on its current extraction of exhaustible 
resources, will enjoy a constant consumption stream" (Spash and d'Arge 1989, 
p92) [Almost always not true: competitive, that is, PV-optimal rents may be too 
low for sustainability. ] 
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"The magnitude C(t)+p(t)-E(t) can be interpreted as the maximum amount of 
output that could be consumed without reducing the original amount of capital, or 
maximum sustainable consumption. " (Hulten 1992, pS17, in my notation) 
[Almost always not true, if "maximum sustainable consumption" is interpreted as 
my maximum sustainable income (definition 11)] 
"Weitzman (1976) defined the NNP as the 'largest permanently maintainable value 
of consumption'. This concept amounts to the Hicksian social income that can be 
represented by the current value Hamiltonian function of a dynamic economy. " 
(Hung 1993, p380) [Almost always not true, if "largest permanently maintainable 
value of consumption" is interpreted as maximum sustainable income. ] 
"Maler (1991) showed that Proper Net Domestic Product as a measure of 
sustainable income can be defined and measured using the shadow, or imputed, 
prices that emerge from a dynamic optimization problem. " (Common, Blamey 
and Norton, 1994) [Almost always not true, if there is no sustainability constraint 
applied to the dynamic optimization problem, and "sustainable income" is 
interpreted as maximum sustainable income. ] 
In answer to my third question, it is hard to predict what will happen if 
people no longer confuse NNP and maximum sustainable income, and come 
to realise that non-declining aggregate wealth does not guarantee 
sustainability. Theoretical research may begin to consider price differences 
between sustainable and unsustainable constant utility paths. Practical 
applications of my results will be harder, because of the uncertain technical 
progress which occurs in reality but has been ignored above (although it is 
also ignored in large swathes of the national accounting literature! ). Perhaps 
the greatest impact of the above results will be philosophical, simply because 
people will be reminded that even perfected market forces cannot guarantee 
the long run future of civilisation. 
3.3 SINGLE-PEAKEDNESS AND INITIAL SUSTAINABILITY OF 
RESOURCE ECONOMIES 
Propositions 3.5-3.6 and Figures 3.1-3.2 assumed, without proof, the 
existence of a PV-optimal path of a capital-resource economy which is 
116 Chapter 3 
single-peaked (that is, with first rising and then falling utility) and initially 
sustainable. Here I give some moderately general conditions under which 
PV-optimal utility is either single-peaked or always falling (in which case 
it is unsustainable"); and then a much more restrictive case where PV- 
optimal utility is initially sustainable, and therefore single-peaked. Then in 
Section 3.3.2 1 discuss the physical realism of these conditions. 
One might be surprised that this exercise is necessary at all, since the 
properties are quite intuitive, and were mentioned long ago by DH74 (p17) 
and DH79 (p299). However, the existence of single-peakedness, which was 
claimed in DH79 for a Cobb-Douglas economy with diminishing returns to 
scale, was not actually proved there ; 17 nor was it in the constant returns 
case in DH74. " And DH79's Diagram 10.3 (p299) implied that initial 
sustainability will occur for a low enough utility discount rate 6, and that 
initial unsustainability will occur for a high enough 6, but no proof was 
given. This lack of proof matters for the above propositions and for the 
properties of the opsustimal path to be derived in the next section. It also 
matters for Asheim (1994, p262). He relied on the results in Diagram 10.3 
to deduce "by a continuity argument" that there is a6 (in my notation) 
16. By Lemma 3.2, if U- initially falls it stays falling, which would then give it less 
PV than the initial maximin if UO ýý! FJ(O), contradicting the PV-optimality of 
&. 
17. Their analysis of the diminishing returns case ends (p302) with a pair of non- 
autonomous differential equations for resource flow and the capital stock, which are 
(indeed) "difficult to dissect in detal ". 
18. Single-peakedness does follow from their equation (1.37); but their assertion 
(p17) that it "would appear" to follow from having a large enough initial stock of 
capital was unproven, and moreover incorrect in the Special Case analysed below. 
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which makes PV-optimal utility and current maximin utility initially the 
same; and then used this 6 to prove a weaker version of Proposition 3.5, 
namely that rising aggregate wealth does not necessarily imply sustainability. 
3.3.1 Conditions for single-peaked or initially falling paths, and for 
initial sustainability 
The most general conditions I know for single-peaked or initially falling PV- 
optimal paths to occur as are follows. The economy is the 'Dasgupta-Heal' 
economy of DH74 with just one capital stock and one resource stock, so it 
is already much less general than the economy of (3.1) which allowed for 
multiple capital and resource stocks. The PV-optimal utility path U(t) is the 
solution to 
MAX f 0. U[C(t)]e-6dt (3.9) 
{C(t), R(t)l 
t. k= F(K, R) - C; -R (3.10) 
where U= utility and C= consumption as before, and now also F= 
output, K= capital, R= non-renewable resource depletion rate, 
and S= resource stock. Restrictions on these variables are: 
K«» = Ko > 0, S(O) = So > 0; C, K, R, Sý0, 
U is twice continuously differentiable, with 





F(K, R) is twice continuously differentiable, non-negative, has 
a strictly positive elasticity of substitution between capital K and 
resource flow R, and is linearly homogeneous, so we can write 
[F(K, R)IIR = F(KIR, 1) =: f(x) where x KIR; 
Also f(O) =0 and f(x) >0 for x>0; 
and FK(K, R)=f'(x)>O, f"(x)<O for xýý! O; 
: 2ý- lim 1 X-- f (X) =: p<ö; 






a(x) >a>0, where (j(x) is the elasticity of substitution between 
capital and resource flow. 
Note that: 
(3.18) 
(3.10) allows capital consumption (k < 0), which is a key feature of 
many unsustained solutions to the above problem; 
the production function (3.13) omits labour as an input, and yet has 
constant returns to scale in the remaining inputs (capital and 
resources); 
in (3.16) the utility discount rate exceeds the limit of the marginal 
productivity of capital. 
This last assumption is what drives PV-optimal consumption to zero 
asymptotically, thus creating a conflict between PV-optimality and 
sustainedness. We now prove the single-peakedness result for the solution 
to (3.9)-(3.18), in two stages: 
19. 1 am grateful to Geoff Lewis for pointing out to me that DH74"s assumption 
(p9) that F is strictly concave is incompatible with linear homogeneity; but the 
assumptions here on f are all that are actually needed for our results. 
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LEMMA 3.1: Along any Pareto-efficient path, the marginal product of 
capital (which equals, in a competitive economy, the interest rate) is strictly 
decreasing, and approaches p, i. e. 
for all t; 
FK(x(t)) ---> p as t --> oo. 20 
PROOF: See Appendix 3.1. 
LEMMA 3.2: The PV-optimal consumption path 1ýý must either be as shown 
in Figure 3.1 (1. e. first rising, and then falling asymptotically towards zero) Y 
or always falling towards zero. 
PROOF: 
From DH74 (pl 1), the PV-optimal path C(t) obeys the Ramsey savings rule: 
CIC = (FK-6)177(Q for all t, (3.19)21 
20. Strictly we should write f'(x) instead of FK(x), since F is formally a function of 
K and R; but we retain FKhere and in the Appendices as a reminder that it is the 
marginal product of capital. 
21. A comment by David Ulph led me to study a variant of PV-optimality which 
highlights the contrast between the weighting approach mentioned in Chapter 2 and 
sustainedness as non-declining utility. Suppose that the economy's objective function 
is Je-`w(t)U(Qt))dt instead of J'ýOe-"U(Qt))dt, where w is some intertemporal 00 
weighting function. Then it is straightforward to show that (3.19) must be replaced 
by bC=(FK-6+w1w)1-q(C). A function w(t) o--+ expl6t- Jtf'[x(z)]dzJ (the sign 0 
oc+ means 'positively proportional to) would then make e=O (=* non-declining 
utility) on the (modified) PV-optimal path. This w(t) is the product of e't, which 
cancels the negative exponential discount factor e` that drives the conventional PV- 
optimal path to zero asymptotically, and expf -I tf[x(z)]dzJ, which is just as strong 0 
as a discounting of future utility as the economy's production function can withstand, 
without leading to declining utility on the modified PV-optimal path. But given 
(3.16), such a w(t)--ý- oo as t---> oo, so 10 w(t)dt does not converge. Hence w(t) is not 
a nornial weighting nction. 
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where 77(Q: =- UccClUc, the elasticity of marginal utility, is positive (but 
not necessarily constant) by (3.12). So if the initial Productivity of capital 
FK(x(o)) > 6, C is initially rising. But by Lemma 3.1, (FK- 5) always 
declines over time and approaches - (6 - p) (<0, by (3.16)) in the long run. 
So the growth rate of iff given by (3.19) also approaches a negative number 
bounded away from zero, and ýff itself must be asymptotically zero. If 
FK(x(O)) < 6, the initial rising phase does not occur. 
As its last line shows, this proof has not established that the PV-optimal 
path is single-peaked rather than always falling; only that if consumption is 
initially rising, then its growth rate always falls and eventually becomes 
negative, giving at most a single peak. Let us turn then to the question of 
initial sustainability (which also implies single-peakedness). That is, when 
is MO ýý! U(O)? A problem here is that the general conditions for sustained 
paths to exist at all are difficult to establish, and like Asheim (1994) 1 have 
nothing to add to the analysis of Cass and Mitra (1979). For a specific 
example of both single-peakedness and initial sustainability, however, we 
can resort to a special case of the economy in (3.9)-(3.18): 
Re Special Case: 
F(K, R)=K'R'-'; U(C)=C'-"1(1-a); 0.5<a< 122 (3.20) 
A 
AP endix 3.2 shows that the initial PV-optimal and maximin consumption up 
levels for this case are: 
= oe{K2ci - C(O) = bKola; Co 0 '[(2a-l)Soll-a)l/ce- 
For low enough 6, clearly U[C(O)l < U(CO), i. e. the PV-optimal utility 
path is initially sustainable. Note also that CmOIC(O) oc KO("-')` and 
22.0.5<u is the Solow (1974) condition for positive, permanently constant 
consumption to be feasible. 
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a-1<0. so increasing the initial capital stock KO makes initial sustainability 
less likely, contrary to the assertion in DH74 (p17). Intuitively, a large 
stock of capital will decrease its marginal product and hence the incentive 
to save. Exploring the Special Case by spreadsheet simulations was the 
inspiration for much of this chapter, and we will use the Special Case 
throughout Section 3.5. 
3.3.2 Doubts about the neoclassical framework 
The above analysis raises doubts about the validity of using a neoclassical 
framework like (3-9)-(3.18) to study sustainability, which are worth 
recording here before moving on to study opsustimality, the central theme 
of the second half of this chapter. 
Firstly, the assumption of constant returns in just capital K and resource 
flow R, which comes from DH74 and is retained for the rest of this 
Chapter, is in some sense inappropriate. Labour clearly does play a major 
role in production, which ought to imply diminishing returns in capital and 
resources, as DH79 (p199) recognise. However, this seems at root to be a 
mathematical rather than a physical problem, since the properties that follow 
from the constant returns assumption, such as single-peakedness and initial 
sustainability, are still intuitively appealing in the diminishing returns case. 
Though to my knowledge these properties have not yet been proved for 
diminishing returns, they might be in future. 
More troubling is the physical unreality of the infinite time horizon 
assumed, as already noted at the end of Section 1.3 of Chapter 19 which 
leads to excessively gloomy results about the effect of finite resources on 
sustainability. An approach perhaps worth trying, but not explored here, 
would be to use a discrete generation approach with a zero terminal value 
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for the resource stock at the end of the last generation. However, the 
omens for tractability are not good, since Howarth's work with a finite 
number of generations which was noted in Section 1.3 always ends up with 
numerical solutions, even for just two overlapping generations. 
Also troubling, but in the direction of excessive optimism, is the ability 
of unending capital-resource substitution in the Cobb-Douglas production 
function to produce an unbounded amount of valued output from a finite 
physical input of natural resources - output which would be what Daly 
(1977,118) calls "angelized GNP". This is also physically unrealistic, 
because it surely breaks the First Law of Thermodynamics: the average 
product of resources, FIR, is surely bounded above (which also rules out the 
assumption of endless technical progress made in Chapter 2). This 
observation is at the heart of the ecological economic critique by Daly, 
Pearce, and several others, of the neoclassical approach to sustainability, 
which has already been noted in Section 1.2.2. But note the above 'surely' 
qualifiers: proving that FIR is bounded involves human psychology as well 
as thermodynamics, a problem often ignored by the ecological school of 
thought. A rigorous proof would require extensive work on what people 
derive value from, as well as the ultimate limits to technical progress in 
producing value. 
So, contrary to Solow (1974, p34), the most realistic case to investigate 
theoretically is the combination of a finite time horizon with a bounded 
average product of resources (which would mean an elasticity of substitution 
less than 11 if it is constant); but this remains for further work. Our main 
concern here is to demonstrate the technical properties of opsustimality in 
the simplest way, so we stick to the well-known neoclassical assumptions, 
despite their physical inexactitudes. 
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-000- 
Section 3.4 now considers analytically what the opsustimal path looks like 
in a fairly general case, and what happens to aggregate wealth and aggregate 
investment on it. Section 3.5 uses the above Special Case to show 
analytically when the opsustimal path is distinct from the maximin, and 
numerically how it compares to the PV-optimal path and how it is affected 
by changes in parameter values and in the initial consumption level. Section 
3.6 returns to the general case of Section 3.3.1 to analyse what policy 
interventions could convert a PV-optimal path into an opsustimal one. 
3.4 OPSUSTIMALITY I: GENERAL RESULTS 
In this Section we derive two key results for the opsustimal consumption 
path, denoted Ct(t). " This is the solution of the PV-optimality problem 
(3.9)-(3.18) in the Dasgupta-Heal economy, subject to the constraint that 
utility (and therefore consumption) must be sustained: 
For all tj, t2 ý!! 
0, t2 > tj =* Qt2) > C(t 1); (3.21) 
or if consumption 'is differentiable, (ý >0 for all t. Assuming that this 
constraint is feasible for strictly positive consumption, Section 3.4.1 shows 
that the opsustimal path has either rising consumption followed by constant 
consumption, or constant consumption forever. Section 3.4.2 then shows 
that on the opsustimal path, non-declining aggregate wealth does correspond 
to non-declining utility, unlike on the PV-optimal path. 
23. Rather than using Chapter 2's tilde/cross combination (as in 
Zý) for 
opsustimality, here we use just the cross superscript t, for visual simplicity. 
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3.4.1 The two-phase nature of the opsustimal Path 
PROPOSITION 3.7: The opsustimal consumption path is continuous, and 
either has constant consumption (and hence utility) for all t, or corresponds 
to path W (t) in Figure 3.4, which has rising utility for 0:!! ý t<V, and 
constant utility for t 
In essence, this result has already been proved by Asheim. (1988, Lemma 
4). But he used a production function with diminishing returns to scale and 
discrete time, and discrete time makes some important conclusions about 
continuity less transparent. So we present a separate proof here for a 
constant-returns economy in continuous time, which also helps to build 
intuition about the nature of opsustimality, by way of Lemma 3.2 from the 
last section and three further Lemmas. The full proofs of these are in 
Appendix 3.3, although we give a few hints here. 
LEMMA 3.3: The opsustimal consumption path cannot always rise. 
(The intuition here is that rising consumption in the long run, even if 
feasible, would 'overachieve' sustainedness. The eventual decline of the 
PV-optimal path means that the PV of an always rising path could be 
increased, without breaking the sustainedness constraint, by shifting 
consumption earlier in time until the path is no longer rising in the long 
run. ) 
LEMMA 3.4: On a continuous opsustimal consumption path, a period with 
(j =0 cannot be followed by a period with (j > 0. 
(If it is, saving more at the start of the period with C=O and spending it 
when (ý >0 can increase PV, without breaking the sustainedness constraint. ) 
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LEMMA 3.5: The Opsustimal consumption path is continuous. 
(This follows from the strict concavity of the utility function. ) 
Using the above Lemmas, we can give: 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.7: 
At t=0, a opsustimal path must have either (ý =0 or e>0 (since e<0 
breaks the sustainedness constraint). If it has the former, then by Lemma 
3.41 must remain zero for all time. If it has the latter, then by Lemma 
3.39 must become zero after some finite time, and then by Lemma 3.4, 
must remain zero for the rest of time. Lemma 3.5 rules out upward 
discontinuities between separate segments with e= O. 11 
3.4.2 Aggregate wealth and sustainability on the opsustimal path 
We first state two Lemmas on continuity on the opsustimal path, which are 
both proved in Appendix 3.4. Note, for use in the proof of Lemma 3.7 and 
later, that in a competitive Dasgupta-Heal economy, prices 7r=(Uc, UcFR) 
and stocks F, = (K, S), so aggregate investment w. ý= Uc(k - FRR) - 
LEMMA 3.6: The opsustimal resource flow rate R is continuous. 
LEMMA 3.7: Aggregate investment is continuous on the opsustimal path, 
and zero from V onwards. Net national welfare is continuous on the 
opsustimal path, and equal to utility from V onwards. 
Using these Lemmas, we can prove the following result, illustrated by 
Figure 3.4 and based on the two phases identified by Proposition 3.7. 
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PROPOSITION 3.8: Let the transition time between the rising and constant 
utility phases on the opsustinzal path be Tt. Then: 
t<Tt =* Ut(t) < Unt(t) < Zt(t) 6pV t (Ut ) 
tý!! Tt => Ut(t) = U'ý(t) = Zt(t) 64rt(t) = 6pV t(Ut) 
and all five functions are continuous at t- 
PROOF: See Appendix 3.4. 
This proposition differs significantlY from Proposition 3.6 in Section 
3.2.1, which was for the combination of the PV-optimal path and an 
unanticipated constant utility phase. This is because the policy which 
achieves the constant phase of the opsustimal path from V onwards must 
have been pre-announced at time zero, so that private agents could optimise 
PV in response to the policy and make a continuous transition to the 
constant phase at time Tt. 
A notable aspect of Proposition 3.8 is that for t<V, PVt(W), the 
forward-looking measure of wealth, is the same as both the backward- 
looking measure of wealth Tt and the instantaneous measure ZV6, in spite 
of the transition to the constant consumption phase after t=V. 2' However, 
current maximin utility Umt is still below net national welfare Zt during the 
rising phase. Also notice that, since aggregate investment is net national 
welfare Zt minus current utility U% it is always positive (i. e. aggregate 
wealth is always rising) before Tt. So on the opsustimal path aggregate 
wealth and utility both rise together, and then both are constant together. 
But although rising aggregate wealth thus guarantees sustainability, this is 
of little practical value for detecting unsustainability, unless the prices r that 
24. Note also the analogy between Zt=: bTt here and Solow's claim, discussed in 
Section 3.2.2, that Y= W 
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would hold on the opsustimal path can somehow be estimated from current, 
'unsustainable' prices and other data. 
3.5 OPSUSTIMALITY II: SPECIAL AND NUMERICAL RESULTS 
Here we tackle a number of questions which can be answered analytically 
or numerically in the Special Case of Section 3.3.1 , but not at all in the 
more general case there. The results are intuitively appealing, and I 
conjecture that they may be true for a wider range of economies than just 
the Special Case. 
3.5.1 nen does the rising phase of the opsustimal path occur? 
Does the rising phase of the opsustimal path, identified as a possibility by 
Proposition 3.7, actually exist? The answer is simple for the Special Case: 
PROPOSITION 3.9: If 6 (KOISO) < (2a - 1) "', the opsustinzal path is 
different from the maximin path in the Special Case. If 6 (KO/Sd 
(2a - 1) ", the opsustim-al and maximin paths are the same. 
PROOF: See Appendix 3.5. il 
By definition, if the opsustimal path is different from the maximin path, 
it must have higher PV than the maximin. So Proposition 3.9 shows that 
in the Special Case, there is no scope for getting higher PV than the 
maximin path while maintaining sustainedness if impatience (6) or the initial 
capital/resource stock ratio (KOISO) is too high. Also, comparing (A3.15) 
and (A3.16), from Appendix 3.2,6(Ko1So)('-O')"" ' (2a-1)"' 44 C'o ý<> 
Eý(O)] 
a2/(2a - 1) > 
eý(O), since a>0- 5). Differentiating (A3.13) shows 
that C(O) >0 <-# 6< a(SO1KO)('-I")1c'. Table 3.1 summarises the four possible 
initial states of the Special Case economy that then arise. As 
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Table 3.1 Initial opportunities for a transition to sustainedness in 
the Special Case economy 
Range of 0 Opsustimal path PV-optimal path Initial PV- 
6(KO1SO)(1-c, )1" different from (and initially optimal 
hence higher PV than) sustainable? consumption 
the maximin path? rising? 
0< (2a - 1) "0' Yes Yes Yes 
(2a - 1)'/" -< 0 No Yes Yes 
< ot2(2u - 1)(1-a)'c' 
(x'(2a - 1)(1 -cf)'a No No Yes 
<0< Cx 
a No No No 
b(KO1SO)('-c')`, denoted by 0, rises" (whether through a higher utility 
discount rate 6, a higher initial capital stock KO or a lower initial resource 
stock SO), the initial opportunities for making a painless transition from a 
PV-optimal to a sustained economy are successively extinguished. First the 
opsustimal path can no longer improve on the maximin path; then the 
maximin is lower than the initial PV-optimal consumption, so the latter is 
unsustainable; finally, the PV-optimal path itself has falling consumption 
from the start. 
This succession also happens simply as time passes on a PV-optimal path 
during its rising phase, if it has one, since from (A3.13) and (A3.14), 
KIS oc J(j - a)t+ [x(o)]' -c') "0 -c) which strictly increases over time. 
So 
even if the prospects for moving from PV-optimality to sustainedness are 
25. Note that 1/2 <a<1 => 0< (2a-l)'/' < a2(2a-1)('-')/" < a. 
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initially cheerful, they become grimmer as time goes on. To the extent that 
the model here is anything like a parable of the real world, and assuming 
that a sustainedness constraint is contemplated but not yet in force, it would 
obviously be of great interest to policy-makers to know roughly in which of 
the four states of Table 3.1 the world currently lies. 
3.5.2 Is opsustimal consumption initially higher than PV-optimal 
consumption? 
A result which turns up in numerical solutions of the Special Case is that 
the opsustimal consumption path is initially higher than the PV-optimal 
consumption path. Since the first path is sustained while the second is not, 
this may seem quite counterintuitive. However, it can be explained by 
considering what happens to aggregate investment on the two paths. 
Proposition 3.5 showed that at the last time when a PV-optimal path is 
sustainable, aggregate investment is still positive (as shown at point G at 
time TL on Figure 3.2), and would then drop to zero on the constant utility 
path that starts from G (by Hartwick's Rule). But from Lemma 3.7 and 
Proposition 3.8, aggregate investment is continuous on the opsustimal path 
and zero at the change to constant utility (which will, however, happen at 
a different time TI). This suggests that aggregate investment is lower on the 
opsustimal path than on the PV-optimal path at the same time, and the 
intuition for this is that the PV-optimal path 'overinvests' initially when 
returns are high, only to disinvest (k<O) later when returns become too 
low. But ceteris paribus aggregate investment Uc[FK(K, R)K- C] is 
decreased by higher consumption C, or (assuming Fy, > 0) by lower 
resource flow R. So initially we expect to find higher C and lower R on the 
opsustimal path. 
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As noted above, concrete evidence on the initial behaviour of C and R is 
available only from numerical solutions of the Special Case of Section 3.3.1. 
The reason why the opsustimal path of this case cannot be found analytically 
is that there is no exogenous terminal condition for the rising phase, 
assuming that one occurs. Equation (A3.11) therefore cannot be integrated 
definitely, and we then have no analytic expression for St(Tt), the resource 
stock at the end of the rising phase. However, from the equations (A3.7) 
and (3.10) for the production and distribution of output, we do have a 
differential equation for K in the opsustimal rising phase: 
k -KuRO I -"{ 1- [a QO) IK06] (1 -e- ("')) I'- " 
- [C(O)lx(O)II(I-a)t+[x(0)1'-"'1'1('-c)e-("o)' 
Using numerical methods, we can integrate this, and (M. 11) for k 
Then we apply the continuity condition at V with the maximin path starting 
then, which is found by substituting Ký(Tt) and St(Tt) for KO and So in 
(A3.16). Thus we can compute the two-phase opsustimal path of the 
Special Case in some illustrative cases. We have in fact already seen the 
path for a=0.7,6 = 0.1, KO = So =I in Figure 3.4 (the same parameter values 
as were used for Figures 3.2 and 3.3). Figure 3.5 now illustrates all the 
above by plotting to scale the PV-optimal, initial maximin and opsustimal 
paths of (a) consumption and aggregate investment26' (b) resource flow and 
(c) capital stock in this case. Limited numerical experimentation has so far 
shown this Figure to be a typical case, provided that the opsustimal path has 
an initial rising phase (so 0< (2a - 1)"0', from Table 3.1). 1 therefore 
suggest: 
26. Figure 3.5 uses consumption rather than utility units simply because the visual 
comparison of the PV-optimal and opsustimal paths is more striking. 'Aggregate 
investment' as plotted here is thereforek-RFRrather thanuc(k-RFR) - 
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CONJECTURE 3.1: 
Provided that 0=6 (KOISd ('-, ýOlcl < (2a - 1)'/I in the Special Case, or that an 
equivalent condition holds in a more general case: 
Opsustimal consumption C' starts higher than PV-optimal 
consumption C and lower than initial maximin consumption C'O, - 
Opsustimal resource flow Rt starts out lower than both PV-optimal 
and maximin flows. 
If there is a rising opsustimal phase and (i) holds, then the constant phase 
of C must be higher than the initial maximin CO, otherwise C could not 
have higher PV than Co. And if (ii) also holds, opsustimal aggregate 
investment, which equals FK(K, R)K- C by the proof of Lemma 3.7, is 
initially lower than PV-optimal investment, but higher of course than 
maximin aggregate investment (which is zero, by Hartwick's Rule). 
3.5.3 How do changes in parameters and in the initial consumption 
level affect the opsustimal Path? 
To explore how changes in key parameters affect the opsustimal path, 
Table 3.2 lists some approximate results for changes in the utility discount 
rate, and the capital and resource stocks, in the Special Case for the 
parameter values noted, and using the notation developed above. (The 
results are approximate because powerful numerical methods would be 
needed to compute the opsustimal path very accurately, and the manual 
spreadsheet iterations used can give results only to two or three significant 
figures. ) 
It seems intuitively likely that the direction of the changes shown in the 
Table hold for other parameter values as long as 0< (2a - 1)", and indeed 
in a more general economy altogether. So for example, a higher utility 
discount rate should raise initial consumption and resource depletion on the 
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Table 3.2 Selected numerical results for opsustimal paths 






4: Less KO, 
more S. 
KO I 1 1 0.738' 
Para- SO 1 1 1.5 1.5 
meters 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 
6 0.1 0.12 0.1 0.1 
Cf(O) 0.15 0.18 0.15 0.11 
ct(O)Z(O) 1.07 1.08 1.07 1.06 
Ct(T) 0.74 ý0.65 1.01 0.94 Re- 
sults CM Ct(Tt)l 0 1.57 1.38 1.79 2.00 
RI(O) 0.13 0.16 0.20 0.21 
Rt(O)IR(O) 0.94 0.93 0.95 0.96 
Kt(O) 0.40 0.39 0.47 0.39 
V 7.2 5.3 7.9 8.4 
1. This value is chosen so that the initial maximin consumption level CO is the same as for 
Cases 1 and 2. 
opsustimal path; make the change to a constant consumption phase happen 
sooner; and lower consumption in the constant phase. But all this remains 
as another conjecture. 
A different question is to ask what will be the effect on the opsustimal 
path of a historically given initial consumption level CG. In Section 2.5 of 
Chapter 2 we explored this question in a model with utility U(C, S) 
dependent on the resource stock as well as on consumption; we therefore 
had to look at the effects on sustainability of both CGitself (questions (i) and 
(ii) in Section 2.5), and of a change in the initial resource stock So, given 
CG (questions Gii) and (iv) there). Here utility U(C) is independent of the 
resource stock, so we need look at only the first effect. Figure 3.8 is a 
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mixture of conjecture and certainty about what happens to the constrained- 
opsustimal (COS) consumption path in a general Dasgupta-Heal economy as 
given initial consumption CGrises above the initial opsustimal level, Ct(o). 
it is straightforward to show that Lemmas 3.3-5 and hence Proposition 
3.7 still hold for the COS path, and hence that COS paths must generally 
comprise a rising phase followed continuously by a constant phase, as 
shown. Since these paths must be efficient, they must intersect with all 
other efficient paths such as each other, the PV-optimal path Zý(0)11, the 
opsustimal path C(O)A, and the maximin path COE as shown. I conjecture 
that the effect of a historical constraint which increases initial consumption 
above C(0), but only to a sustainable level (so that we are answering 
question (i)), will be similar to the effect which a sustainedness constraint 
was shown to have by using a numerical solution in the previous subsection. 
If so, CB, the COS path starting from C, > C(0), stays above C(t) until it 
(the COS path) becomes constant, as shown; and the COS path C2D stays 
above CB until the former becomes constant, as shown; and so on until we 
reach the initial maximin consumption level CO. The effect of a higher (but 
still sustainable) initial consumption level is then to shorten the duration of 
the 'growth window' during which consumption can rise before having to 
level off, which seems plausible. 
However , if 
CG> CO, there is no sustainable path, and we are answering 
question (ii) in Section 2.5 of Chapter 2. What the 'best' development path 
is then depends on what we assume about the adjustment costs of returning 
consumption to a sustainable level. With adjustment costs dependent on the 
rate of consumption decline, I conjecture that the path will look something 
like C3F, with a continuous decline in consumption followed by constant 
consumption at a level below CO (as required by the efficiency of COE). 
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3.6 OPSUSTIMALITY III: POLICIES TO ACHIEVE IT 
3.6.1 General analysis 
Thanks to the assumption of constant returns to scale, we can regard the 
ownership of both the capital and resource stocks in our model as being 
divided equally among a large number of identical, price-taking agents. 
There are apparently no externalities in the model, so that Conjecture 3.1 
from Chapter 2, that sustainedness can be a collective good if a non- 
renewable resource has social amenity value, does not apply. Why then is 
there is any role for public policy in achieving sustainedness here? If agents 
seek it, why cannot they simply change their private resource depletion and 
consumption plans accordingly? The answer is given at some length in 
Chapter 4. The underlying reality, which an infinitely-lived, representative 
agent model merely seeks to reflect, is that society comprises different 
generations and different sexes. Any parents' bequests of capital and 
resources to their children give an altruistic 'warm glow' not just to 
themselves, but also to the parents of the mates that their children select, so 
any degree of randomness in mate selection gives rise to intragenerational 
externalities. If individual parents care about sustainedness at the family 
level, sustainedness may then be a valid goal of public policy, because the 
mixing of bequests that happens when children mate make it infeasible, or 
at least inefficient, for parents achieve sustainedness by their own actions. 
So we assume here that agents seek unconstrained PV-maximisation in their 
private choices, yet still vote for a government which enacts non-coercive 
(i. e. market-based) policies to achieve sustainedness. 
Chapter 2 explored sustainedness policies (which have been neglected by 
the literature on Hartwick's Rule) in detail, so we will be somewhat briefer 
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here. We assume that policymakers influence private saving and resource 
depletion decisions by specific taxes (or 'fees') of oc(t) on consumption, 
OK(t) on capital, ORW on resource depletion, and Os(t) on the resource stock 
(which will in practice be a negative tax, i. e. a subsidy to encourage 
conservation of the remaining stock). All tax revenues are returned to 
agents as lump sums which are not affected by any one agent's choices. 
The undiscounted Hamiltonian of the unconstrained control problem in 
(3-9) - (3.17) then becomes, from the point of view of an individual, 
H= U(C) + 7rK(t) [F(K, R) - C(I + Oc) - (ýKK-4)RR - (ýsS] - 7rs(t)R 
27 
A 
From Chapter 2, Section 2.4.1, we can see that the consumption C and 
A, AA 
capital/resource ratio KIR =x that will be chosen by individuals in response 
to the taxes respectively obey the following modified Ramsey rule and 
modified Hotelling rule: 
,ýAA 
CIC ý::: If f -6-OCIO +OC)-OKII'q (3.22) 
,ýA I& AAAAAA 
XIX ::: -- (1 - OKIf 
1) 6f IX (f I OR - OR - OS - OKOR)IX2(-f 
11) (3.23) 
Between them, (3.22) and (3.23) define the range of tax schedules Oc(t), 
OK(t) 
I OR(t) and Os(t) by which the government might cause private agents 
to choose constant consumption paths (C=0). We consider first the role of 
the consumption tax and the capital tax, and then the two resource taxes. 
3.6.2 A consumption tax or capital tax must become a subsidy, and 
resource taxes arepowerless 
Consider first the case where the opsustimal path has an initial phase of 
rising consumption ending at time Tt. Any tax which alters intertemporal 
allocation during this phase will cause consumption to depart from local PV- 
27. By ignoring the technical productivity factor and all derivatives of utility with 
respect to the resource stock there, which are features absent here. 
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optimality, which could not be opsustimal. So from (3.22), any 
consumption tax has to be at a constant level (ýc=O), or a capital tax must 
be zero (OK= 0)2' during a rising phase. Continuity of consumption, and 
the possibility of arbitrage across the transition time Tt, mean that either tax 
must be at the same level just after V. 
But after V, the consumption tax cannot stay constant (or, the capital tax 
cannot stay zero). Approaching time V at the end of a rising phase, (3.19) 
implies f'(x) > 6. Resources are not taxed, so arbitrage will keep the 
resource price FR(K, R) and hence resource flow R and x=KIR continuous 
across time V, as in Lemma 3.6; so f '(x) >6 just after Tt. To get (ý =0 
thereafter, from (3.23) ýc orOKinitially need to be positive, and then (since 
f'--->p <6 as t-->oo, by Lemma 3.1) negative; effectively, they lower the utility 
discount rate that people use to calculate their optimal saving. During the 
constant consumption phase, a consumption tax Oc must therefore first rise, 
and then fall asymptotically to a 100% subsidy on consumption (since we 
must have limj,,:. 4)c/(1+Oc) = -(6-p) and thus liml,,,. Oc = -1, by 
Lemma 2.1 in Chapter 2); whereas a capital tax must fall to -(6-p), a 
subsidy equal to the difference between the interest rate p and the utility 
discount rate. 
Intuitively, the tax can be regarded as 'squashing flat' the unsustainable 
peak of the PV-optimal utility curve in Figure 3.1 and elsewhere, bringing 
some of it forward with a rising (ýc or positiveOK, and then pushing back 
the rest with a falling Oc or negative OK. Although this is no problem in 
theory, in practice it would be near-impossible politically because of the 
lump-sum taxes needed to finance the subsidy phase, as noted in Chapter 2. 
28. There is little 
OCIO + Od 7-4 0 3ý6 OK' 
point in consid0ring the. case where 
OC1(1+0C)+OK'-O but 
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Also, the government's intention to achieve constant consumption from 
V onwards must be credibly announced at time zero. Only then will private 
agents be able to use their perfect foresight to depart from PV-optimality 
and choose the higher initial consumption and lower initial resource flow 
that (according to Conjecture 3.1) characterise the opsustimal path. If there 
is no initial phase of rising consumption, we have fI<6 at time zero, so the 
policy starts straightaway with no need for pre- announcement. The 
consumption tax falls (or the capital tax is negative) from time zero 
onwards, ending up with politically impractical subsidies as before. 
Because they do not appear directly in (3-22), but influence the time path 
of consumption only through their effect on the capital/resource ratio x in 
(3.23), neither a resource depletion taxORnor a resource stock tax Os (in 
practice a subsidy) can achieve (permanent) sustainedness. For consider 
(3.22) withOC = OKýO. The only way that e can be zero from the transition 
time V onwards is for x to be held constant for all t ýýt V at the level x, 
defined by f I(X6) =6.21 R is then proportional to K, and both must be 
bounded away from zero to support a constant consumption level; but such 
a non-vanishing R can be sustained for only a finite time by a finite stock 
S. - So both a depletion tax and a stock subsidy are powerless to achieve 
sustainedness, given the assumptions of this chapter. 




In an economy with accumulating capital, non-renewable resources and 
constant technology, maximising the present discounted value of utility 
('PV-optimality') can be unfair to the future, by subjecting distant 
generations to misery, even though rising wellbeing is possible. But 
constant utility (the result of the maximin criterion) is often an inefficient 
way of being fair to the future, because it bans current investment which 
would be preferred by both current and future generations. A third 
criterion, that of maximising PV provided that utility never declines - 
called PV-optimal sustainedness or 'opsustimality' here - offers an 
intuitively attractive compromise which can perhaps be both fair and 
efficient. 
My primary purpose in this chapter has not been to inquire into the 
philosophical foundations of opsustimality, but to analyse its purely technical 
properties. What does an opsustimal development path look like? When is 
it distinct from the maximin path, and how does it compare to the PV- 
optimal path? What policies might achieve it? 
A related, prior question is whether there is some measurable condition 
such as 'maintaining aggregate wealth' or 'keeping total capital constant' 
which guarantees sustainability. The theory of such measures seemed a 
natural place to look for tools for analysing opsustimality, and so it proved. 
But, in common with Asheim (1994), we found an important flaw. If it is 
measured at prices which are corrected for obvious distortions like 
monopoly and pollution, rising aggregate wealth (defined as the integral 
over time of aggregate investment in capital and resource stocks) does not 
guarantee sustainability. Indeed, in a typical PV-optimal resource economy 
with a sustainability problem, there is bound to be a period when rising 
139 Chapter 3 
wealth and unsustainability happen at the same time. This is because an 
unsustainable economy depletes non-renewable resources too rapidly, and 
drives down their prices. Aggregate wealth measured at such prices can 
then still be rising, which gives a false reassurance about sustainability. 
A formal investigation of this problem and its offshoots took up about 
half the chapter. It yielded a number of other results about welfare and 
wealth measured on an initially sustainable, PV-optimal utility path, such as: 
(a) net national welfare (current utility plus the rate of increase of aggregate 
wealth) cannot be attained as a permanent utility level; 
(b) declining aggregate wealth does imply unsustainability; 
(c) waiting until aggregate wealth is at a peak before making a transition to 
the maximum available constant utility path does not sustain development, 
because it results in a downward jump in utility and net national welfare 
at the transition time, although not in aggregate wealth itself. 
We then clarified a number of misinterpretations of these results that exist 
in the literature, particularly in the influential paper by Solow (1986) which 
overlooks points (a) and (c). And in order to show that an initially 
sustainable PV-optimal path exists, and thus justify the assumptions that 
underlie result (c), we first had to analyse a more restrictive 'Dasgupta-Heal 
economy' with one capital and one non-renewable resource stock, and 
constant returns to these two stocks, and then a Special Case of this 
economy with Cobb-Douglas production and isoelastic utility. This raised 
more general doubts about the relevance to sustainability modelling of the 
infinite time horizon and infinite cap ital-re source substitutability typically 
assumed in neoclassical growth modelling. 
Moving on to opsustimality itself, several results were established, 
although at differing levels of generality, as summarised in Table 3.3, 
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Table 3.3 Summary of main results, and their level of generality 
Results Summary of their meaning Assumptions 
obtain- made (and 
ed hence level of 
generality) 
Propo- Net national welfare is equivalent constant 1: Convex 
sitions utility level of PV, and therefore not , smooth, regular, 
3.1-3.4 achievable as constant utility; net national capital-resource 
welfare is return on aggregate wealth; economy. 
declining aggregate wealth implies 
unsustainability. 
Propo- There must be a period when wealth is rising 2: As 1, but also 
sitions on PV-optimal path, but path is unsustained. initially 
3.5-3.6 sustainable and 
single-peaked. 
Propo- OPsustimal consumption (and utility) path has 3: As 2, but also 
sitions (perhaps) rising phase followed by constant one capital, and 
3.7-3.8. phase. Opsustimal net national welfare is one resource 
return on aggregate wealth, equals equivalent stock, constant 
constant utility of PV. returns, low 
asymptotic 
Section Consumption or capital tax must become marginal 
3.6 subsidy to sustain constant utility; resource productivity of 
taxes cannot sustain constant utility. capital. 
Appen- Low enough discount rate or initial 4: As 3, but also 
dix 3.1 capital/resource stock ratio makes PV-optimal exact functional 
Propo- utility initially sustainable, and (at a lower forms (i. e. the 
sition 3.9 threshold) makes opsustimal path different Special Case); 
from maximin path. analytic result. 
Conjec- Consumption is higher on initial rising phase 5: As 4, but 
ture 3.1 of opsustimal path than on PV-optimal path. numerical result 
Table Higher discount rate raises initial opsustimal 
3.2 consumption, lowers transition time and 
eventual opsustimal consumption, etc. 
which includes the above results on aggregate wealth. For the general 
Dasgupta-Heal economy, we showed that the opsustimal path either 
comprises a phase of rising consumption (and therefore utility) followed by 
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a phase of constant consumption, or has constant consumption always. All 
the economy's variables are continuous between the two phases, in contrast 
to the discontinuities in (c), and the correspondence between non-declining 
aggregate wealth and non-declining utility is exact. On the opsustimal path, 
net national welfare is always both the return on aggregate wealth, and the 
constant utility equivalent of PV. 
The exact solution of the Special Case showed that the opsustimal path 
differs from (and therefore has higher PV than) the initial maximin path 
only if impatience or the initial capital/resource stock ratio is low enough. 
Since this ratio rises without limit as the PV-optimal path develops, the 
current opsustimal path will eventually merge into the current maximin. 
Numerically, we found that the rising phase of an opsustimal path has 
slightly a lower resource flow but higher consumption than the PV-optimal 
path, which is an attractive feature, and accords with the intuition that the 
PV-optimal level of capital investment is initially too high for sustainability. 
Finally, we returned to the more general Dasgupta-Heal economy, and 
revisited the conclusion in Chapter 2 that it is surprisingly hard. to find an 
effective sustainedness policy, given that consumption and resource 
depletion cannot be directly controlled in a market economy. To achieve 
the opsustimal path, a consumption or capital tax must be credibly 
announced at time zero, in order to shift the economy from the PV-optimal 
to the rising phase of opsustimal path (assuming there is one), and come into 
operation at the start of the constant phase. Both taxes must end up as 
subsidies, with all the political problems that financing them would entail in 
practice. Resource taxes are even worse, being unable to achieve 
sustainedness, essentially because they can shift resource depletion to the 
future, but cannot induce sufficiently high saving. The root of this long- 
term policy problem is clearly that attaining constant utility is plain difficult, 
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once PV-maximising individuals have piled up capital and eaten away the 
resource to the point where they have a strong incentive to consume capital, 
rather than accumulate more of it. 
I hope I have shown why indicators of sustainability are not always what 
they seem, and why opsustimality is an interesting and attractive, although 
not always straightforward, alternative to PV-optimality or to the maximin 
as a criterion of intergenerational equity. A natural extension of both topics 
would be to include other standard features of environmental and resource 
economics, such as renewable or repairable resources, resource stock effects 
on production, population growth, and extraction costs. But in further 
research, I would perhaps be tempted first to explore four issues, either 
separately or together, that were touched on above: irreversible capital 
accumulation; a finite time horizon; a production function with a bounded 
average product of resources; and last but not least the role of technical 
change, which can so radically transform any result concerning sustained or 
constant utility paths. Another thrust of theoretical research in this area 
should be to see whether anything useful can be said about the 'sustainability 
prices' which would make a change in aggregate wealth an accurate measure 
of sustainability. Or can we say only that if our current development is 
unsustainable, then the existing measure will warn us about it - but too late 
to prevent at least some suffering? 
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APPENDICES TO CHAPTER 3 
Appendix 3.1 Proof of Lemma 3.1 
LEMMA 3.1: Along any Pareto-efficient path, the marginal product of 
capital (which equals, in a competitive economy, the interest rate) is strictly 
decreasing, and approaches p, i. e. 
&WO) <0 for all t; (A3.1) 
FK(x(t)) -> p as t ---> co. (A 3.2) 
PROOF: 
Any efficient path in a capital-resource economy with no resource 
renewability and no externalities obeys Hotelling's Rule, IýRIFR=FK. Given 
(3.17), resource flow is always strictly positive, by DH74's Proposition 5: 
R(t) >0 for all t on any efficient path (A3.3) 
and Hotelling's Rule then takes the special form (see DH74 p 11): 
x= u(x)f(x) for all t on any efficient path (A3.4) 
By (A3.3), x must be finite at t=O, and by (A3.4), x cannot be zero at 
t=O (otherwise, by (3.14), R would remain infinite for a finite time, which 
is impossible with a finite resource stock). Hence by (A3.4) and (3.18), 
x> af[x(O)] >0 for all t, (A3.5) 
x ---> oo as t oo .1 
(A3.6) 
(A3.5) and (3.15) give (A3. I). (A3.6) and (3.16) give (A3.2). 11 
1. Note the role here, and often elsewhere, of the infinite time horizon, the 
physical unreality of which was highlighted in Section 3.3.2. 
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Appendix 3.2 Proof that PV-optimal utility in the Special Case can be initially sustainable and single-peaked 
DH74 (pl7) studied the economy defined by (3-9)-(3.18) and in addition: 
U(C) >0 (A3.7) 
F(K, R) = KR'-al 0.5 <<1 
By defining x: =KIR, the capital-resource flow ratio, DH74 showed by 
integrating the Hotelling rule (which is x =x' here) that 
X(t) = {(l-Cz)t+[X(O)l I-a1 
1/0-01) 
(A3.8) 
and thus from the Ramsey rule Cl C= (FK- 6)1-q that PV-optimal consumption 
is 
C(t) - C(O)[X(0)1-cl", {(l-U)t+[X(O)l 1 -Cilctl? 7(l - cl)e (A3.9) 
We cannot prove that this is initially rising (and hence that U is also) unless 
we know ýý(O) as an explicit function of the parameters KO, So, a and 6, but 
this seems impossible to calculate. However, since Jý Clx in an efficient 
Cobb-Douglas economy, ' 
(A3.10) 
We may then use the Special Case assumption (3.20) that -q = ce (and since 
both -q < cz and -q >a are allowed by the parameter restrictions, there is no 
reason to suppose that q =a will produce atypical results) to give 
-: 1 (5/a)t 
R [C(O)lx(O)]e- . 
(A3.11) 
2. From (A3.4), the Hotelling rule with Cobb-Douglas production is 
x1x=k1K-kR=F1K, whence j=R(k-F)1K=-C/x. The exponent of 
{(1 - aft + 
fx_(O)]"j in (A3,10) is incorrectly given as alq in DH74 (p 17). 
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This can be integrated, using the initial and terminal conditions S(O) =So and 
limt--).. cOS(t) = 
0', to give the PV-optimal paths of the resource stock and flow: 
S(t) = Soe-(bloe)tl R(t) = (61u)Soe-(61a)t (A3.12) 
which with (A3.8), (A3.9) and K(O) =KO give the PV-optimal paths of 
consumption and capital: 
I /(I - ce) Olce)t C(t) = IC(O)IX(0)1{(l-U)t+[X(0)11-ul e- (A3.13) 
K(t) = (a/6) C(t) (A3.14) 
O/Cj; 
ý(O) = UK 16S ; where ýý(O) = 6K 00 
c(O)IX-(O) = 62S 0 
/Cl2 (A3.15). 
From Solow (1974, p39), the maximin consumption at time zero is 
Cm = a{KO 
2et- 1 [(2a - 1)SO]'-'1'1" (A3.16) 
Initial sustainability (ýý(O):!! ý CO, which also implies single peakedness) 
occurs if 6:!! ýa'[(2a-1)SO1KO](")1"'. 11 
In fact, in the Special Case one can prove algebraically that U> U' and 
- I: _ - -x. E >0 can coexist. The current maximin utility U(C, ) comes from 
(A3.16), by replacing KO and So by the current capital and resource stocks 
K and K Aggregate investment 7r. E equals UJK-FýR); and from (A3.7), 
Uc= C-'I and FRR=(1- u)K"R`1. One can also calculate net national 
welfare from the above formulae for R, C and K, and 
check numerically that Z> [Pn, always (as in Figure 3.3, which was 
3. Defining 7rs as the costate variable of the resource stock, this stems from the 
transversality condition lim. I . -xs(t)S(t) = 
0, the adjoint equation7rs-67rs alllaS 
= 0, where H is the undiscounted Hamiltonian of the PV-maximisation problem, and 
the condition 7rs >0 for some t. These conditions all apply to any efficient resource 
depletion path in a Dasgupta-Heal model, and are implicit in the optimal control 
analysis on plO of DH74. 
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computed for the Special Case with So = KO - 1, u= -q = 0.7 and 6-0.1). 
Appendix 3.3 Proof of Lemmas 3.3-3.4 
LEMMA 3-3: The opsustimal consumption path cannot always rise. 
PROOF: 
At any point on the opsustimal path, either the sustainedness constraint 
(3.21) is binding ((ý=O) or it is not (e>O). On an always rising path 
(e > 0), the constraint is never binding, so the path always satisfies the PV- 
optimal condition &C= (FK- 6)/-q(C). But then by the proof of Lemma 3.2, 
consumption is zero asymptotically, a contradiction. 11 
LEMMA 3.4: On a continuous opsustimal consumption path, a period with 
(j =0 cannot be followed by a period with (i > 0. 
PROOF: 
Assume Lemma 3.4 is wrong, so that the opsustimal path (call it C") does 
exist with &= 0 in some Period 1 (t, < t:!! ý t2) followed by el >0 in some 
Period 2 (t2 :! ýý t :! z-: ý t3). (3.19) can be rewritten as 
FK =ö+ -q(C)ÜIC 
so during a locally PV-optimal period such as Period 2, FKUc, the marginal 
PV benefit from saving a small unit of consumption for a small unit of time, 
equals the PV cost of pure impatience (6Uc) plus the PV cost of declining 
marginal utility -q(C)Uc(ýIC. So then FK> 6 in Period 2, and by Lemma 
3.1, FK> 6 during Period 1 as well. But that means F K>6+'00(ýIC 
throughout Period 1, so that saving will always have a positive net PV 
benefit. By the assumed continuity of the opsustimal path, and the 
construction of Period 1. saving a small amount at the start of Period I 
(before which consumption is rising) and spending the proceeds at the 
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beginning of Period 2 does not break the sustainedness constraint. Such a 
perturbation will therefore lead to a sustained path with more PV than 
Hence C' is not opsustimal. 
LEMMA 3.5: The opsustimal consumption path is continuous. 
PROOF: 
Consider any path C' with an upward jump at some time tj > 0, as 
shown in Figure 3.6, where 
C and CI(tj+) =C+J, >C 
(CI(tj-) denotes the limit of CI(t) as t approaches tj from below, etc; and 
the case J, <0 need not be considered because it breaks the sustainedness 
condition. ) Consider the perturbation to consumption shown by the dotted 
lines in Figure 3.6, where 0< co << 1. The total saving lico 
2 
after tj equals the 
dissaving 
&W2 
before tj; plus what 
&C02 
, had 
it been added to capital, 
would have produced after tj, which is 
O(W3). So the net PV of the 







JJ)] (1 - 
öw) 
oc uc(c) - UC(C+J, ) - O(W) 
which is sure to be positive for small enough w, since UJQ > Uc(C+Jl) 
by the strict concavity in (3.12). The perturbation thus maintains 
sustainedness and adds PV to ýC, so Cl cannot be opsustimal. li 
A trivial extension of Lemma 3.5 shows that the PV-optimal path is also 
continuous, as we used already in Proposition 3.3. 
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Appendix 3.4 Proofs of Lemmas 3.6-3.7 and Proposition 3.8 
LEMMA 3.6: The opsustimal resource flow rate R is continuous. 
PROOF: 
This is similar to the proof of Lemma 3.5, and only a sketch is given. If 
R is discontinuous at some time t, then by the continuous differentiability of 
F and the continuity of K, FR(K, R) jumps downwards at t. One can then 
bring forward a small amount of R from just after t to just before t in a way 
that increases consumption just before t, without affecting consumption just 
after t (the decrease in output just after t caused by the reduction in R would 
be offset by a decrease in investment then, which can be more than made 
up for by the increase in output just before t). So PV would thus be 
increased, which means a discontinuity in R cannot be opsustimal. 11 
LEMMA 3.7: Aggregate investment is continuous on the opsustimal path, 
and zero from V onwards. Net national we4fare is continuous on the 
opsustim, al path, and equal to utility from V onwards. 
PROOF: 
k-FRR = F-C-FRR = FK(K, R)K- C, given constant returns to K and 
R. By Lemmas 3.5 and 3.6 this is the sum of two continuous functions on 
the opsustimal path, and thus is continuous itself. Uc is also continuous by 
(3-12), so Uc[FK(K, R)K-C] (= aggregate investment in utility terms) 
approaches zero as t approaches V from below, since it is continuous and 
zero from V onwards by Hartwick's Rule. Given the differentiability 
assumptions about U, net national welfare Z= U+ Uc[FK(K, R)K- C] is also 
the sum of two continuous functions, and therefore continuous, and equal 
to U from V onwards - 
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PROPOSITION 3.8: Let the transition time between the rising and constant 
utility phases on the opsustimal path be V. Then: 
Ut(t) < Unt(t) < Zt(t) 6Tt(t) 6pV t<Tt => t (Ut ) 
t-2! Tt =* Ut(t) = Unt(t) = Zt(t) 6PVt(Ut) 
and all five functions are continuous at t=V. 
PROOF: 
Prooffor the rising phase when t< Tt. - 
Since we know from Proposition 3.7 that utility will be rising and then 
constant, Ut(t) < Utt. (Otherwise Utt is inefficient, a contradiction. ) 
Next, since the non-declining utility constraint does not bite during the rising 
phase of the opsustimal path, the path is locally competitive during this 
phase, in the sense of Asheim (1994, p259). Hence (3.5) holds, as long as 
the upper limit of integration T is less than or equal to V. So let T=P, 
and we then have: 
t 
e- `Zt(t) -e -'TtZý(Tt) = bf7t Ut(s)e-"ds, which with Lemma 3.7 gives 
e Ut(s)e-'sds = be-'tf Ut(s)e-'(s-t)ds 
00 -'tZt(t) -e 
-'TtUt(V) + 6fTt' 
Zt(t) = b[PV, (Ut)] as required. 
Next, from the derivative of Zt in (3.4), the definition and derivative of Tt 
in (3.7) and (3.8), and Lemma 3.7, we have that Zt and Tt are continuous 
functions with the same value at t=0 and the same derivative till V, and so 
are equal throughout the phase. Finally, since the opsustimal path from t 
<V is not constant, and by standard arguments is unique, the current 
maximin cannot attain the PV of the opsustimal path, i. e. (Pt/6 < PV(Ut). 
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Prooffor the constant phase when t> Tt: 
(i) Ut constant and PV-optimal =: ý Ut is efficient, and so equal to Umt. 
(ii) Ut constant =* Hartwick's Rule holds, i. e. kt(t) -T'Rý(t)Rt(t) =0 
Zt(t) = Ut+Uc(kt-FIRt) = Ut. 
(iii) Ut constant 00 =* 6PV, (Ut) =6 Ut f e-('-Ids = Ut. 
(iv) Because Kt -F, ýRt=O, V=O, and V continuous for all t 
=> *t(t) = *t(P-) = Zt(P-) = zt(t). 
Appendix 3.5 Proof of Proposition 3.9 
Consider Figure 3.7, where Cm is the maximin level of consumption 0 
from time zero. The first part of the proof starts from the given condition 
(2a-1)"(SO1KO)('-O')'0'16 >1 (A3.17) 
The dotted line AOBODO is a consumption-only perturbation (i. e. one that 
assumes no change in resource flow, the other control variable) that leads 
from an initial consumption level reduced by an amount gco below the 
maximin. path, where 0<1- [t << I and 0<w <-, 1, to a consumption level 
maintained permanently at (I -1t)w above the maximin. path, starting after 
a short time w. Average perturbed consumption is (It - 1/2)co lower than the 
maximin. path during 0:! ý-= t:!! ý co. The increase in the capital stock at t= CO is 
(tt - I/ )W2, thus 2 which gives a rise in the permanent consumption level from 
time co onwards of 
0) 
(It _ 
I/ )W2 2)W2(aCO1aK 2 (2a 
= (1 -It) co from Figure 3.7. 
1)"0'(So1Ko)('-c')1c" from (A3.16) 
(A3.18) 
The net gain in PV on the perturbed path is thus 
(IL 
-12 -öco)/ö 
+ 0( /2) (0 UC(c MO) + 10 - IL) ü) 
UC(CMO)] (1 
oc -I+ (2a-l)""(SolKo)('-)"(l-bco)lb + OM 
from (A3.18). This last expression is positive for small enough w, thanks 
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to (A3.17). The perturbed path is thus sustained and has more PV than the 
maximin path, so the latter cannot be the opsustimal path. 
The second part starts from the given condition 
(2 a- 1) "0'(SOIKO) (' -a)lcel6 (A3.19) 
Assume, contrary to Proposition 3.9, that the opsustimal path Cý(t) is 
distinct from the maximin path. By Proposition 3.7, it must therefore be 
C, n like ABID' in Figure 3.7, comprising a rising phase up to consumption 
> C' at time V and constant consumption equal to C' thereafter. (A3.16) 0# 
together with C' > C' then gives #0 
2ce-I > SO' -aKo 2a-1 I 
and (A3.3) (RO(t) >0 for all t) 
S(7") < So, which with (A3.20) 
r(7) > Ko, which with (A3.21) 




Now consider the consumption-only perturbation A'12M"N. A similar 
marginal analysis as above shows this perturbation has a net PV gain if 
-1 
which is true from (A3.19) and (A3.22). Thus A'L'M'N' is sustained and 
has higher PV than AIBID', so AB'D' is not the opsustimal path. 11 
152 Appendices to Chapter 3 
Figure 3.1 Illustration of the main issues about PV-optimality and 
sustainability 
U-bl* 
ý /-r "\ uu? ) 
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u 
Figure 3.2 Utility, current maximin utility and net national welfare 
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Figure 3.3 Utility, current maximin utility and net national welfare 
on a PV-optimal path interrupted by an unanticipated 
constant utility policy 
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Figure 3.5 Numerical solutions for PV-optimal and opsustimal paths 
in the Special Case with a=0.7,6=0.1 and KO=So=l 
(a) Consumption and total investment 
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Figure 3.7 Can the opsustimal path improve on the initial maximin? 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCERN FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
IN A SEXUAL WORLD * 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
An important if fairly obvious result of Chapter 2, which explored the 
relationship between controlling environmental deterioration and achieving 
sustainable development (SD), was that achieving SD may apparently entail 
a loss of present value of utility (PV) for everyone in the economy. How 
then can SD policies be justified in terms of individual preferences? The 
question is important, if such policies are to be democratically 
implementable (Kennedy 1994). The answer suggested by Conjecture 3.1 
was that each agent values the prospect of forever on some scale which is 
commensurate with PV. However, because of the social amenity value of 
the common environment, it is inefficient or even impossible for her to 
achieve SD by individual action, so she finds it individually rational to 
support a government which pursues an SD policy. 
But how can one so justify an SD policy in economies with no 
environmental externalities, as in the models of Chapter 3? Moreover, what 
if one also assumes constant returns to scale, so that the ownership of capital 
and resource stocks can then be regarded as being divided equally among 
*I thank Geir Asheim, Rich Howarth, Antonella lanni, Geoff Lewis, Liz Peters, 
Alan Rogers, Mike Toman, Richard Vaughan and David Ulph for helpful 
conversations. This research was funded by award no. L320-27-3002 from the 
Global Environmental Change Initiative of the UK Economic and Social Research 
Council. 
158 Chapter 4 
a large number of identical, price-taking agents? In such circumstances, if 
individual agents seek SD, why can-not they simply change their private 
resource depletion and consumption plans accordingly? Why would they 
wish instead to vote for government which pursues the SD policies analysed 
in Chapter 3? These are the central questions to be addressed here. And 
their interest is not merely theoretical. Many people are not persuaded that 
society-wide, cumulative environmental problems are severe enough in 
themselves significantly to affect future social utility. To convince them, we 
would have to find another explanation. 
Such sceptics are not very likely either to accept the simple assumption 
that each agent is concerned to achieve collective SD, i. e. NDU forever for 
an agent representative of the economy as a whole, rather than just NDU 
forever for herself and her immediate descendants. We will henceforth refer 
to NDU forever for the individual as sustainedness, since sustainable 
'development' has inevitable connotations of something achieved at a 
societal rather than an individual level. (As observed in Section 1.2 of 
Chapter 1, at the level of the whole economy, NDU forever, SD and 
sustainedness, are all formally equivalent concepts in this thesis. ) Individual 
concern for sustainedness could justify SD policy, since collective SD is 
certainly impossible to achieve by individual action. While not investigating 
SD as such, Howarth and Norgaard (1993, p347) develop this theme by 
assuming that "an individual's concern for the welfare of future generations 
... may extend to all members of 
future generations", following Marglin's 
(1963) precedent. They defend this assumption by observing (p352) that: 
"A great many individuals who neither have nor plan to have children profess a 
concern for future generations, and participants in debates over such diverse issues 
as the environment, the national debt, and education often argue that members of 
the present generation are obligated to provide for future generations in general, 
not simply for their own lineal descendants. " 
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While by no means disagreeing with such sentiments, this is not the 
assumption I choose to make in this chapter, since it seems unnecessarily 
strong. All I need is the first part of another observation which they do not 
actually develop as a formal model: 
"In reality, most people live in households where assets are shared between 
members... Parents's efforts to benefit their offspring will thus benefit their 
offspring's spouses as well, much to the satisfaction of the spouses' parents. 
Given such interconnections between families, the welfare of children becomes a 
public good; acting individually, parents will underinvest in their children's futures 
relative to the outcome that could be achieved through collective action. 
(Howarth and Norgaard 1993, p351; italics added) 
What this recognises is that the asexual agents who populate the vast 
majority of models of economic growth and development, be they infinitely- 
lived, or finitely-lived with a single, unbranching line of descendants, do not 
exist in reality. Sex and marriage exist, and for good genetic reasons 
(Dawkins 1989, p293), children marry outside the family and share the use 
of inherited assets (i. e. bequests) with their marriage partner in almost all 
cultures. This sharing has a profound effect on saving and bequests, and 
therefore on the sustainability of economic growth. To analyse it, we must 
abandon the continuous time, infinitely lived person framework of Chapters 
2 and 3. The fact that an infinitely lived person has no offspring and makes 
no bequests did not matter crucially when we were uninterested in how such 
bequests might be shared when people die. Here, we are interested, so 
deaths and births do matter, and we must recognise the existence of separate 
generations formally within the model. 
In doing so, we will follow the lead of Nerlove, Razin and Sadka (1984). 
They combined parental concern for immediate offspring' with marriage 
1. In fact Nerlove, Razin and Sadka assume parents derive utility from their 
children's combined inheritances, rather than from their children's welfare as such. 
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outside the family. They assumed that: 
parents make equal bequests of assets to their children (whether by 
imparting knowledge, accumulating physical capital or just leaving 
undepleted natural resources), and in so doing decrease their own 
hedonistic pleasures and increase their children's; 
(2) marriage partners are chosen for 'love' (that is, for reasons unrelated 
to bequests); 
(3) partners share equally any bequests received from their parents, and 
average out any preferences inherited from their parents; this means 
that 'individual' in this paper can usually refer equally to one partner 
or both partners as a couple, without causing ambiguity; 
(4) bequests are made before parents know who their children's mates 
will be; 
Given these assumptions, parents bequeath less than the Pareto-oPtimal 
amount of resources to their children, because they ignore the benefit that 
their bequest gives to their children's mates' parents. Thus giving bequests 
becomes partly a public good, and a matter for public policy. 
In particular, the combination of equal bequests in (1), random mating 
in (2) and (4), and constant population (which I will assume, even though 
Nerlove, Razin and Sadka allowed for population growth) will result below 
in factors of 2 appearing in expressions for individually optimal bequests 
where a factor of 1 would be socially PV-optimal. The suboptimality of 
laissez-faire bequests is thus potentially very large for fundamental 
reproductive reasons, reasons which the kind of sceptics who belittle the 
significance of suboptimal environmental bequests will find much harder to 
ignore. True, assumptions (1), (2) and (4) are empirically debatable (and 
not obviously realistic in the pure resource economy to be modelled below). 
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In a society where all wealth is passed to one sex of child and/or marriage 
partners are carefully chosen for their wealth, the suboptimality of family 
bequests will be much less. ' But assumptions (l)-(4) are fairly realistic 
given prevailing modern attitudes towards marriage and sexual equality, and 
the fact that much of parental bequests is in raising and educating children 
before they marry. A substantial degree of suboptimality from marriage and 
bequests is therefore likely, and therefore worth studying in its purest form 
as a potential justification for SD policy. 
In this Chapter I call the Nerlove-Razin-Sadka ignored benefit a mating- 
bequest externality. My contribution is to combine it with an assumption 
that individual parents are concerned aboutfamily sustainedness, defined as 
their children being as well off as they themselves, or the current generation 
of all parents, are; although I do not provide any detailed empirical or 
philosophical reasons for assuming this. This concern is included as part of 
PV in an extended intergenerational welfare function, as suggested in 
Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1 then illustrate, by assuming some particular 
functional forms in a model of non-overlapping generations, that if parents 
desire family sustainedness, then it may be a valid goal of public policy, 
because the mixing of bequests that happens when children mate make it 
infeasible, or at least inefficient, for parents to achieve sustainedness 
individually. Further work clearly remains in studying individual concerns 
for sustainedness, and in building an overlapping generations framework 
which can also include children's concerns for their parents. 
2. Cole, Mailath and Postlethwaite (1992) analyse the effect of some alternative 
social norms for mating on bequests and economic growth which 
differ from 
assumption (4). And other factors exist, such as automatic bequests of knowledge, 
which may result ceteris paribus in parents bequeathing too much capital and 
resources rather than too little, and therefore alleviate the sustainedness problem. 
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A simple game-theoretic version of my model also reveals three less 
obvious but closely-related conclusions. Firstly, if individual sustainedness 
is feasible, SD as an overriding policy concern (i. e. of infinite value, so that 
SD has to be achieved no matter what the cost in terms of other policy 
objectives) cannot be derived from individual preferences, because if 
individuals' concern for sustainedness, were unbounded, they would achieve 
it anyway by individual action. Secondly, if individual concern for 
sustainedness is too weak, then SD policy is not justified either. Thirdly, 
feasibility is affected by which form of family sustainedness it is that parents 
seek. Is it internal sustainedness, defined here as children being no worse 
off than their parents themselves (which is always feasible); or external 
sustainedness, defined here as children being no worse off than their 
parents' generation as a whole (which is sometimes infeasible)? 
We start by considering in Section 4.2 various ways in which overall 
parental welfare depends on their own hedonistic utility when alive, and on 
their children's future utility. We then assume one such form of parental 
concern, the sum of a linear function and a step discontinuity that represents 
concern for sustainedness, and show its qualititative implications for SD 
policy. Section 4.3 develops these ideas more precisely using particular 
functional forms for resource growth and utility, and gives a preliminary 
game-theoretic analysis of individual sustainedness. Section 4.4 shows how 
equivalent results to Section 4.3 exist in a reduced-form, asexual version of 
the model, and argues that collective SD policy can still be justified, even 
when individual sustainedness action seems in the asexual model to be both 
feasible and as efficient as collective action. Section 4.5 compares the 
sexual and asexual results in detail, and Section 4.6 concludes. 
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4.2 PARENTS' CONCERN FOR THEIR CHILDREN 
4.2.1 The nature of their concern 
We model a world with non-overlapping generations, so that parents live 
for just one period (indexed by t), and their children live only during period 
t+ 1 ('Period' and 'generation' mean the same length of time throughout). ' 
All individuals of the same generation are assumed to be economically 
identical. Population and the sex ratio are both constant, with each pair of 
parents producing on average one boy and one girl in the next generation. 
The concern of each parent in generation t for his or her children is 
modelled as his or her intergenerational welfare function with paternalistic 
altruism: 
Wt = Wt(Ut, Ut+, ); awlaut > 0, awlaut', > 0; where 
U the hedonistic quality of life that each parent enjoys t 
during period t, which we call instantaneous utility or 
just utility, and which will typically depend on current 
consumption C,; ' 
t+1 the utility of each of their children, 
i. e. the hedonistic U 
quality of life the children enjoy while alive in period 
t+1, which will typically depend on consumption C, 1. 
3. One could instead assume, as Vaughan (1991) and Howarth (1992) do, that their 
children are alive but with no independent economic role during period t (e. g. living 
costlessly on 'mother's milk'). But this is mathematically equivalent to, and thus 
formally no more realistic than, the non-overlapping generations model here. 
4. In Chapter 1, the notation for instantaneous utility of a person of age a in an 
overlapping generations model was Ita. However, age is unspeciiieci in ine 110il- 
overlapping generations framework here, so we may identify it, with 
U, the 'net 
benefit to society in period t' 
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We could have instead, as Dasgupta (1974) and Asheim (1988) do, called 
Wt 4utility', and U, 'felicity', or simply left the latter unnamed. The analysis 
of non-declining W, is avoided because it would be more complex than the 
analysis of non-declining U, less in the spirit of what sustainedness means 
(in my view) to most people, and liable to the sort of dynamic inconsistency 
problems that both authors identify. 
simple functional form typically assumed for W, for analytical 
convenience as much for as any other reason, is 
W U, + U, +, ID; D>1 t (4.1) 
where D is the intergenerational utility discount factor. ' This is similar to 
the seminal formulation of Marglin (1963, p101), except that the latter was 
in terms of marginal utility. More importantly, Marglin ignored any 
biological influences on personal preferences by including concerns for all 
other members of the current generation, and for all other people in the next 
generation, irrespective of their degree of relatedness to the person holding 
the preferences. Note also that if instead of (4.1) we had chosen the non- 
paternalistic, recursive form W, = U, + W,, IID = E"0(11D)iU(C, +j), we 0 
would have still have ended up with (4.1) as the maximand for parents in 
generation t, by applying the derivation in Blanchard and Fischer (1989, 
p105) to the non-overlapping generations model here. Finally, it is 
interesting to speculate what value of the discount factor would have been 
naturally selected in primitive human environments. The obvious guess is 
that D=2 (equal to about 3%a year over a 25 year generation span), since 
5. Perhaps a majority of authors call IID (< 1) rather than D the 'discount factor' 
(for example Asheim 1988, where 1 ID = b), but I find the definition in (4.1) more 
memorable since an increase in D then represents increased impatience, as does an 
increase in the utility discount rate 6 in Chapters 2 and 3. 
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in a constant population each parent can be viewed as bequeathing resources 
to one child, to whom his degree of relationship is 0.5. However, since 
such calculations normally apply to transferring resources between parent 
and child (as in Rogers 1994), rather than transferring utility, some more 
careful thought may be required here. 
The linear welfare function (4.1) needs to be extended if it is to reflect 
any idea that parents seek sustainedness for their children. Figure 4.1, 
which plots three alternative graphs of WXU111) I Ut=constanv suggests some 
simple possible extensions. Common to all of them is some kind of 'loss 
aversion' effect on parents' welfare as children's utility U,,, changes from 
just above some critical reference level UP of utility in the parents' 
generation (e. g. at points N) to just below it (e. g. at points M). In each 
case, parents care much more about a fall in their children's utility ftom N 
to M, than about a rise of the same magnitude from N to P; so in some 
sense they place a special value on sustaining the utility of the family above 
the reference level UtP as time passes ftom one generation to the next. But 
whereas Figure 4.1 (a) shows a change of slope of Wt about UtP, Figure 
4.1(b) shows a discontinuous jump of size B in W, at UtP, with no change in 
slope, and in Figure 4.1 (c) the discontinuity of Figure 4.1 (b) is 'smoothed 
out' so that UP is a point of inflection of Wt rather than a discontinuity. 
I suggest that Figure 4.1 (c) is something like the true nature of concern 
that parents feel for their children. This is however pure intuition, and I am 
not aware of any empirical research which would bear this out (estimating 
W, empirically would face the double difficulty of dealing with preferences 
for intangible utility, and with preferences over long periods of time), or of 
any philosophical research which studies how such concerns would 
be 
consistent with other concerns. I further suggest that a typical reference 
utility level UP is simply parents' current utility U, which is therefore far 
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above the pure survival level for all but the very poorest societies today. 
This psychological concern for maintaining our children's utility at least as 
high as our own would, I imagine, have evolved from our biological origin 
as a subsistence species, when the survival of our genes depended crucially 
on our children being as well off as ourselves and our contemporaries, and 
thus able to survive. 
For analytical tractability, I will in fact assume the simpler, discontinuous 
form of concern in Figure 4.1 (b). The conclusions stemming from it are 
probably similar, but more clear-cut, to those stemming from the 
nonconcave form on Figure 4.1 (c). (4.1) thus replaced by 
W= PV, + BJ{Ut+,, UtP), (4.2) t 
where 
PV, = U, + U, + 11D; D>1 is called the 'continuous' or present 
value (PV) part of welfare; 
B>0 is referred to as the benefit or the value of sustainedness; and 
J{a, bI: =0 if 0<a<b; :=1 if a-.. ýý b>0 is a step or 'jump' function. 
Two alternatives for the reference level UP are the parents' actual utility 
U, as suggested above, or the average population utility in generation t, say 
U,; for the moment we do not specify which of these is chosen. Ex ante 
such differences are important, as we show in the game-theoretic analysis 
of Section 4.3.3, but ex post there will be no difference between them, as 
all families are indeed identical. Our ex post definition of sustainedness as 
non-declining utility is thus as in Howarth and Norgaard (1992), and 
consistent with the definitions already given in Chapter 1: 
Ut for all t. 
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4.2.2 An overview of externality-correction policies in a sexual world 
with sustainedness concerns 
The welfare function (4.2) gives rise to two analytically distinct 
approaches to using government policy to maximise social welfare in a 
sexual world. Both approaches arise from the mating-bequest externalities 
caused by parentsý concern for their children, who mate outside the family 
and share their inheritance with their mates. Any increase in bequest that 
two parents in period t give to their children will then increase the 'warm 
glow' of altruistic welfare enjoyed by the parents of their children's mates. 
The increase occurs continuously through the term U,,, ID in PV, and 
discontinuously through the step function BJJU, 1, UPJ. But if mating is 
random and happens after bequests have been made (assumptions which are 
made throughout this chapter), free markets externalise both these sources 
of extra intragenerational value of a bequest. Social welfare will then be 
maximised by government policies, such as a consumption tax, which give 
an incentive at the margin for higher bequests. ' 
In the first analytical approach to analysing what tax level maximises 
welfare, we assume that the sustainedness value B is zero. We thus ignore 
the discontinuous part of the externality in parents' welfare. Recognising 
that any increase in children's utility U,,, requires a sacrifice of parents' 
utility U, a parent's overall welfare W, is therefore maximised by setting 
dPV, 1dU, = dU, (U, )ldU, + 11D = 0, (4.3) 
assuming that d'PVIdU,, 12 =d2 UIdU,, 12 < 
0. The solution to (4.3) will 
6. The literature on 'Ricardian equivalence', which purports to show that 
government redistributive policies are ineffective because they are cancelled out by 
individual actions (see for example Barro 1974 and Bernheim. and Bagwell 1988) is 
irrelevant here, as this literature studies lump sum taxes rather than the incentive taxes 
modelled here. 
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be called the zero-B social optimum for UI, denoted by U,,,. The child's 
utility level that individual parents select as optimal in the zero-Bfree market 
(where there is no government intervention, no sustainedness value B, and 
each family assumes that it acts alone), denoted by U,,, -'. Because of the 
continuous mating-bequest externality, U,, 11" is always less than Ut+, - One 
way to maximise W, for everyone would then be for the goverm-nent to 
impose a revenue-neutral consumption tax at the level needed to raise an 
individual parent's plan for his child's utility from U, +, " to 
Ut+,. 
The second analytical approach is to assume a finite, positive value of 
sustainedness (B > 0) - There are then three different ways in which this can 
interact with the various possible relative positions of U,,, ", ffj and the 
reference level UP to affect the tax level that is needed to reach a global 
maximum of overall welfare W, as shown in Figure 4.2, which assumes 
that everyone acts together. ' Firstly, in Figures 4.2(a) and 4.2(b), it 
happens that UP < U,.,,, so sustainedness concerns have no effect on the 
collective choice of Uj as the globally maximum utility level in period 
t+ 1. (They might make the sustained point S in Figure 4.2(b) individually 
preferable to the unsustained zero-B free-market solution M, but we will not 
analyse this case here. ) Secondly, Figure 4.2(c) shows the case which will 
most concern us here. Here Ut+l < UtP and B > PVt(Ut, j)-PVt(UtP-) 
(where the UP - notation means the value just left of the 
discontinuity at 
U, P), so that a policy to move to the zero-B optimum point L is not globally 
optimal. Instead, an explicit SD policy which achieves U, 1= UP at point 
G is globally optimal (ignoring the possibility, which we study 
in Section 
4.3.3, that individuals find it individually rational to reach G by their own 




nevertheless be a fixed value of UP at which it equals U,,,. 
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effort). Thirdly, Figure 4.2(d) shows the case where the zero-B optimal 
level Ut+ is not sustained, but the cost of sustainedness 
pvt(Ut,, )-PV, (UtP-) is greater than its value B, so that it is globally 
optimal to stay at the zero-B optimal point. 
We now illustrate these general principles by developing a model with 
particular functional forms, in which we can calculate the values of U,, IA I) 
and UtP, and the nature of the SD policies needed to reach UtP. We 
start in Section 4.3.1 by calculating the zero-B results, which ignore specific 
sustainedness concerns. We then add in these concerns in Section 4.3.2. 
In Section 4.3.3 we consider the question of individual sustainedness: can 
collective SD policy ever be redundant, because individual families may be 
able and motivated to achieve sustainedness by their own initiative? 
4.3 A MODEL OF RESOURCE DEPLETION AND BEQUESTS IN 
A SEXUAL WORLD 
4.3.1 The model without sustainedness concerns 
This section uses the same framework as the general model in Section 
4.2.1 
, and then assumes a particular 
functional form for utility. Successive, 
non-overlapping generations each have the same, large number of 
economically identical couples of opposite sex, and random mating occurs 
outside the family to form the couples of each new generation. 
Consumption (which gives utility) directly depletes a durable resource stock, 
the remainder of which grows at a constant, exogenous rate between 
generations. ' Each couple pass on their remaining resource stock as equal- 
8. Whether the 'resource I is instead called a 'commodity' (Dasgupta 1974), 'corn' 
(Howarth 1992), a 'renewable resource' (Mourmouras 1993) or gnatural capital' 
(Kennedy 1994) is unimportant. The equations relating consumption, asset growth 
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sized bequests to their two children in the next generation, who pool their 
resource inheritances with their mates. At the beginning of period t, a 
parent is endowed (by a bequest from her own parents) with a stock S, of 
resource. Because her mate is economically identical, he receives the same 
endowment S, - They each choose to consume a fraction g of this joint stock 
during the period, so per capita consumption is 
Ct = (4.4) 
The government in period t levies taxes at rate ý5 on parents' 
consumption. The total tax paid by each parent is OgS, and the government 
achieves revenue-neutrality by paying this back as a lump sum of Og7 S, 
where g is the average consumption fraction (henceforth called propensity) 
across all couples in period t. All couples make the 'zero conjecture' and 
regard g, and hence the lump sum, as something their behaviour cannot 
influence. ' They then leave whatever stock remains to grow during the 
period by an exogenous (technical or biological) growth factor r (> 1). 
To find the government's optimal choice of tax rate 0, note that each 
couple's remaining resource in period t, after accounting for consumption, 
taxes and the lump sum refund, is 2(1-g -Og+Og)S,, which grows to 
2(1-g-Og+O9)PSt at the start of period t+I, that is, to a bequest of 
(1-g-Og+0k)rSt per child. From the couple's point of view, the 
resource endowment of either child's (say a son's) household at the start of 
period t+ I will be 
and bequests set out below are the same as in all these models, and form the discrete 
time equivalent of Special Case 1 of the cake-eating model of Chapter 2, with a zero 
environmental preference e. 
9. See Hirshleifer (1988, Note 17) for comments on consistency problems with this 
zero conjecture. 
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2S,,, = (1-g-Og+Og7)1FS, +X (4.5) 
where X is his mate's bequest from her parents. Since she is randomly 
selected, his parents treat X as another parameter beyond their influence. 
We next assume that: 
[At] If parents are not concerned about sustainedness or other issues of 
intergenerational equity, they exert no influence over their children's 
consumption propensities. 
They therefore assume that their son and his mate will choose g freely when 
their time comes. In any case this will be a population-wide choice, so we 
represent the child's family's propensity by another exogenous unknown 
parameter y. Parents therefore calculate from (4.5) that their son's 
consumption C,,, is: 
Ct+l - y[(I-g-4)g+og-)FS, +X]12, (4.6) 
We now assume a specific form for the utility and welfare functions of 
all generations: 
U, 
= log(c) W, = log(C, ) + (11D)Iog(C, +, ); D>1 
(4.7) 
U(C) is thus strictly concave, as required in Section 4.2.2. Together (4.4), t 
(4-6) and (4.7) give parental welfare as 
W, = log(gS) + (11D)Iog{y[(l-g-(ýg+og)]PS, +X]121- (4.8) 
Parents maximise (4.8) by choosing a consumption propensity g to satisfy: 
aW, Iag = j1g - 
which treats g, X and y as parameters (ag7lag = aXlag = aylag = 0), as 
noted above. But since all agents in the economy are identical, the child's 
mate's consumption propensity k and bequest X will be the same ex post as 
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the child's , i. e. g7=g (which also means that the government's budget is 
balanced) and X=(l-g)]PS,. So every parent's privately optimal choice of 
g, given the goverment's tax rate (ý, is then given by 
11g = (1+0)1{2D(1-g)j g=g: = 2D/(2D+1+0) (4.9) 
A 
(using the overscript to denote the privately optimal response to 
government intervention, as in Chapters 2 and 3). The factor of 2 
multiplying D in (4.9) (and in many similar results below) is of general 
significance. It is the 'sexual factor' which reflects the halving of the 
control that parents have over their children's bequests because their 
children marry outside the family. (In contrast, the absence of P in (4.9) 
is a particular effect of the logarithmic form of U, in (4.7). ) From (4.6), 
assuming that the government in generation t +I adopts the same tax policy 
as the government in generation t, y' ex post and period t+I consumption 9 
is: 
(i -ý)rst. Ct+ (4.10) 
From (4.4), (4-7), (4.9) and (4.10), privately optimal per capita 
consumption in periods t and t+ 1, and overall welfare in period t, are then 
AA 
C, = 2DS, 1(2D +1+ 0); C, ,= 2D(l + 0)FStl(2D +1+ 0) 
2; 
A 
W. (O) = (1+11D)Iog[2DS, 1(2D+1+4))]. t 
(11D)Iog[(1+4))F1(2D+I+(ý)1- (4.12) 
With no intervention (0 = 0), from (4.9)-(4.12) we end up with the free 
market equilibrium (denoted by superscript ý' as in Chapter 2): 
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gl' == 2D/(2D + 1) 
C, t4 = 2DSI(2D+ 1); CA= 2D]PSI(2D+ 1)2; t t+j 




But from (4.12), it is in fact optimal for the government to intervene, by 
setting a tax rate given by 
A 
aWlao = 1/[D(I+ý5)] - (1+2/D)/(2D+1+0) =0 
(D- I)I(D+ 1) (4.16) 
(again using the tilde - to denote zero-B optimal). " 
From (4.9)-(4.12) and (4.16), the corresponding zero-B optimal 
consumption propensity, consumptions per capita and welfare level can be 
shown to be: 
T= (D + 1)1(D + 2); 
C, = (D+I)SI(D+2); C,,, = (D+1)]PS, /(D+2)2; 




Comparing these zero-B socially optimal results with the free market results 
(4.13)-(4.15)7 it is immediately obvious that T<g" (so intervention has 
reduced the consumption propensity) and ýý, < Q4, and fairly obvious that 
Ct+1 > C,, ". To show that the government intervention improves welfare 
(i. e. that *7t > W/4, which we need to do since we did not check any second- 
order conditions above) takes a few steps of algebra, spelt out in Lemma 
A4.3 in the Appendix. 
10. Variants of ýT useful for manipulation are I+ 2DI(D + 1) and 
2D +1+ ý7 = 2D(D + 2)/(D + 1). 
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4.3.2 Adding in sustainedness concerns 
If sustainedness has a positive value (B > 0), then from (4.2) and (4.7), 
Wt ---": 109(Ct) + (11D)109(Ct+i) + BJ{Ut+,, Ut); D 
17V 
L, v post sustainedness is defined in Section 4.2.1 above as U, Ut, which 
in turn means C, -,, ýý! 
C,. We now calculate the parameter values that would 
make the various equilibria of Section 4.3.1 sustained. 
From (4.14) the free market equilibrium is sustained and only if 
F ý!! I'll := 2D + 1; 
and from (4.18), the zero-B social optimum is sustained if and only if 
D+2< 2D +1 since D> 1). (4.20) 
These two critical values IF" and F of the growth factor divide the policy 
outcomes into three distinct cases: 
Case I. F ýt 2D+ I corresponding to Figure 4.2(a); 
Case II. 2D+ I> IF > D+ 2 
Ca se III. D+2 > IF 
corresponding to Figure 4.2(b); 
corresponding to Figure 4.2(c) or (d). 
Assuming that the mating-bequest externality from the continuous part of 
parents' concern for their children is internalised by a government 
consumption tax of size ý= (D - 1)1(D + 1), only in Case III is the zero-B 
optimal (-) equilibrium is unsustained. Since from (4.11) the general 
policy equilibrium is sustained if and only if 
(2D +1+ 0)/(l + 0) e 
the required consumption tax to achieve sustainedness for all individuals in 
the economy (i. e. SD) is 
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0= O": = (2D+1-]r)/(IP-1), (4.21) 
where the superscript " denotes 'socially sustained', since the tax is an 
instrument of social (i. e. government) policy ." From (4.9) and (4.2 1) the 
resulting sustainable consumption propensity in generation t is 
g= gS := (I'-l)/F. (4.22) 
This is as expected, since g"rS, = (r - 1)s,, so just achieving SD requires 
that exactly the surplus growth in the resource is consumed. 
Note that by using (4.11) to calculate 088, we are elevating the assumption 
made just before (4.10) into something quite important: 
[A2] If the government of generation t adopts an SD policy, we assume 
that it can commit the governments of all subsequent generations to 
follow the same policy. 
This assumption, which echoes Solow (1974, p36), contrasts with 
assumption [A 1] in Section 4.3.1 where parents exert no influence over their 
children's consumption preferences. Here, we have to assume that, acting 
collectively, parents influence the consumption preferences of all future 
generations. Without this power of 'infinite future commitment', it would 
be impossible to calculate what SD policies for all time should be. The 
power of infinite future commitment was also assumed (although implicitly) 
in the calculations of SD policies in the infinitely-lived, representative 
person framework of Chapters 2 and 3. 
11. The model assumes there are no pre-existing, perverse government policies 
which make the policy equilibrium less likely to be sustained than the free market 
equilibrium would be. This may not be the case in real world applications where 
perverse incentives are commonplace. Useful variants of (4.2 1) are 2D/(2D +1+ 0) 
= (1P - 1)/r and (1 + Ols)]PI(2D +I+ 0') =I- 
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Ac ieving SD with the tax (ý" will be justified in the sense of maximising 
overall welfare only if the individual benefit B of SD exceeds its individual 
cost in terms of PV. We therefore divide Case III into two parts: 
Ca se IIIA B> PV(Ut,,, Ut) - PV(Ut+, SS, Utss) 
Ca se IIIB B ::! ýý PV(Ut,,, Ut) - PV(Ut+lssgutss) 
In Case IIIB, an SD policy is definitely not justified. In Case IIIA, the tax 
would appear to be justified because it increases overall welfare. But firstý 
as promised, we have explore whether or not individual action might ever 
achieve a sustained equilibrium, thereby rendering collective policy 
superfluous. 
4.3.3 Could individual action make an SD policy redundant? 
Could the value B, that each individual family places on its own 
sustainedness, be high enough for it to be worthwhile for it to seek 
sustainedness by its own thrift (i. e. the parents decreasing their own 
consumption level, and bequeathing more to their children), irrespective of 
what it thinks the rest of society will do? If so, an SD policy, although 
welfare-improving, will actually be unnecessary in Case IIIA. To answer 
the question, we first need to return to the remark at the end of Section 
4.2.1 that when defining sustainedness, there can be a difference between 
defining the reference level of utility UP as individual parents' actual utility 
U, or as the average utility of their generation, Ut, Parents in generation t 
are defined here as regarding their family line as: 
o internally sustained if they expect their children to be at least as well off 
in period t+I as they themselves are in period t (i .e- Ut' = 
U) ; and 
177 Chapter 4 
o externally sustained if they expect their children to be at least as well off 
in period t+1 as the average parents in generation t (i. e. UP - U). 
Internal sustainedness is always possible, for as parents decrease their 
consumption towards zero, their own utility declines without limit, while 
their children's increases; so the two must become equal somewhere, even 
though the parents may then be much worse off than their contemporaries 
in generation t. For both internal and external sustainedness we assume in 
contrast to the assumption [Al] of no parental influence in Section 4.3.1, 
that: 
[A3] If a particular pair of parents take action to achieve sustainedness 
just for their own family, they can and do raise each of their 
children to adopt the same consumption propensity as they (the 
parents) choose. 
If we did not assume this, the collection of all families acting individually 
in pursuit of sustainedness (if they are motivated to do so) would not 
produce the same outcome as the current government following a collective 
SD policy, given the infinite future commitment implied by assumption 
[A2]. An immediate implication of [A3] is that external sustainedness may 
be impossible: no matter how much a particular pair of parents scrimp and 
save, if their contemporaries are high consumers, their children (who will 
inherit their parents' low consumption propensity) may never reach this high 
level of consumption. It is hard to know whether internal or external 
sustainedness is more likely to be the 'natural' concern for people to have, 
but here we simply explore the implications of the two definitions. 
Our analysis of the policy implications of internal versus external 
sustainedness for policy starts by assuming that just one family is concerned 
about individual sustainedness in the model of Section 4.3.2. We assume 
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also that governments in all periods are already internalising the continuous 
mating-bequest externality by taxing consumption at a rate 
0= (D - 1)1(D + 1) (from (4.16)), so that other couples' consumption 
propensities are all T= (D + 1)1(D + 2) from (4.17); and that there is indeed 
a sustainedness problem, so r <D+2 from (4.20). To achieve internal 
sustainedness, the per capita consumption level that a particular family 




Let the parents' consumption propensity that satisfies (4-23) be g", which 
their children inherit by assumption [A3]. The parents pay 
g' 'S, (D - 1)1(D + 1) in consumption taxes, but receive a lump sum (using 
(4.16) and (4.17)) of ýýgS, = (D - 1)S/(D + 2). The bequest they pass on to 
each of their two children is therefore 
[1-g's-(D-l)g'sl(D+I)+(D-1)1(D+2)]FS, = 
[(2D+ 1)/(D+2) -2Dg"I(D+ 1)IFS, (4.24) 
This is averaged with their child's mate's bequest, which is IFSý(D+2) 
(from (18)) because the parents are assumed to be acting alone. Their 
child's actual consumption propensity when mated will be ý(g"+-g)12, the 
average of his and his mate's inherited propensities, so from (4.23) and 
(4.24) we get an equation for g1s: 
Ct+ i is - ct's = gsst = 
[g's+(D+1)1(D+2)11PSt[(2D+ 1)1(D+2)-2Dgisl(D+ 1)+ 1/(D+2)1/4 
=* [DI(D + 1)] (gl. ý2 - [11(D+2)lg' .'- (D+I) 
2 /(D+2)2 = -(21]P)g's (4.25) 
To achieve external sustainedness, the per capita consumption 
level that 
the particular family should plan for its children is 
ct+les 
=Ct = (D+1)Stl(D+2). 
179 Chapter 4 
Therefore (4.25) is replaced by 
[DI(D+1)1(g es)2 - [11(D+2)]ges - 
(D+1)2/(D +2)2 - 
- (2/]P)(D + 1)1(D + 2) (4.26) 
Given that g", g", g" and T are respectively defined by (4.26), (4.22), 
(4.25) and (4.17), Lemma A4.5 in the Appendix shows that if 
r> 8D(D+2)/(2D+ 1)2 (4.27) 
(which is needed to make external sustainedness possible), then 
g gis > gss > ges. (4.28) 
One immediate corollary of these inequalities is that neither internal nor 
external sustainedness can be attained exactly if everyone aims for them as 
individuals: if everyone chooses g", the economy falls short of 
sustainedness, while if everyone chooses g", the economy goes beyond it 
(Ut-ý I> Ut) - 
Given the above analysis for a family acting alone, what will happen if 
all families are simultaneously contemplating individual sustainedness 
action? We give here a very preliminary analysis of the multi-person, 
continuous strategy, one-shot game that any one family (say familyf) would 
then play by considering just its own payoffs. It assumes that all other 
families do the same thing as each other, but not necessarily the same as it, 
familyf, does. This short-cuts a formal analysis of all the possible strategic 
interactions of one family with N others, and of then letting N approach 
infinity. We also take the short cut of assuming for the moment that all 
families make discrete choices of g and k* among only four values of g, 
namely the zero-B social optimum 9, the internal sustainedness value 
e, the 
social sustainedness value g", and the external sustainedness value g". 
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This game produces quite complex results, as illustrated for four 
examples of parameter value combinations in Table 4.1 which was 
computed by spreadsheet using base 10 logarithms. Each cell in the four, 
4x4 matrices in the table gives the total welfare W, (including the 
sustainedness value B" or B", as appropriate, and with (I + 11D)Iog]F added 
throughout to make all figures positive) for one of the parents in family f 
that results fromf 's choice of a consumption propensity g, depending on the 
propensity g- chosen by the rest of society. We have to consider all ex ante 
possibilities that familyf chooses a different g from the rest of society, even 
though ex post it will end up choosing the same g, so that only the matrix 
cells on the main diagonal can possibly be equilibria for society. In the 
table we abbreviate T, g's, etc to -, is, etc; and hereafter we talk of 
6 playing (-, is)' to mean family f choosing a consumption propensity ýý 
while all other families choose g". Similarly, PV(ss, ss) :=U, 's + U, ssID, 
etcetera. In the first matrix outcomes which are internally or externally 
sustained are marked (i) or (e) respectively; the same categorisation would 
apply to the other three matrices, since it is only the value of sustainedness 
that varies between them. 
All four examples in Table 4.1 have the same pair of parameter values, 
r=2.5 and D=6. For this pair, the zero-B social optimum (the -, - 
equilibrium) is unsustained by quite a margin (D +2- IF = 5.5 > 0), but 
external sustainedness can be attained by individual action because IF 
satisfies (4.27). What varies between examples is the precise value B" or 
B" that familyf places on internal or external sustainedness. In all examples 
the socially sustained (ss, ss) cell is the global social optimum, being the 
highest cell on the principal diagonal, so a government SD policy which 
takes us from (-, -) to (ss, ss) is thus apparently worthwhile. 
In each 
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Table 4.1 Examples of total welfare payoffs to individual family's choice 
of consumption propensity 
(Suffix of) propensity 
g7 
that familyf thinks all 
other families will choose 
S ffi f ( u xo ) consump- 
tion propensity g that is ss es 
family chooses 
Example 1: . 312 . 319 . 320 . 321 Parameter values 
are 
F=2.5) D=6 is . 338 (i) . 225 . 224 .2 14 (e) 
[=ý PV(-, -)- 
PV(ss, ss) =. 107] ss . 
321 (i) .3 14 (i) . 313 (i, e) . 195 (e) 
" B = . 108 B es == 0 es . 118 (i, e) . 106 (i, e) . 104 (i, e) . 087 (i, e) 
Example 2: . 312 . 
319 . 320 . 321 
Parameter values 
are is . 348 . 225 . 
224 . 214 1'=2.51 D=6 
ss . 331 . 
324 12112 . 7, &iy . 195 B's = . 118 - L B es =0 es 
1 
. 127 . 
116 . 114 . 097 
Example 3: . 312 . 
319 . 320 . 
321 
Parameter values 
are is . 230 . 
225 . 224 . 
332 
IF=2.59 D=6 
ss . 213 . 
207 . 313 B's =0 
B es = . 118 es . 127 . 
116 . 114 . 
097 
Example 4: . 312 . 
319 . 320 . 
321 
Parameter values 
are is . 230 . 
225 . 224 . 
536 
D=6 F-2.5 9 
ss . 213 . 
207 . 527 .5 
t7 
B's =0 
B es = 0.322 es . 332 . 
320 . 318 . 
301 
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matrix the highest cell in each column has been underlined, to show what 
will be family f's best response to the rest of society's choice. Since the 
game is symmetric, any underlined cell on the principal diagonal 
represents a Nash equilibrium of the game, where each family is making its 
best response to what all other families choose. 
In Example 1, where the value of internal sustainedness (. 108) is only 
just enough to make (ss, ss) worth more than (-, -), there is no Nash 
equilibrium visible in the table, so further investigation would be necessary 
(e. g. looking at choices of g intermediate between the four discrete values, 
or at probabilistic combinations of the four) to determine the outcome of the 
game. However, given that a family's best response is always at least g1s 
(> g's by (4.28)), it seems highly unlikely that the global social optimum 
(ss, ss) will be the equilibrium selected. 
By contrast, in Example 2, the value of internal sustainedness (. 118) is 
high enough to make (ss, ss) a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, it should be 
attainable starting from a 'zero action focal point' of (-, -), since for g- 
>g' each family's best response is consume less than other people are 
consuming, so driving society's consumption propensity down to g". 
However, in Example 3 where it is external sustainedness which is valued 
at . 118, ( -, -) is now also a 
Nash equilibrium. It also seems the more 
likely equilibrium to be selected, for even if everyone else consumed a little 
less than T, it would still be in an individual family's interest to stick at'k. 
Only if the value of sustainedness is much higher, such as . 322 
in Example 
4, does (ss, ss) become the sole Nash equilibrium, and one that would be 
attainable by individual action, starting from a focal point of (-ý -) - 
One cannot draw any hard and fast conclusions from so few calculations 
of a solution based on a particular functional form, but this preliminary 
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analysis suggests that: 
(a) There will be a range of sustainedness values in Case IIIA for which 
individual action to reach sustainedness will not happen (assuming 
rational individuals), but a collective SD policy will be both feasible 
and desirable, as in Example 1; 
(b) The range may be finite. If so, placing an infinite collective value 
on sustainedness is inconsistent with individual preferences, since the 
finite range means that if individuals had unbounded concern for 
sustainedness, they would achieve it through individual action. 
(C) The range will be wider for external than for internal sustainedness. 
That is, the sustainedness value that would motivate individual 
parental action and render a government SD policy unnecessary has 
to be much greater if parents seek external rather than internal 
sustainedness. Paradoxically, if parents aimed for less (merely to 
make their children as well off as they are, rather than as the whole 
world is), they would achieve more, since the former aim ends up 
achieving the latter aim as well in equilibrium! 
(d) In any case, as shown in Lemma A4.5 in the Appendix, the resource 
growth rate may be too low for external sustainedness to be 
individually feasible. If this is the type of sustainedness people are 
aiming for, collective policy will then be the only way to achieve it, 
and there potentially is an infinite value of sustainedness which can 
be invoked to justify such policy, in contrast to point (b). 
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4.4 THE EQUIVALENT MODEL IN AN ASEXUAL WORLD 
Economic growth theory almost always ignores mating-bequest 
externalities, and assumes asexual agents who either have infinite lives or 
reproduce by parthenogenesis. We therefore need to check what results of 
the sexual model carry across to its asexual, reduced form. So let us now 
modify the model in Section 4.3 by ignoring sex: each agent in generation 
t simply reproduces itself. Everything else -a homogeneous population of 
constant size, and exogenous utility discount and resource growth factors - 
is unchanged. For reasons that will become clear, we label the discount 
factor used here as Dal to distinguish it from the factor used in Section 4.3. 
As before, agent t chooses a consumption propensity g, giving consumption 
Ct = gst. (4.29) 
Suppose - even though there is apparently no welfare justification for it - 
that the government taxes consumption at rate 0, so the tax payment is OgS, 
and also gives a lump sum payment of Ok7S, where k7 is the population 
average consumption propensity. The bequest left to agent t's child is then 
(1 -g- 4)g + 09 )IFS, As with the sexual model, an agent assumes it cannot 
influence its child's consumption propensity, which we label y, so: 
Ct+i :` Al -g-og+097)]Fst- (4.30) 
Ignoring any sustainedness concerns for the moment, agent t's ex ante 
perception of its welfare is thus 
Wt(g) = 109(gSt) + (l1Da)lo91Y(1-9-09+OW)"rStl 
which is maximised by choosing g s. t. 
aW, Iag = ilg - (1+0)/[D, (1-9-09+(ý97)1 
= 
Since all agents are identical ex post, we may set g=y=9ý 
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=* g=': =91 +(ý) 
is the privately optimal consumption propensity. 12 From (4-29) and (4.30) 
the corresponding levels of consumption are 
AA 
1+0)2 C, = 
DaSI(Da+'+O); C, +, = 
(I+O)DYst1(Da+ (4.31) 
From the government's perspective, there are no externalities in an 
asexual world, so the optimal tax rate is zero: ý5 0, and the zero-B 
free market equilibrium and zero-B social optimum are identical: 
gý' Dal(Da+ 1) (4.32) 
Ct+l =D 




However, suppose each agent now has a discontinuous concern for 
sustainedness, so that its welfare function is 
W(g) = log(gS, ) + (11D)Iog[g(1-9-09+097)1'Sj t 
BJ{g(l-g-Og+09)1F, 9j (4.34) 
From (4.33), this makes no difference if IF> D, + 1, since the economy is 
then already sustained. But if r<D,, + 1, from (4.3 1) sustainednes s can be 
achieved by the government applying a consumption tax at rate given by 
(1 + OTI(Da+ 1 +4ý) ý1 
=* (ý = oss := (D+ 1- ITOP - 1) 
(4.35)" 
12. A useful variant is I-+ 9 
13. A useful variant is D,, I(D,, +1+ (ý') = (r - 1)1]P - 
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The sustained solution is as in the sexual model: 
=* g= gss = (IP - l)/IP 
A 
t= C, = 
DaStl(Da +1+ Oss) = (F - 1)SýIP 
But even if the value B of sustainedness is high enough, namely 
B> (U ++ 1/D) - (U1 + 1VD) 
one cannot apparently justify the sustainedness tax (4.35) as an act of public 
policy, since if (ý =0 in (4.34), each agent will apparently be free to choose 
a propensity g" to maximise its individual welfare. 
However, the asexual model is only a reduced-form representation of the 
real sexual world we live in. Mating-bequest externalities are unavoidable 
in practice, and perhaps can-not be internalised by individual initiatives, as 
shown in Section 4.3.3. Provided B> (ff, + ff, 11D) - (U, " + U, I"ID), so 
that people care enough about sustainedness, there is a reason, albeit a 
hidden one, to analyse a SD policy using an asexual model of the world. 
This is about the most important message of this chapter, and it explains for 
example why sustainedness was a policy goal worth talking about in Chapter 
3, where there were no apparent externalities caused by resource depletion. 
4.5 COMPARING RESULTS FROM THE SEXUAL AND 
ASEXUAL MODELS 
Table 4.2 now compares key results from Sections 4.3 and 4.4. The 
alternative sets of results for the asexual model that are given in the double- 
outlined box will be explained soon. In all other parts of the table, note that 
the sexual results can be derived from the asexual results by substituting 
Da= 2D (4.36) 
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Table 4.2 Comparing results from sexual and asexual models 
Variable Sexual model Asexual model 
of Section 4.3 
-F 
of Section 4.4 
consumption 
propensity given tax 2D/(2D +I+ Dal(Da +I+ 
rate (ý 
AA 
C, +IIC, = intergen'l 
consumption ratio (I + 0)]P/(2D +1+ 0) (1 + O)rl(Da+ 1 +0 
given 0 
g, " = free market 
consumption 2DI(2D + 1) Dal(Da+ 1) 
propensity 
C "/C" t+l t intergen'l free rnkt r/(2D + 1) ýMDa+ 1) 
consumption ratio 
From asexual By analogy with 
model sexual model 
zero-B socially 
optimal consump- DI(D + 1) 0 Dal(Dý, +2) 
tion tax rate 
'ý - zero-B socially 
optimal consump- (D + I)I(D + 2) Dal(Da +1 (Da+2)1(Da+4) 
tion propensity 
Ct+, IC, = zero-B 
socially optimal IPI(D + 2) FI(Da+ 
1) 21/(Da+4) 
consumption ratio 
Oss - consumption 
tax rate to achieve (2D +I- IF)/(IF - 1) (D,, +1- -F)/(. 
r - 1) 
sustainedness' 
gSS = sustainable 
consumption (IF - 1)/r 
propensity 
C SS t+ISSICt 
sustainable 
consumption ratio 
1 SD policies are assumed to apply only if there is a sustainedness problem 
in the zero-B 
optimal solution, i. e. if IF <D+2 or IF < DJ2 + 2. 
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So as long as the intergenerational utility discountfactor used in the asexual 
model is twice that in the sexual model, the asexual model's resultsfor the 
tax, free market and sustained equilibria also apply to a sexual world. This 
appears not to have been noted before in the economic literature, although 
it will not be surprising to geneticists, who typically assume that altruism is 
weighted by the proportion of genes shared in common. If any sexual 
models were ever to get used for policy purposes, they therefore could not 
use utility discount rates estimated from asexual models (e. g. from simple 
survival probabilities, as in Kula 1984). 
In the double-lined box in Table 4.2, the asexual model's results do not 
apply in the sexual model, even after discount factor adjustments. There is 
no formal bequest externality in the asexual model, and so no need for a 
corrective tax. However, since the asexual model is trying to mimic reality, 
we must replace these results with results for and C,,, IC, derived by 
analogy from the sexual model, using (4.36); these are listed in the 
rightmost column. So although the sustainedness tax 0"=(D, + 1 
appears unnecessary in an asexual model because there is no formal mating- 
bequest externality, we can still regard it as a justified policy intervention 
if we believe that parents are sufficiently concerned about sustainedness, but 
are unable or unwilling to achieve it individually in the real, sexual world. 
4.6 CONCLUSIONS 
In any species, parents are concerned for their children's wellbeing, 
otherwise reproduction and life would cease. In a sexual species, children 
mate outside the family, ultimately for good genetic reasons. If such mating 
is at random, being guided by 'blind love' rather than arrangements between 
families already known to each other, parents ignore the fact that increasing 
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their bequests to their children makes the parents of their children's mates 
happier. It is then well-known that this causes parental bequests of 
resources to be generally less than is socially desirable, and policies such as 
consumption taxes or bequest subsidies can increase social welfare. 
This chapter has extended this insight to include parental concern for 
family sustainedness. For the sake of simplicity this was treated as a 
discontinuous jump in welfare which parents enjoy, if they know their 
children will be at least as well off as they themselves or as the current 
generation are. This concern was added to the concave, continuous welfare 
which it is normally assumed that parents derive from their children's 
hedonistic utility, and applied to a non-overlapping generations model where 
each generation has the same number of identical, opposite-sex couples, who 
each own an exogenously growing resource stock which can be either 
consumed now or bequeathed to the next generation. By assuming 
particular functional forms for resource growth and welfare, we illustrated 
how a public policy goal of achieving sustainedness can be based on the 
preferences of individual couples for the sustainedness (i. e. non-declining 
utility) of their own family line, and is not necessarily an undemocratic and 
therefore unimplementable objective, as Kennedy (1994) claims. We also 
highlighted the need for empirical and philosophical research on the 
structure of parental concerns for their children's utility, since little is 
known about such concerns in practice. 
The same fiscal instrument (a consumption tax) can be used to increase 
parental bequests and thus fully internalise either the continuous or 
discontinuous concern that parents have for their children's utility - Policies 
for 'zero-B optimal' bequests (i. e. optimal ignoring individual's concerns for 
sustainedness) and for sustainability-preserving bequests therefore overlap 
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in the same way as environmental and SD policies overlapped in Chapter 2. 
Zero-B optimal policies may achieve sustainedness as a side-effect, but if 
they do not, an explicit SD policy may then be possible, if the current 
generation has the power of 'infinite future commitment' and can guarantee 
that future governments or its offspring will have the same attitude towards 
sustainedness that it does now. And such a policy will be justified if two 
further conditions hold. Firstly, the discontinuity in parents' concern - the 
6value of sustainedness' - must be large enough to warrant the reduction 
in the present value of the continuous part of utility that an SD policy will 
cause. 
Secondly, it must be either impossible or inefficient for individuals to 
achieve sustainedness through their own initiative, a condition similar to that 
underlying Conjecture 2.1 in Chapter 2. A preliminary game-theoretic 
analysis of parents' choices of consumption propensity showed that this 
condition can be true in some cases of our model; but in other cases, 
individual sustainedness is possible and efficient, so sustainedness cannot 
have infinite value and therefore be an over-riding policy concern, as 
individuals would then achieve it on their own anyway. The analysis also 
showed that individual sustainedness is more likely to occur if parents aim 
for their children to be as well off as the average in the current generation 
(called 'external sustainedness'), rather than just to be as well off as they 
(the parents) are ('internal sustainedness') -a somewhat paradoxical result, 
as the same overall state of the economy achieves both aims at once. 
Since economic growth theory almost always ignores mating-bequest 
externalities by assuming asexual agents who either have infinite lives or 
reproduce by parthenogenesis, we checked what results of the sexual model 
carry across to its asexual, reduced form. Several formulae remain the 
same, including the tax level needed to attain sustainedness, save only that 
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the utility discount factor used in the asexual model must be twice the sexual 
discount factor. And while an asexual model of purely private resource 
depletion with no environmental effects predicts that no government SD 
policy can be justified in terms of individual preferences, this may well be 
false in the more realistic, sexual model. So if we are willing to assume 
that individuals desire non-declining utility for their descendants, and cannot 
in practice achieve it efficiently (or at all) by individual increases in 
bequests, the comparison of these two simple models strongly suggests a 
cost-benefit rationale for using government policy to achieve sustainedness 
- even when, as in Chapter 3, it is analysed in an asexual model apparently 
'free' of externalities. As long as sex and death exist, the freedom is always 
only apparent, and never real. 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4 
Lemma A4.1 
log x>I-1A if x>1. 
Proof: 
For t>t, l1t > 1/ý 
=ý If (110dt > If (llt2)dt for x>1 
=ý [log X]xj = log x>[-1 ItIf =1-1 /X. 
Lemma A4.2 
ylog (I + c-ly) is an increasing function of y, for E>0 and y>0. 
Proof: 
(d1dy) [ylog(l + c-ly)] log(I+E/Y) + y(_Ely2)1(1+ely) 
10g(l + IE/Y) - (I + Ely - 1)/(l + C-/Y) 
log(l+E/Y) - [1-1/(l+c-/Y)] 
>0 by putting x=1+ dy in Lemma A4.1. 
Lemma A4.3 
(I+IID)Iog[(D+I)S, I(D+2)] + (IID)log[PI(D+2)] > 
(]+IID)Iog[2DS, 1(2D+])] + (IID)log[PI(2D+I)j 
Proof: 
By putting y-D +x >0 and E=D-I>0 in Lemma A4.2, 
(D+z)log[I+DI(D+z)] is an increasing function of z. Hence 
(D+l)log[l+(D-1)1(D+1)1 > Dlog[l+(D-1)IDI 
=* [(D+2)/D]Iog[(2D+ 1)/(D+2)] > [(D+ 1)/Dllog[2D/(D+ 1)] 
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=* (1 +I /D)Iog [(2D + 1)(D + 1)12D(D + 2)] 
- (1/D)log[(D+2)/(2D+1)] >0 
(1+11D)Iog[(D+I)SI(D+2)] + (1/D)Iog[]F/(D+2)] > 
(1+1/D)Iog[2DSý(2D+1)] + (1/D)Iog[r/(2D+1)] 
which from (4.15) and (4.19) means *, > W, ý'. 
Lemma A4.4 
log (I +Y) if Y>0. 
Proof: 
For t>0,1 > 1/(l +t) 
ýy dt > ly [1/(l + t)ldt for y>0 00 
[fly =y> [log(l+t)]Y = log(l+y). 00 
Lemma A4.5 
To show that if the following hold: 
[DI D+ 1 es 2 11D+2 es _ (D+ 1)21(D +2)2 )J(g ) )jg 
= -(21r)(D+I)I(D+2) 
9 ss 1) /T 
gis)2 _ [JI(D+2)lgis - (D+ 
1)21(D +2)2 IDI(D + 1)](, 
g= (D+I)I(D+2) 
r< D+2 
r ý,, . 8D(D+2)1(2D+1)2 
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Proof: 
One can readily check that the quadratic 
f(g) = [DI(D + 1)]g2 _ Lll(D+2)]g - (D+ 
1)2/(D + 2)2 -0 
has roots 
g, =- (D + 1)1(D + 2) and92 = (D+ 1)21[D(D+2)] 
so that the graph of f(g) looks like Figure 4.3. Between g, <0 and92 ýý' 01 
f(g)<O. The minimum point M has coordinates f(D+1)/[2D(D+2)], 
- [(D + 1)(2D + 1)2/4D(D + 
2)2] 1. Hence there is at least one real positive 
root for g" G. e. external sustainability is feasible) only if 
-(21]F)(D+1)1(D+2) > -[(D+J)(2D+1)2/4D(D+2)21 
from which condition (4.27) follows immediately. Assume now that (4.27) 
does hold, which means that 
- 2/r >- (2D + 1)21[4D(D + 2)] >_ 
(2D+1)2 /2(D+2). 
Since the last expression is the slope of OM, the line -2glIF must cut the 
graph of f(g) somewhere in the segment MQ, as shown. So g" must lie in 
the segment PQ, wheref(g) is an increasing function of g; and of course the 
higher real root for g" must also be in PQ. To prove the Lemma it will 
therefore suffice to show that, as shown on Figure 4.3: 
(i) f(-g) > -(21]P)-g g 
is < -9) 
(ii) f(gss) < -(211')T g 
is > gss) 
(iii) f(gss) > -(21]P)(D+1)1(D+2) gss > ges) 
Results (i)-(iii) follow from (4.22), (4.17), (4.20) and (4.27) by routine but 
tedious algebra. 
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Figure 4.1 Individual parental concern for children 
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Figure 4.2 Collective parental welfare, including 
concern, versus child's utility 
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Figure 4.3 Proof of Lemma A4.5 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS TO PART I 
Each of Chapters 2-4 has its own detailed concluding section. My aim 
here is to highlight just the more important conclusions of Part 1, and their 
wider implications. 
The main motive behind Part I was the conviction that sustainable 
development (SD) , which numerous governments in both rich and poor 
countries round the world now claim to be pursuing as a goal of economic 
policy, can be in conflict with the conventional concept of (PV-)optimal 
development. Formal economic study of SD and allied concepts therefore 
promised to be interesting and useful. The formalism chosen was to define 
SD (or equivalently sustainedness) as non-declining instantaneous utility 
(NDU) of a representative person in a deterministic, infinite-horizon 
economy where natural resources are non-renewable but substitutable for by 
human-made capital. 
The particular assumption that resources are non-renewable but 
substitutable made the analysis more relevant to developed countries than to 
developing countries. While severe problems with depletion of renewable 
resources in the latter have undoubtedly been the major driving force for 
recent interest in SD, if SD is to be a widely useful notion it should also be 
applicable to developed countries as well. My research should therefore be 
considered complementary to work aimed at developing countries. 
At least five separate topics about SD have been covered. These relate 
closely, though not exactly, to the questions Q1-Q7 originally posed in 
Chapter 1, as noted in brackets: 
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How appropriate is NDU as a criterion of SD, and how does it 
relate to other possible criteria? (QI, Q7) 
2) How does an NDU path compare to a socially PV-optimal or free 
market path? (Q2-4) 
3) What instruments of policy intervention can achieve NDU? (Q3-4) 
4) Can an NDU policy be justified in terms of individual preferences? 
(Q5) 
5) Does non-declining aggregate welfare guarantee NDU? (Q6) 
I will address each of these in turn. It should be understood throughout that 
further research into the effects of different assumptions such as uncertainty, 
human mortality, resource renewability and non- substitutability would be 
desirable in most cases. 
5.1 NDU VERSUS OTHER FORMAL CRITERIA OF SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT 
A formal mathematical criterion is often a compromise between the 
original, pure concept intended, and what can actually be used analytically 
to derive new results that are not already obvious from that concept. 
Defining SD as NDU is no exception to this. What has this thesis has 
revealed about NDU both ex ante in terms of how fitting its definition is to 
the idea of SD , and ex post 
in terms of how useful it is? 
As the discussions in Chapter 1 and Section 2 of Chapter 2 recognised, 
NDU is clearly an oversimplification of what people and politicians really 
mean by 'sustainability' if they stop to think about it. One thing clear from 
the dozens of competing definitions of sustainability concepts catalogued in 
Appendix 1 of Pezzey (1989) is that they are all, at least in part, concepts 
of intergenerational equity. No one is really concerned if someone chooses, 
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in a way that affects no one else, to have declining utility at some point in 
his or her own lifetime. What they may well be concerned about is if the 
PV of a typical person's lifetime utility path declines from one generation 
to the next, because of the course of development that the economy is 
following. By omitting all distinction between young and old people alive 
at the same time, NDU in a representative person model conflates the two 
topics of potential concern. But a brief review of recent work by Howarth 
and Norgaard and by Mourmouras showed that non-declining PV in 
overlapping generations models appears much less tractable than NDU in 
representative person models. In particular, it would seem to be very hard 
to learn much about non-declining PV paths, and the policies to attain those 
paths, when the decline or growth of PV is not exponential. When it is, the 
non-declining PV and NDU criteria give analogous results. The desire for 
greater tractability, and to be comparable with the many other well-known 
works on growth with exhaustible resources, is the main reason why the I 
chose the NDU route. 
However, the analysis of Chapters 2-4 showed that the tractability of 
NDU is still quite limited, as will be reviewed below. In particular, it is 
hard work to say much in general about how the freedom to have rising 
utility, which is allowed under NDU, can be used to reach the NDU path 
with the highest PV, which I called the 'opsustimal' path (for PV-optimal 
sustained). This is in contrast to the only other criterion of intertemporal 
allocation that has made more than a passing appearance in the thesis, which 
is maximin utility, effectively maximum constant utility. Although no one 
claims this to be a criterion of SD, it is certainly the best-known criterion 
of intergenerational equity. It is supported by a much more impressive 
philosophical pedigree, and moreover is a good deal more tractable than 
NDU, resulting in many elegant technical papers since Solow's seminal 
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contribution in 1974. And on efficiency grounds, an opsustimal path will 
generally start off below the maximum constant level of utility (see for 
example Figure 3.5), and we know little about which path politicians would 
in fact prefer. But in theory it seems reasonable to suppose that they would 
prefer the path with higher PV, i. e. the opsustimal path, so that constant 
utility is less politically realistic than an NDU constraint. 
It would be desirable to be even more realistic than NDU, though, by 
including an important part of popular concern for sustainability which NDU 
omits. (Recall that popular views are relevant to this thesis because it is 
primarily a work of political economy, not moral philosophy. It seeks to 
reflect intergenerational politics as it is, rather than it perhaps should be. ) 
The omitted part is concern for the speed in the decline of consumption or 
utility, including any declines from the initial level given by history. If this 
historically given level is above the initial level of utility on the opsustimal 
path, it is politically unrealistic to expect an instant drop from the former to 
the latter to be chosen. Long -term concern for sustainability will surely be 
traded off to some extent against short-term adjustment costs. This 
recognised in Section 2.2, which suggested among other future research 
topics that the NDU criterion could perhaps be replaced by an objective of 
maximising, without any side constraints, a broader intergenerational social 
welfare function (ISWF). Such an ISWF could perhaps be the sum of 
discounted utility using an adjustment cost utility function U(C, (ý), and some 
separate value ascribed to the asymptotic level of utility. If the elements of 
this broader ISWF were differentiable (which they would need to be if 
tractability is to be maintained), SD would become another element of the 
goodness' of a development path, rather an overriding determinant of its 
rightness' that must be preserved at all costs. 
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An NDU constraint is thus arguably further away than either a non- 
declining PV constraint, or an adjustment-cost-plus-terminal-value type of 
ISWF, from a politically realistic representation of SD; and further away 
from tractability than constant utility. But the former two alternatives are 
probably less tractable approaches to SD, and constant utility is less 
realistic, than NDU. ADU there re emerges from this thesis as a : fo 
instructive compromise between realism and tractability in the search for a 
formal criterion of SD. Whether a better compromise can be found remains 
for further research, probably starting with an adj ustment-c o st-plus- terminal- 
value type of ISWF approach to SD. 
5.2 COMPARING AN SD PATH TO THE SOCIALLY PV-OPTIMAL 
OR FREE MARKET PATH 
This resolves itself into two distinct issues. When does the socially PV- 
optimal or free market path have a decline in utility at some time? If so, 
what is the opsustimal (PV-optimal sustained) path, and how does it differ 
from the socially PV-optimal or free market path? Both these issues were 
examined in Chapter 2, where non-renewable resources had amenity value, 
and in Chapter 3, where they did not. In both cases the conditions for 
either the socially PV-optimal or free market path to be sustained were no 
great surprise. Either there has to be a source of endless, sufficiently rapid, 
exponential technical progress or resource growth in the economy, or capital 
has to be very substitutable for resource inputs. Essentially, this is because 
the reward for saving for the future becomes insufficient to outweigh 
exponential discounting of the future. This much could more or less be 
concluded from a critical review of the 1974 Review of Economic Studies 
Symposium (as for example provided by Toman, Pezzey and Krautkraemer 
1995), although the distinction (caused by an externality in the economy) 
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between socially PV-optimal and free market paths was absent then. 
And there was some novelty in Chapter 2's demonstration that socially 
PV-optimal development, i. e. development where the environmental value 
of non-renewable resources has been internalised, may still be unsustainable, 
even though it will be 'more sustained' in a crude sense than the free market 
path which externalises this value. This finding will be news to the many 
policy analysts who see sustaining development and protecting the 
envirom-nent as virtually identical issues. More research into a quantitative 
measure, rather than a qualitative condition, of sustainedness would help to 
sharpen this result. 
Another interesting insight was the conjecture (based on a numerical 
solution) in Chapter 3 that the opsustimal path may well initially entail 
higher consumption than the PV-optimal path, which is contrary to untutored 
intuition. The explanation is that it is PV-optimal to accumulate lots of 
capital early on, while resources are still plentiful and thus the marginal 
product of capital still high, in order to consume it in later years. An 
interesting topic for research would therefore be on the effect on PV-optimal 
and opsustimal paths of assuming non-consumable rather than consumable 
capital. 
5.3 POLICY INSTRUMENTS TO ACHIEVE SD 
The formulae in Chapters 2 and 3 for policies to achieve SD are also 
fairly new. The novelty is mainly because the technical literature on 
intergenerational equity (defined as maximum constant utility) has shown 
remarkably little interest in policy. So it may surprise some people to learn 
that even though non-renewable resource depletion and envirom-nental 
degradation are key causes of unsustainable development (if it happens), 
205 Chapter 5 
resource or environmental taxes are probably incapable of curing it. It may 
also come as a surprise that the policies that do work, such as consumption 
and capital taxes, must end up as subsidies in the long run, which poses 
some unresolved problems for public finance. 
However, such fairly clear results were available only asymptotically. 
During finite time, a wide range of things can happen. Active SD policies 
may be needed from time zero, or only after a finite time. If the latter, they 
must almost certainly be announced at time zero, otherwise people cannot 
have perfect foresight in predicting future prices, which affect actions today. 
In at least one case, once SD policy intervention had started, it had to 
continue forever, but there is no reason why this should be true generally. 
5.4 JUSTIFYING SD IN TERMS OF INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES 
It would surely advance the case for treating SD as an important policy 
goal if it can be shown that people want SD, can achieve it through 
collective action (e. g. through government policy intervention), but cannot 
achieve it individually. Casual empiricism, allied with intuition derived 
from evolutionary biology and psychology, and from the academic and 
governmental publications on SD which I noted in Chapter 1, suggests that 
most people would like to see their children live as well in the future as they 
themselves do now. However, I did not produce any data showing that 
people do place a large value on SD. What I tried to do in two chapters 
was to advance the second part of the idea above, namely that if people want 
SD, then one can readily think of ways in which they can achieve it 
collectively, but not individually. The underlying intuition is clear from 
Our Common Future, the title of the book which largely inspired this thesis. 
If a large part of the assets which will determine future welfare are held in 
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common, or at least not individually, then collective action may be needed 
to preserve sufficient assets for sustainability. 
Two ways were highlighted in which assets for the future are not held 
individually. In Chapter 2, where individual people have minuscule 
influence over the quality of the future natural environment, we showed a 
case where collective action to conserve the environment costs an individual 
far less than the amount (which might be more than the individual's wealth) 
that individual action would cost. If people value SD in this case more than 
the cost of collective action, but less than the cost of individual action, then 
an SD policy is justified in terms of individual preferences. 
In Chapter 4, individual pairs of parents are assumed to have power over 
only half of the material wealth that their children inherit. The other half 
comes attached to their children's spouses, of whom parents have no prior 
knowledge or control. Because of the need to model mating and bequests, 
we adopted an explicit generational framework with sexual rather than 
asexual agents in this chapter, albeit with non-overlapping generations and 
no distinction in sexual roles. One can then again show cases where 
collective action to achieve SD is cheaper than individual action, and thus 
potentially justified in terms of individual preferences. This particular 
insight is an important riposte to those (Beckerman 1994, Kennedy 1994) 
who regard SD as an illogical or undemocratic goal for policy in the pure 
intergenerational context where common environmental assets are an 
unimportant part of the whole. But we still lack data on how much parents 
are concerned for their children to be as well off as they themselves are, and 
any detailed analysis (whether economic, philosophical or biological) of why 
they should feel such concern. Both topics await further research. 
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5.5 NON-DECLINING AGGREGATE WEALTH AND 
SUSTAINABILITY 
I have left until last a review of what is perhaps the most important single 
result of this thesis, which arose by accident. In Chapter 3,1 enquired into 
the relationship between aggregate wealth (the combined value of all forms 
of human-made capital and environmental resources on a particular 
development path at a particular time) and sustainability (defined as the 
ability to achieve NDU forever, starting from the level of utility on the same 
path at the same time). My enquiry was confined to an economy with 
constant technology, and where natural resources are absent from the utility 
function, and present in the production function only as a flow. Pearce and 
his school had frequently claimed that Solow (1986) had shown non- 
declining aggregate wealth to be a condition for sustainability. I had 
intended merely to check this result in my particular models. 
However, Section 3.2 showed that although non-declining wealth is 
necessary for sustainability in constant-technology (what were called 
'Weitzman') economies, it is not a sufficient condition. Aggregate wealth 
can be rising while the current level of utility is unsustainable. Indeed, this 
must happen during some finite time interval if the economy's PV-optimal 
development path is single-peaked and initially sustainable. The intuition is 
that a general development path, including the PV-optimal one, is not 
subject to any kind of sustainability constraint, so there is no reason to 
expect relative prices on the path, which are used to calculate aggregate 
wealth, to tell us much about sustainability. This obviously undermines 
current attempts to use national accounts data to measure sustainability, 
although it also suggests that any negative conclusions (i. e. that a country 
is unsustainable if it has falling aggregate wealth measured at market prices) 
are strengthened . 
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In comparing this result with the existing literature, we then found a more 
serious confusion in the literature between the terms net national product 
(NNP) and maximum sustainable consumption. Many writers have come 
to assume, after reading Weitzman (1976) and/or Solow (1986), that the 
two terms have been shown to be equal. But if one defines NNP as 
consumption plus net investment on a competitive (i. e. PV-optimal) 
development path, if one defines maximum sustainable consumption as what 
I have termed the 'current maximin' consumption, and if one assumes an 
economy in which the PV-optimal path varies over time and is unique, then 
maximum sustainable consumption is always strictly less than the NNP. 
Research in this area therefore needs to focus on price differences between 
sustainable and unsustainable constant utility paths, in addition to its existing 
focus on the adjustments that need to be made to include environmental 
values in national income accounts. 
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PART 11 
CHAPTER 6 
INTRODUCTION TO PART 11 
In a competitive industry with p ollution- control costs that vary among 
firms, it is well known that market mechanisms such as emission charges 
and marketable emission permits are efficient in the short run. They 
equalise marginal control costs across all firms, and thus achieve a given 
total emission reduction at minimum cost to the industry. This was 
demonstrated for charges by Baumol and Oates (1971), and for permits by 
Montgomery (1972). But until recently, little progress was being made in 
introducing such minimum cost mechanisms into envirom-nental policies. 
During two years spent in the mid-1980s as an Economic Adviser in the 
U. K. Department of the Environment, when my job was to promote market 
mechanisms, I came into contact with some of the arguments causing this 
lack of progress, arguments which are documented in Pezzey (1988). 
In particular, it seemed impossible to find a form of emission charge 
which was both politically feasible and economically respectable. Any 
proposal for a pure, Pigovian emission charge - as distinct from a 
9 redistributive' charge at a rate so low that it would have little effect on 
emissions - met with strong resistance from British industry, on the 
grounds that 'residual' emissions (i. e. those less than current regulatory 
standards) were 'acceptable' and therefore should not be taxed. But 
including any kind of offsetting subsidy element, so that firms would still 
face the same marginal charge on their emissions, but would receive a per 
unit subsidy for emissions below a certain baseline, was criticised by 
economists. It was held that any subsidy element would increase firms' 
profits and thus encourage excessive long run entry of firms into the 
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polluting industry (Baumol and Oates 1988, Chapter 14). 
On the other hand, marketable permits seemed to stand a better chance 
of being both politically and economically acceptable. Evidence from the 
USA already suggested that political resistance to permits could be greatly 
reduced by giving away permits free to existing polluters ('grandfathering' 
them); but since permits would not be free for new polluting firms, there 
would be no problem of excessive entry. This lack of symmetry between 
4 control by price' (charges and subsidies) and 'control by quantity' (permits) 
struck me as strange. At a fundamental level, my instinct was that the short 
run symmetry between the two control systems (i. e., both achieve control 
at minimum cost, as noted above) should be extendable to a long run 
symmetry. Might the answer might lie in the nature of the emission rights, 
implying various kinds of ownership of the environment, which underlie the 
two types of control? Furthermore, might the distribution of emission rights 
among important political interest groups contain the key to implementing 
of market mechanisms as actual policies? 
Chapters 7 and 8 are the result of pursuing these two questions. ' 
Chapter 7, " The Symmetry between Controlling Pollution by Price and 
Controlling it by Quantity " focuses on the first question. It examines the 
property rights underlying various market mechanisms, and in particular 
studies how each mechanism treats a new firm entering a polluting industry, 
and an old firm leaving the industry. It shows that if the underlying 
emission rights are complete for both control by price and control by 
quantity, and if also several simplifying assumptions hold about perfect 
I Both Chapters were written as independent essays. Chapter 7 was written in 
1991, and it is printed here very much as published by the Canadian Journal of 
Economics in 1992, except for changes to section numbering. Since each Chapter has 
a detailed literature review, only selected references are given in this Introduction. 
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competition and information, then any control by price is indeed 
symmetrical to a control by quantity which embodies the same amount of 
emission rights, in that it achieves both short run and long run economic 
efficiency in resource allocation. 
Chapter 8, "On the Political and Informational Economy of Distributing 
the Efficiency Gains from Market Mechanisms of Pollution Control", uses 
this economic symmetry and assumes a general market mechanism of 
control, mostly without specifying whether the immediate instrument of 
control is a price (the emission charge rate) or a quantity (of permits). It 
concentrates instead on the second question noted above: How large should 
the emission rights underlying the mechanism be, in order to maximise its 
political acceptability? Could not total rights under a market mechanism be 
less than the defacto total allowed by regulatory standards? Can ownership 
of the rights be divided among industry and taxpayers? The answers to 
these questions show the theoretical possibility of using market mechanisms 
to give a 'win' (i. e. a net economic benefit) to all of three important interest 
groups in society: envirom-nental users, industry and taxpayers. However, 
this all assumes perfect information, and a later section of the chapter 
considers how various types of information costs limit the applicability of 
this 'win-win-win' result. 
The main point of interest in Part I was distribution over time among 
different generations. Given the inherent complexity of dynamic analysis, 
we made the simplifying assumption that people at any point in time were 
homogeneous. In contrast, the main point of interest in Part II is 
distribution among different interest groups at one point in time. In 
common with most of the literature on market mechanisms we therefore 
ignore time, and work in a comparative static framework. We consider 
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differences both among people, which explain the existence of 
environmental users, industry and taxpayers as separate interest groups, and 
among firms in an industry, which provide the basic efficiency advantage 
of market mechanisms as compared to uniform regulatory standards. 
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CHAPTER 7 (nearly as published in Canad. J. Econ. , 25,985-91,1992) 
THE SYMMETRY BETNVEEN CONTROLLING POLLUTION 
BY PRICE AND CONTROLLING IT BY QUANTITY* 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The essential result of this Chapter is very simple. Under ideal 
conditions, controlling excessive pollution or congestion of a scarce public 
or common property resource by using a price-based instrument such as a 
fee or charge can be made symmetrical, in terms of short-run efficiency, 
long-run efficiency, ' and political acceptability, to using a quantity-based 
instrument such as a marketable licence or permit. The symmetry between 
pure charges and sold or auctioned marketable permits has- already been 
shown by Spulber (1985). Here we show that there is also symmetry 
between charge- subsidies, and corresponding marketable permit schemes 
where some or all of the permits are freely granted rather than sold. There 
is thus no Jýndamental reason, as long as the decision has been taken to use 
some market instrument rather than direct regulation, for choosing control 
by price instead of control by quantity, or vice versa. 
I am grateful for research support from the Harkness Fellowships, the UK 
Department of the Environment and the UK Centre for Economic and Environmental 
Development. I also thank seminar participants at the University of Colorado, Chuck 
Howe, Gene Murny, Wallace Oates, Paul Downing and three anonymous referees for 
helpful connnents on earlier drafts. All remaining errors are mine. 
1. As usual in the pollution control literature, 'short-run' takes as given the finns 
that exist in the industry, while 'long-run' allows for the entry and exit of firms. 
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The key condition for attaining this useful freedom of choice is that, in 
any given application, both types of instrument embody the same degree of 
4enviroiamental ownership, ' in the form of symmetrical, private property 
rights in the resource. However, the relevant literature implicitly or 
explicitly, but in either case rather inconsistently, rules out this property 
rights condition for control by price, but does not rule it out for control by 
quantity . As a result, it often happens that efficient and acceptable 
instruments are rejected by economists; efficient but unacceptable 
instruments are proposed instead; while inefficient but acceptable 
instruments are the ones actually adopted by policymakers. The aim of this 
chapter is to encourage the adoption of control instruments that are both 
efficient and acceptable. 
In keeping with the existing literature, the argument below uses the 
language of pollution control, specifically the control of water pollution. 
However, it can also apply to a range of natural and man-made resources 
which are not yet privately owned, such as the atmosphere, land for waste 
dumping, wilderness and wildlife, road space or airport landing slots, where 
either one-way or mutual (congestion) externalities may arise. 
The 'ideal' conditions that are assumed to hold here constitute perfect 
competition in its fullest sense. We consider a perfectly competitive 
industry comprising many small firms, each of which is a rational profit- 
maximiser producing a single output, and discharging a single effluent, 
emission or waste stream. The effluent is neither storable on the factory 
site, nor cumulative in the environment, but is continuously assimilated into 
a well-mixed but finite environmental reservoir. Firms face perfectly 
competitive markets for their outputs and for their capital and labour inputs, 
but they own different sets of fixed factors such as enterprise, and therefore 
have different marginal cost schedules for effluent control. Time-dependent 
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phenomena such as uncertainty and technical innovation in pollution control 
are ignored. Perfect information is freely available to all firms and to the 
pollution control authority (hereafter just 'the authority'), and transaction 
costs are zero; as we shall see in the latter part of Chapter 8, removing this 
assumption will make a difference to some of the results obtained here, 
although not to the central insight. Last, but by no means least, a perfect 
authority, whose sole objective is to maximise public welfare, is assumed. 
Contrary to normal practice, we first, in Sections 7.2 and 7.3, state the 
case for the equivalence of control by price and control by quantity, and 
then, in Section 7.4, relate the ideas thus raised to the existing literature. 
Finally , in Section 7.5, we 
draw out some implications for policy. 
7.2 CONTROL BY PRICE: THE CASE FOR THE CHARGE- 
SUBSIDY 
Controlling pollution by price implies the use of charges' per unit of 
effluent added and/or subsidies' per unit of effluent reduced. The way in 
which charges and subsidies can be combined into a 'charge- subsidy' 
scheme, which achieves short-run efficiency, long-run efficiency, and 
political acceptability, has been fully spelt out in a neglected paper by 
Mumy (1980). ' His scheme is effectively that each polluting firm pays 
V(E - Et, ) (in say dollars per month) 
to the authority, where 
2. Also known as fees or taxes. 
3. Also known as bribes, payments, or compensation. 
(7.1) 
4. The name 'charge-subsidy' is mine; Mumy himself referred to 'efficient property 
rights sharing', to emphasise the property rights involved in the scheme. 
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V= the charge rate (in say dollars per ton of effluent) set by the 
authority, which does not vary from firm to firm or with time; 
E= the effluent level (in say tons per month) - This is under the firm's 
control and so may vary from firm to firm and over time; ' 
Eb = the baseline effluent right (in tons per month) which is initially given 
as a property right to each existing firm by the authority. Eb 
may vary from firm to firm but does not vary over time. 
If a firm has a positive baseline, and its effluent is less than its baseline 
(E<Eb), it receives a subsidy from the authority. If Eb=0 for all firms, the 
scheme reduces to a pure Pigovian pollution charge. V (which will of 
course equal the industry's marginal cost of effluent control in equilibrium) 
is chosen so that the marginal damage cost of the resulting total effluent EE 
is equal to V, thus achieving short-run efficiency, given the ideal conditions 
assumed. ' EE is thus determined on economic grounds, and is not 
necessarily the same as total baseline effluent EEb, which is determined on 
political grounds (see below). The scheme therefore may not be revenue- 
neutral for the authority. 
Long-run efficiency is achieved because E,, is a full property right. New 
firms entering the industry are therefore not given effluent rights (so for 
them, E,, ==O), while existing firms exiting from the industry keep their 
effluent rights, and receive a subsidy of VE,, in perpetuity. Under these 
entry-exit rules, the opportunity cost to any firm of producing output Q and 
5. Murny actually considered the more restricted case where effluent is strictly 
proportional to output and output itself is taxed. 
6. Because each firm remains small in relation to the environmental reservoir, the 
marginal damage cost curve of each firm's effluent is constant. See Burrows (1979) 
and Collinge and Oates (1982) for the modifications required to the charge scheme 
if marginal damages increase as the firm's effluent increases. 
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effluent E rather than closing down production (or not starting production 
in the first place, in the case of a new firm) is the sum of QQ, E), the firm's 
ordinary cost function excluding effluent charges and subsidies; V(E-Eb), 
the effluent charge-subsidy; and VEb, the cost of not receiving the perpetual 
subsidy for closing down. The net opportunity cost to the firm is then 
C(Q, E) + V(E-Eb) + VEb = C(Q, E) + VE; (7.2) 
and since C(Q, E) + VE is the social opportunity cost of production, long- 
run efficiency is achieved. The baseline effluent right Eb disappears from 
formula (7.2), so it has no effect on production costs or resource allocation; 
the invariance proposition of Coase (1960) is thus recovered. Owning Eb 
effluent rights simply increases the wealth of the firm's owners, and there 
are no wealth effects because firms are small. Holderness (1979) observed 
how Coase invariance exists only 'when rights are assigned to closed classes 
of individuals or entities, ' and the above entry-exit assumptionsdo indeed 
close the class of owners of effluent rights. 
In a charge-subsidy scheme, baseline effluent rights E,, for each firm 
should be chosen entirely on political grounds (which is why EEb and EE 
may differ). The choice is unlikely to be easy. In many cases de facto 
effluent rights clearly exist in the form of existing effluent standards 
(Buchanan and Tullock, 1975,142; Pezzey 1988,207). However, both 
environmental and industrial interests often fear, if for quite opposite and 
incompatible reasons, that formally recognising effluent rights will be 
disadvantageous to them in the long-term struggle that usually precedes the 
establishment of any property rights over public or common resources. 
Whichever is the case, the more quickly and firmly that a formula can be 
found to settle disagreements between environmental and industrial interests, 
the sooner and greater will be the economic gain which can then be shared 
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between these interest groups, and also taxpayers and consumers. 
7.3 CONTROL BY QUANTITY, AND SYMMETRY WITH 
CONTROL BY PRICE 
The authority can achieve effluent control by a quantity instrument, in a 
way that is formally symmetrical to the above scheme of control by price, 
as follows. As with charge- subsidies, the control authority starts by 
knowing the optimal total effluent EE. The authority gives ('grandfathers') 
each existing firm a free baseline amount Ebof marketable effluent permits 
(MEPs), ' and takes such steps as are necessary to create an efficient market 
to bring together potential buyers and sellers of MEPs. If EEb> EE, the 
authority must then rent back (EEb-EE) permits from the lowest offerer; if 
EEb< EE, it must create an extra (EE - EEb) permits and offer these out for 
rental to the highest bidder. In either case, the equilibrium rental price of 
an MEP becomes V, the optimal effluent price. ' If a firm's effluent E> Eb, 
it legally must rent (E-Eb) permits at a rental price V, whereas if E< Eb it 
will wish to lease out (Eb-E) spare permits. If the firm closes down 
(E = 0), it can lease out all Eb spare permits and receive a permanent income 
of VEb. As with the charge-subsidy scheme, firms entering the industry do 
not receive effluent rights (i. e. Eb=O). In all cases a firm producing output 
Q and effluent E therefore ends up paying V(E-Eb) to the authority, but 
faces opportunity costs of production equal to QQ, E) + VE. These are the 
7. Also known as transferable discharge permits (TDPs), tradeable emission 
licences, tradeable effluent rights, marketable pollution consents, etc, etc. 
8. The talk is of renting rather than selling permits in order to make the symmetry 
between marketable permits and charge-subsidies more obvious. If the interest rate 
is r and the permit is permanent, the selling price would be V1r. Other details of this 
market, for example whether it uses quoted prices or auctions, are not discussed here. 
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same formulae as (7.1) and (7.2) for the charge-subsidy scheme, so the 
MEPs achieve the same short and long-run efficiency, and as before, 
baseline effluent permits can be distributed according to political criteria 
without impairing efficiency. The whole scheme is presumably similar to 
that envisaged in a comment on Mumy by Beavis and Walker (1981), 
though with the important difference that here the total EEb of the effluent 
baselines does not need to be exactly equal to the 'total amount of acceptable 
discharge, ' i. e the optimal total effluent EE; if it does, political and 
economic considerations become entangled again. 
The available schemes for control by price and control by quantity are 
summarised in Table 7.1, and under our ideal conditions we have shown 
that the two types of control are fully symmetrical in terms of efficiency and 
Table 7.1 Categorisation of market instruments for effluent control 
by method of control, and by effluent rights embodied 
..... ....... ......... ................................................... 
........................ ...... . ....... -X': ... ....... ........ 
Effluent rights owned by firm' 
.............. 
. ......... ....................... ............... ............... 
Zero Intermediate Free market 
. ... ........ .......... 
............... .......... 
level of 
..... ....... effluent 
Control by Price P1. Pure charge P2. Charge-subsid. 112 P3. Pure 
price or by subsidy 
quantity? Quantity Q1. Sold or Q2. Freely granted Q3. Granted 
auctioned MEPs (grandfathered) MEPs and bought 
6m 
back MEps 2 
NOTES 
1 The choice of three discrete baseline values reflects what is assumed in the literature, 
but there is nothing in formula (7.1) which says that effluent rights have to be confined 
to these values. Chapter 8 explores in detail the implications of allowing effluent rights 
to take on any intermediate values. 
2 Instruments in italics are frequently ignored in the literature (for example, by Milliman 
and Prince 1989). 
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acceptability. Our key conclusion is therefore that the best control scheme 
is to formalise the de facto effluent rights of each firm into precise 
baselines, and then incorporate these baselines as property rights into either 
charge-subsidy or MEP schemes, with the choice between charge- subsidies 
and MEPs being determined by practical departures from the ideal 
con itions. 
7.4 ARGUMENTS AGAINST SUBSIDIES 
There is little in Sections 7.2 and 7.3 that is technically new, as already 
noted. However, the symmetry we have established and depicted in Table 
7.1 is widely rejected in the literature. It is therefore important to examine 
this rejection here, before briefly reviewing in Section 7.5 why a 
fundamentally free choice between control by price and control by quantity 
is desirable and how it should be made, and suggesting how the debate can 
move forward. 
The literature on effluent charges and subsidies stretches from Kamien, 
Schwartz and Dolbear (1966) to modern textbooks like Baumol and Oates 
(1988, Chapter 14). ' Its essential conclusion is that subsidies are 
undesirable, for three reasons: one economic, one administrative, and one 
political. The first, economic reason given is that, in the long run, subsidies 
encourage excessive entry into a polluting industry, and avoiding this would 
require the practically and politically impossible task of tracking down 
potential polluters and subsidising them to stay out of the industry. 
However, this conclusion entirely depends on the (usually implicit) 
assumptions that subsidy payments are available to all firms that enter, and 
9. An earlier version of this Chapter (Pezzey 1990) contains a more detailed review 
of this and related literature. 
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terminated for all firms that exit. The case for these standard 'open-class7 
entry-exit assumptions, which differ crucially from our 'closed-class' 
assumptions above, is rarely given. While the standard assumptions may 
represent the way in which real subsidy schemes generally operate, as noted 
by Baumol and Oates (1988,214), there is no theoretical reason why a new 
firm should not have to buy or rent its effluent rights from existing owners 
of the enviroriment, just as it must buy or rent its new factory site from 
existing owners of land. 
The second, administrative reason given, for example by Baumol and 
Oates (1988,216) , 
is that it would be infeasible to pay subsidies indefinitely 
to firms which have exited. If so, the solution would be the suggestion in 
Dewees and Sims (1976,330) that the authority buys out exiting firms' 
effluent rights by offering lump sum subsidies in compensation (although 
this could make big demands on the authority's cashflow). The third, 
political reason is that given by writers such as Spulber (1985,106), who 
object to firms owning effluent rights on the grounds that society owns the 
environment, and recommend pure charging instead. As argued above, this 
ignores the political reality that many firms have de facto effluent rights and 
the clout to defend them. 
Despite the formal symmetry that we have shown to exist between freely 
granted MEPs and charge- subsidies under ideal conditions, the former are 
both much better known and much less likely to be criticised in the literature 
than the latter; see for example the approval given to granted MEPs in 
Baumol and Oates (1988,179). Such writers are much more prepared to 
accept the notion of environmental property rights with control by quantity 
than with control by price. As a result, they thus explicitly or implicitly 
accept the closed-class entry-exit assumptions for control by quantity, and 
thus ensure that the long-run economic objections of excessive entry to the 
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industry do not arise with freely granted MEPs- Also, MEN do not get 
tainted with criticism of related instruments, because of the asymmetric 
choices of instruments that are made when comparing control by price and 
control by quantity. For example, Milliman and Prince (1989), in an 
otherwise comprehensive study of how instrument choice affects technical 
innovation, choose pure charges and pure subsidies (PI and P3 in Table 7.1) 
as instruments which control by price, but sold MEPs and freely granted 
MEPs (Q1 and Q2) as instruments which control by quantity. Choosing to 
study pure subsidies instead of the charge-subsidy option (P2) tends to 
associate control by price in general with the specific moral hazard of pure 
subsidies, which arises when the level of effluent that firms initially (or 
hypothetically) discharge in the absence of all regulation is used as the 
starting point for subsidies. The equivalent objection to MEPs does not 
arise because no one thinks it sensible even to consider option Q3, whereby 
firms are given permits equal to what their free market, unregulated 
discharges would be. 
7.5 IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 
Conventional economic wisdom thus unnecessarily excludes a rights- 
based charge-subsidy scheme (option P2 in Table 7.1) from serious 
consideration as a policy instrument. This may have expensive 
consequences in real cases where pure charging (option PI) is politically 
unacceptable because of well- e stabl ished de facto effluent rights, but control 
by price is more cost-effective than control by quantity. In any given case, 
practical choices between control by price and control by quantity, and 
about how much regulation should be retained as a backstop to market 
instruments, should be based on how well each instrument copes with the 
way the real world departs from the ideal conditions set out in Section 
7.1. 
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These departures include uncertainty; monitoring and enforcement costs, and 
how these are distributed between firms and the control authority; storage 
or accumulation of pollutants; changes over time due to economic growth 
and technical progress; and vulnerability to monopoly power (see Rose- 
Ackerman 1977 and Pezzey 1988 for surveys of many of these points). 
Because of the variety of practical circumstances that can occur, there can 
be no general presumption that control by quantity is superior to control by 
price. 
Uncertainty is worth a special mention. It is well-established, following 
a seminal contribution of Weitzman (1974) and a recent summary by 
Baumol and Oates (1988, Chapter 5), that if the authority has good 
information on the marginal benefits of effluent control, is uncertain about 
the absolute level of control costs, but is reasonably sure that marginal 
benefits decrease less steeply than marginal costs increase as effluent is 
reduced, then control by prices will give greater expected social welfare 
than control by quantities. Harrison (1983) and Oates, Portney and 
McGartland (1989) documented cases (concerning aircraft landing noise and 
urban air pollution, respectively) where these conditions are met, and 
control by price is economically preferable. In the context of global 
warming, the choice between carbon taxes and tradeable carbon emission 
permits may be one where, if effective progress is to be made, using control 
by price to avoid excessive costs to industry is more important than using 
control by quantity to achieve precise control over carbon dioxide emissions. 
How then can the charge-subsidy idea be added to the menu of 
instruments considered by policymakers? One way to overcome resistance 
to the idea may be to change the language used. Kelman's (1981) survey 
showed that attitudes to effluent charging are greatly influenced by the 
choice of particular words such as 'fees, ' 'charges' or 'taxes'. Clearly, 
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L ,e is also a vast difference in political perception between 4a bribe, ' 'a 
sidy' and 'compensation, ' even if all three are financially identical; 
ých word many writers have chosen to use can hardly be accidental. 
wever, it is also clear from other policy studies, such as the analysis of 
US emissions trading scheme in Hahn (1989,101), that a fundamental 
ssage of economic analysis - that once a resource has become scarce, 
eeds to be owned, and priced, if it is to avoid becoming even scarcer - 
)ne that many people do not want to hear, particularly when it is applied 
. he natural environment. 
The implications of an economic need for the 
,p oceans and the stratosphere to be 'owned' can indeed be disturbing, 
h practically and psychologically, and may provoke second thoughts 
)ut how far the physical demands of continued economic growth can be 
)wed to proceed. However, while they do proceed, there is an urgent 
,d to find ways of controlling resource use that are both efficient and 
, eptable. The delicate task of promoting schemes which contain the 
-, essary elements of subsidy and effluent rights, whilst trying to avoid 
is therefore one which economists should . ct use of such emotive words, 
duck. 
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CHAPTER 8 
ON THE POLITICAL AND INFORMATIONAL ECONOMY 
OF DISTRIBUTING THE EFFICIENCY GAINS 
ROM MARKET MECHANISMS OF POLLUTION CONTROL 
I INTRODUCTION 
Progress around the world towards the use of market mechanisms of 
Ilution control, such as emission charges and marketable emission permits 
IEPs), ' generally remains slow (Hahn and Stavins 1992). This is despite 
me promising developments in recent years, and despite the well-known 
*I am greatly indebted to Bob Kohn for providing the original stimulus to this 
per, and for numerous discussions about its earlier versions. I also thank Mick 
immon, Linda Critchfield, Tony Leiman, Geoff Lewis, Danny McCoy, Renee 
10 ,, Charles Perrings, Joe Swierzbinski and 
Tom Tietenberg for helpful comments. 
I errors and omissions are mine. I am grateful for research funding under award 
. L320-27-3002 of the 
U. K. Economic and Social Research Council's Global 
virom-nental Change Research Initiative. 
' The word 'pollution' is ambiguous: it can mean the amount of pollutant emitted, 
concentration in the environment, the physical damage it does to the envirom-nent, 
the value of this damage; and each of these four quantities can be measured 
ative to zero emissions, or relative to some acceptable level of emissions. 
ýenever clarity is needed, I avoid 'pollution' and use 'emission' or 
'emissions' to 
han the first quantity, measured relative to zero. When 'pollution' 
is used, as in 
; eneral phrase like 'pollution control policy', the ambiguity will 
be unimportant. 
[other semantic point is that my analysis applies to any medium, so 
I could have 
"'d the language of water rather than air pollution and talked of 
'effluent' rather 
in 4emissions'. Finally, I use the word 'control' throughout, rather 
than its 
ionyms 'abate' or 'abatement'. 
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ort run theoretical efficiency of these mechanisms when used to control 
iissions from a heterogeneous industry (Baumol and Oates 1971, 
ontgomery 1972). One possible reason is that proponents of market 
ýchanisms still pay too little attention to the following dicta: 
it ... economists who continue to support the penalty tax alternative [i. e. Pigovian 
taxation of pollution rather than direct regulation] ... had best ... begin to search 
out and invent institutional arrangements that will make the penalty tax acceptable 
to those who are primarily affected". (Buchanan and Tullock 1975, p147) 
"... the probability that a policy is adopted depends on who gains from it, who 
loses, and by how much. " (Zeckhauser 1981, p215) 
. cent policy analyses by Pezzey (1988), Hahn (1989) and Hanley, Moffatt 
ýd Hallett (1990) also stressed that the distributional effects of proposed 
arket mechanisms are crucial in determining whether or not they are 
bpted. However, these papers focused mainly on the two types of market 
echanism which have seen practical use, namely redistributive emission 
Larges in Europe, where a low charge rate is aimed at raising revenue for 
bsidising emission control investments, and freely-granted 
y 
, randfathered') MEPs 
in America. 
Here I describe a more general design of market mechanism which allows 
policymaker, at least in a world of perfect information, a much wider, 
ntinuous range of policy options. The key features of the mechanism are 
ie, it exists in both charge ('control by price') and marketable permit 
. ontrol by quantity') form. Two, it can always 
be 'win-win-win', that is, 
oduce a gain for each of three interest groups: industry, environmental 
c,, rs, and taxpayers. Moreover, these two features are available without 
y sacrifice of short or long run efficiency. The 'win-win-win' property 
achieved by setting industry's total emission rights at some level between 
ro and a level of emissions less than the total level permitted by the 
rrent, inefficient system of emission control. Such a property should, one 
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)pes, improve the political acceptability (and therefore actual progress) of 
arket mechanisms, although the open recognition of industry's emission 
ghts that is required would need careful handling. 
Section 8.2 describes the win-win-win mechanism diagrammatically, and 
)serves that, following the result of Chapter 7, the mechanism can 
toretically be implemented by either charge- subsidies or partly-sold MEPs. 
ibsequent sections spell out subsidiary results, hidden assumptions and 
,, cessary qualifications to this basic result. Section 8.3 discusses the choice V 
'interest groups and control mechanisms made in Section 8.2, and shows 
at the literature has been quite confined in its choices up till now. Section 
4 shows that, unless firms' emission rights are changed in an unlikely, 
, iequal way, one cannot extend strict 
Pareto improvement to the firm level, 
id 'average' firms may well lose from a win-win or win-win-win 
. echanism. 
Section 8.5 argues that it would be unusual for a pure market 
. echanism 
(one with zero emission rights for industry) to have the win-win- 
in property, since this would imply that the existing or any feasible 
ternative regulatory system of control must be extremely inefficient. 
-ction 8.6 discusses several important ways in which various types of 
formation costs may limit the practicality of the win-win-win mechanism. 
Inally, as an illustration of the paper's arguments, Section 8.7 shows how 
e recent S02 emissions trading program in the USA could fairly easily 
ive been an example of this win-win-win mechanism, but in fact is only 
win-win mechanism. Section 8.8 concludes. 
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BASIC DESCRIPTION OF THE WIN-WIN-WIN MECHANISM 
The analysis is confined to an industry which discharges a single, non- 
)rable, non-cumulative pollutant into a well-mixed environment. 2 Firms 
the industry face perfectly competitive markets for their outputs and for 
, ir capital and labour inputs, but they own different sets of fixed factors 
., h as enterprise, and therefore have different marginal cost schedules for 
Juent control. ' We abstract from time-dependent phenomena such as 
certainty about the future, and technical innovation in pollution control; 
latter omission therefore ignores the possibly important dynamic 
ýiciency benefits that can flow from market mechanisms (Downing and 
hite 1986, Milliman and Prince 1989). For the moment, all information 
d transaction costs are assumed to be zero; this is relaxed in Section 8.6. 
, stly, we assume that the pollution control authority 
(hereafter 'the 
thority') aims to maximise public welfare, has no operating costs, 
forces any control system perfectly, and passes any revenue raised by a 
irket mechanism directly to taxpayers. The important complications of 
iltiple pollutants local variations in environmental quality, imperfect 
mpetition and realistic authorities are all left for further work. 
Suppose that such an industry has the structure of emission control costs 
)wn in Figure 8.1. There is a continuous, monotonic, marginal control 
But following Kohn (1994), 1 do not need to assume that each firm faces a 
-izontal curve for the marginal damage caused by its emissions. 
' As shown in more detail later, without the assumption of heterogeneous control 
ts, it is hard to see why the existing regulatory system should be inefficient, and 
ice where the efficiency savings from any market mechanism are to come from. 
vertheless, plenty of literature on market mechanisms assumes identical 
firms and 
ice uniform control costs (see for example Buchanan and Tullock 1975, 
Spulber 
15, and Kohn 1985,1994). While this simplification improves tractability, 
it can 
sight of the main practical reason for being interested in market mechanisms. 
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)st curve SA if control is by some form of inefficient, direct regulation. 4 
lower curve SGFC would apply if control by an alternative, more 
ficient system. For the sake of exposition, we assume henceforth that this 
ternative is the kind of market mechanism (discussed further below) which 
, hievesfully efficient control: i. e., control that is efficient in both the short 
in, given the existing number of firms, and in the long run, allowing for 
itry and exit of firms. However, most of our results also apply to any 
dft from inefficient to more efficient, even if not fully efficient, control. 
With either inefficient or fully efficient control, the industry would emit 
flow OS of pollutant if uncontrolled. Marginal damage costs are not 
ýecified precisely, and could for example be either of the dashed curves FA 
CBA. A change from inefficient control at A to fully efficient control at 
would lower industry's total control costs by area GAS, while leaving its 
tal emissions unchanged at ON. Market mechanisms exist which could 
hieve this change in a revenue-neutral way. For example, the authority 
iuld issue free ('grandfathered') MEPs to all firms equal to their current 
nissions under standards, which total ON. This would indirectly establish 
uniform price OP per unit of emissions, and hence achieve the efficiency 
Jns GAS while leaving these gains as a clear 'win' for industry, to be 
alised by permit trading among firms. 
However, the authority could instead achieve a 'win-win' outcome which 
nefits envirom-nental users as well as industry, by establishing an emission 
ice of OF rather than OP. This would move the industry from G to F, 
is lowering total emissions to OM, which would benefit environmental 
' The assumption of monotonicity is standard, and is supported by much empirical 
ýdence. However, economies of scale in the control cost function are theoretically 
practically possible, and can cause considerable complications (Pezzey 1988, pp. 
)-241; Harford 1989). 
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users (by an amount MFAN or MBAN, depending on whether FA or CBA 
is the marginal damage curve). To continue the MEP example, the 
authority could issue MEPs totalling OM instead of ON, by giving each firm 
permits equal to OM/ON times its current regulatory standard. The overall 
move from A to F would still give industry a net benefit since, with the 
curves as drawn, MFGN < GAS; that is, the extra cost of reducing total 
emissions from ON to OM is less than the savings in keeping total emissions 
at their original level ON. Whatever the origin of the win-win idea (it is 
implicit in Pezzey 1988, pp. 214-6, but doubtless occurred to others much 
earlier), it has been little discussed in environmental economics articles or 
major textbooks, probably because of its political rather than economic 
nature. Yet, as noted in Section 8.7, it can play a vital role in securing 
progress towards more efficient pollution control. 
The authority could also go beyond revenue-neutrality, and achieve a 
6win-win-win' outcome which benefits taxpayers as well as industry and 
environmental users. Continuing our MEP example, it could give firms 
permits totalling less than OM, say OL, and sell the remainder LM to them 
at the competitive price OP'. Taxpayers would then receive the sales 
revenue LDFM, ' but the move from A to D would still be a net 'win' for 
industry since, again with the curves as drawn, LDFGN (the revenue paid 
' The revenue, rather than being given to taxpayers as lump sums, could be used 
to reduce other taxes in the economy, such as income taxes. Stemming from Terkla 
(1984), there is a widely-held view these days (Pearce 1991, Repetto 1992) that the 
latter use would give a further efficiency gain to the economy, by reducing 
diStortionary deadweight losses. However, this view is not without critics (Bovenberg 
and de Mooij 1994) who see it as too simplistic. Whichever way this debate is 
resolved, the revenue per se will be seen as a benefit by taxpayers, even if the 
Political cost of raising it may sometimes be felt to be too high, as noted in Section 
8.7 in the context of the USA's S02 trading program. 
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to the authority under the market mechanism, plus the extra control cost) is 
less than GAS (the control cost saving on the original emissions). The 
central observation of this paper is that, for any sensible position of the 
three control or damage cost curves, ' one can always reach such a point D 
with the 'win-win-win' property, by a suitable choice of emission price OF 
and free permit total OL. 
Moreover, this result is not confined to MEPs ('control by quantity'). 
It holds for the more general market mechanism defined in Chapter 7, under 
which each firm has to pay the authority an amount in respect of its 
emissions equal to 
V(E-Eb) (in, say, dollars per month) (8.1) 
where V is the unit emission price, E is the firm's actual emission level, and 
Eb is called its baseline emission right (or just 'baseline'). MEPs are one 
form of this mechanism, with V being the market price at which total permit 
demand equals the total FE issued by the authority, of which EEb are given 
away free (where the summations are across all firms in the industry). 
Another form of (1) is a system of charge-subsidies ('control by price'), 
with V being the emission charge set by the authority, EE the industry's 
total emission demand in response to this, and EEb the sum of the baselines 
which form the boundary between charge and subsidy for each firm. I 
showed in Chapter 7 that as long as the baselines in either form are treated 
as full property rights, the mechanism is efficient in the long as well as the 
' Even assuming linear marginal control and damage cost curves, there is still 
enormous variety in the way that the three curves in Figure 8.1 can be drawn (since 
there are 5 independent parameters determining their position), and a corresponding 
range of relative sizes of the various areas under the curves. 
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short run .7 Freely given 
MEPs and charge- subsidies which use identical 
distributions of baselines (which represent lump-sum transfers of wealth) 
among firms are then economically and politically equivalent control 
systems, at this level of theoretical abstraction. 
To use the general mechanism (1) to reach a win-win-win point like D 
in Figure 8.1, the authority would set 
Emission price V= OF > OP (which defines points M and F) (8.2) 
Baseline total EEb= OL < OM < ON (which defines L and D) (8.3) 
in such a way that LDFGN < GAS. Note that rule (3) treats the baseline 
total EEb as a continuous rather than a discrete variable. MEPs must be 
partly-sold rather than all freely-given; or equivalently, charge- subsidies 
must be positive- rather than zero-revenue. Rules (2) and (3) allow a range 
of choices of D, and any particular choice determines how the efficiency 
benefits of market-based emission control are divided among the three major 
interest groups. I suggest that this division can and should be deliberately 
used to make the shift to market mechanisms as politically attractive as 
possible. 
8.3 THE CHOICE OF INTEREST GROUPS AND CONTROL 
MECHANISMS 
The choices of interest groups and market mechanisms made in the above 
analysis are important in determining its relevance to real policy issues. It 
is thus worth discussing these choices further, and comparing them to other 
choices made in the literature. Regarding interest groups, I have 
distinguished industry, taxpayers and environmental users because they do 
I In particular, charge- subsidies that treat Eb as a property right do not cause 
excessive entry or insufficient exit of polluting firms in the long run. 
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exist as separate, powerful lobbying groups in almost all industrial countries. 
This separation ultimately reflects differences among people: differences in 
their ownership of individual firms and of industry overall, in their payment 
of taxes, and in their use of the environment. To see why, recall that if the 
authority sold marketable emission permits (MEPs) to firms, the sales 
revenue would (under our assumption about the authority's goals) go to 
taxpayers. If instead the authority gave free MEPs to firms, the same 
revenue would remain as part of firms' profits. But if everyone paid the 
same taxes and owned an equal share of each and every firm, they would 
be indifferent to this shift from sold to freely given MEPs, because it would 
leave their after-tax incomes exactly the same. In practice, differences in 
ownership make people far from indifferent to such a change, and liable to 
form special interest groups which lobby for or against it. 
We will also focus in Section 8.4 on different types of firm within an 
industry. ' This is because, as already pointed out in footnote 3, without 
variation among firms, it is difficult to see why the existing regulatory 
system of pollution control would be inefficient. Also, different types of 
firm, and often individual firms, clearly do play major lobbying roles in 
public debates about pollution policy, and our analysis helps to explain why. 
But we generally ignore different types of taxpayers or of environmental 
users, because, given the millions of people who usually pay taxes and use 
any given environment, it is much harder to organise subgroups of them into 
effective lobbying forces. However, if there are just a few sharp divisions 
among taxpayers or environmental users, assuming that the interests in each 
' But we ignore another desirable distinction to make within industry, which is 
among the interests of labour, management and ownership. Given the variable degree 
to which these groups have sunk their capital into their particular firm or industry, 
they may have significantly different interests in environmental policy. 
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of these two groups are uniform could obviously become misleading; but 
this is another complication left for further work (see for example Pearce 
1980 on the differences in pollution damages suffered by rich and poor 
environmental users). 
Regarding the choice of instruments, the crucial innovation above, which 
is implicit in equation (1) but was undeveloped in Chapter 7, is to treat one 
dimension of the choice, the level of baseline emission rights, as a 
continuous rather than a discrete variable. As illustrated in Table 8.1, 
which summarises the interest groups and market mechanisms chosen by 
Dewees (1983), Mestelman (1985), Chapter 5 of Tietenberg (1985), Hahn 
(1990) and Chapter 7 of this thesis, the choice of baseline in the existing 
literature on the political economy of pollution control has until now been 
confined to at most three levels for each firm. Eb =0 corresponds to a 
pure market mechanism (a pure charge or sold MEP), Eb = current 
emissions corresponds to a revenue-neutral mechanism (a zero-revenue 
charge-subsidy, or a freely given MEP), and Eb = unregulated emissions 
corresponds to a pure subsidy, or an over-given and bought-back MEP. 
The purpose of the Table is to highlight the rather limited choice of interest 
groups and mechanisms that has so far been made. In particular, while 
most authors nowadays recognise the difference between sold and free 
MEPs, charge- subsidies continue to be widely ignored (for example by 
Rajah and Smith 1993 and Howe 1994) as an alternative to pure charges. 
8.4 THE PROBLEM OF THE AVERAGE FIRM 
Unfortunately, it is impossible to find a realistic design of a win-win or 
win-win-win market mechanism which also benefits every firm in the 
industry. 'Average' firms tend to lose out, which somewhat mars the 
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Table 8.1 Choices of interest groups and market mechanisms of 
pollution control made by papers which study the 
political economy of market mechanisms 
Reference Dewees Mestel- Tieten Hahn Chapter 7, 
(1983) man -berg (1990) this thesis 
Topics covered (1985) OCN (190. )) 
Industry - capital V/ 
Political Industry - labour V 
V/ 





Con- Pure charges 
trol 
by Charge- subsidies 
price Pure subsidies 
Mar- 
ket Sold or auctioned V/ 
mech- Con- MEPs' 
anisms trol 




-tity Given and 
bought 
I back MEPs 
NOTES 
1. While Dewees calculates the effects of different instruments on tax revenues and emission levels, 
he does not consider the political reactions to these effects. 
2. MEPs = marketable emission permits. 
3. Hahn does not specify whether his 'marketable permits' are sold or free. 
mechanisms' appeal. To see this, suppose that the competitive industry in 
Figure 8.1 comprises an equal number of three types of firms, with the 
marginal costs of controlling emissions being as shown in Figure 8.2 for 
each firm, where the horizontal scale has been expanded. One type has a 
High marginal cost curve sea of controlling emissions below level Os, one 
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has a Low curve sgc, and one has the 'Average' curve sd. 1 We could 
consider many firms of different sizes and control cost curves, but there is 
little loss in generality in working here with just three firm types (although 
there is a loss in generality in assuming linear marginal control costs: see 
footnote 13). 
Assume that the pre-existing system of control imposes a uniform 
regulatory standard of On per firm. " To achieve the same emissions total, 
a revenue-neutral 'win' market mechanism (either a zero-revenue charge- 
subsidy, or a freely given MEP) would have to create an emission price OP, 
and would typically choose to give baseline emission rights of Eb- On per 
firm. Low would then emit Oh and thus spend hcgn on extra control costs 
relative to the uniform standard, but gain hcdn (either from the subsidy or 
from selling hn spare permits to High). It would thus enjoy a net benefit of 
I Geometrically, point d is defined by Pd=(Pc+Pe)/2 rather than by 
nd-(ng+na)12, so the Average firm defined by sd has average emissions when the 
market mechanism is applied, rather than average control costs when uniform 
standards are applied. Note that for a firm's 'control cost curve' to be independent 
of pollution control policy, the firm must be free to equalise the marginal control 
costs of all its sources of a given well-mixed pollutant. However, many existing 
direct regulations prescribe emission limits for particular sources within a firm with 
little regard to control costs. This can cause great inefficiency at the firm level 
(Maloney and Yandle 1984), and a correspondingly great opportunity for more 
flexible regulation such as 'bubbling' to enable a multi-source firm to achieve lower 
control costs. But I would not regard this as an example of savings from a market 
mechanism, since I use the term to mean only a system which enables reallocation of 
control costs among different firms (either directly with each other, or via the 
authority). 
11 SA, the industry-level control cost curve under regulation in Figure 8.1, would 
then be the vertical average of the firm-level curves in Figure 8.2, multiplied 
horizontally by the number of firms; while SGFC would be the horizontal sum of the 
finn-level curves. 
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cdg, while High would get a corresponding net benefit of dae. The switch 
from uniform standards to this market mechanism would have no effect on 
environmental users (since total emissions are unchanged) or on taxpayers 
(because of the revenue-neutrality). So Low and High have benefits which 
can offset the net cost to them of the further step to a 'win-win' or 'win- 
win-win' mechanism, assuming that this step entails not just a higher 
emission price but also a lower emission baseline for each firm. 
But under the 'win' mechanism, Average's emission is unchanged at On, 
which leaves it no net benefit to offset any further cost. And it seems 
inevitable that there would be a cost, since for Average to receive a higher 
baseline from a win-win or win-win-win mechanism while Low and High 
receive lower baselines (as some firms must, since the baseline total EE, 
must be lower) would seem politically implausible, even though it would not 
harm economic efficiency and could still leave every firm in the industry 
better off. So an average or near-average firm is very likely to be worse off 
under a win-win or win-win-win mechanism, and thus to oppose it. 
Moreover, it may be easy for such opposition to outweigh Low's and High's 
support politically, since losses are often valued much more highly than 
financially equivalent gains (Knetsch 1990). The fewer near-average firms 
there are, the greater should therefore be the chance of such mechanisms 
being adopted. Whether or not this prediction is borne out in practice 
remains to be seen; probably no one has yet looked for any data that could 
confirm or deny it. 
Also, average firms may be less of a problem than would appear from 
Figure 8.2, because their definition is actually rather fluid. For example, 
in Figure 8.3, firms A, B and C have marginal control cost curves A'A", 
B'B" and C'C" respectively. At emission price OP,, Firm B is the average 
firm of the three because its emissions are the average of C's and A's. But 
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by the same reasoning, because of the different curvatures of A'A", B'B" 
and C'C ", as the price rises toOP2, OP3 and then toOP4, which firm is the 
average one changes from B to A, to C, and then back to firm B again. So 
unless the future emission price under a market mechanism is clear, it may 
be hard to identify near-average firms. 
8.5 CAN A PURE MARKET MECHANISM BE WIN-WIN-WIN? 
The overwhelming political disadvantage of a pure market mechanism (a 
pure charge or fully sold permit) is that it makes firms pay transfers to the 
authority. The sum of these transfers could easily exceed the industry's 
overall cost saving (as certainly is the case in Figure 8.1, where OPGN > 
GAS), and this will ensure industry's opposition. However, one can 
construct contrary, special cases like Figure 8.4, where both firm and 
industry-level cost curves have been drawn for a two-firm industry. Control 
costs diverge so sharply here between the High and Low cost firms that a 
move from uniform standards to a pure market mechanism will benefit the 
industry as a whole, since here GAS exceeds OPGN. " 
However again, the distribution of this overall benefit between the two 
firms is very uneven: High saves (dae - OPdn), whereas Low spends 
" If all the firms' marginal cost curves are linear, the conditions for this to 
happen are straightforward to calculate. If the existing degree of overall emission 
control, NS/OS =: C, and the ratio of industry control costs under uniform standards 
to costs under efficient control, NA/NG =: M, then C(M+ 1) >2 means that a pure 
market mechanism will benefit the industry. One can further calculate M from the 
distribution of marginal control costs among firms, if these are known. For example, 
if there are equal numbers of two types of firm with marginal costs in the ratio 1: m 
(m > 1), then it can be shown that M= (M + 1)2 14m. If however firms' costs are 
distributed uniformly between 1 and m, then M= [(m + 1)ln(m)] /2(m - 1). 
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OPcgn. Indeed, changing from uniform standards to a pure mechanism 
would impose a net cost on any firm whose emissions in response to the 
price OP would be below the standard On, since such a firm would pay 
higher control costs under the mechanism, and also charges or permit costs 
for its remaining emissions. This clear division into winners and losers 
would make a pure mechanism politically much less attractive, even if it 
could ever actually lower industry's total financial cost of emission 
control. 12 
Also, if control costs were as hugely divergent as in Figure 8.4, it is 
more likely that the authority would have known this. It could then have 
applied (and if not, still could apply) more flexible regulation than uniform 
standards, such as the British policy of requiring the use of the 'best 
available technology not entailing excessive cost' (BATNEEC) to control 
pollution. In Figure 8.4, an example of flexible regulation would be that the 
authority sets standards of Oj (=(Oh+On)12) for Low, and Oq 
(=(On+Or)12) for High. This would reduce the cost of reducing total 
emissions from OS to ON under standards by nabq-jfgn, whilst still leaving 
Low paying jfs overall, which is much less than the qbs that High would 
pay. When compared to flexible regulation, such as any standard between 
Oh and On for Low and between On and Or for High, a pure market 
mechanism may thus no longer give a net benefit to industry, even in this 
special case. 
" An administratively pure mechanism might however be achievable if existing 
emissions are low enough for the authority to be able to 'buy them out' by offering 
lump sum compensation (as suggested by Dewees and Sims 1976, p330) when 
introducing a pure mechanism. This might be worthwhile to the authority because 
it would eliminate the cost of administering positive baselines, which is one of the 
information costs discussed in Section 8.6 below. 
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8.6 INFORMATIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON MARKET 
MECHANISMS 
We now relax the assumption of perfect information and certainty, and 
recognise the existence of various types of information costs and 
uncertainties regarding actual emissions, emission control costs, and 
emission damage costs. Some such recognition is logically unavoidable, 
since various information costs played a major role in creating both the 
existence of pollution regulations (rather than reliance on Coaseian 
bargaining), and their inefficiency (which market mechanisms seek to 
improve upon). It is also a recognition forced upon us by case studies of 
the real world applicability of market mechanisms (see Hanley and Moffatt 
1993 for a recent review and a new case study). We assume throughout this 
section that all information costs are independent of the actual level of 
emissions, so that the same diagrams as before can be used for marginal 
analysis. However, we now have to remember that there may be hidden, 
discrete jumps in information costs as we switch from one control system 
to another. The globally optimal system may therefore not be at the 
marginal optimum suggested by diagrammatic analysis. 
Even if policymakers may originally have wished to create a regulatory 
system which was economically efficient at the margin, information costs 
would have greatly hampered them. For an authority would have needed 
to know each firm's control cost curve in order to calculate efficient 
standards, which in Figure 8.2 would be Oh, On and Or for the Low, 
Average and High firm respectively, where Oh+Or=20n. Thecostofthis 
information might well have been prohibitive, as recognised long ago by 
Kneese, Ayres and d'Arge (1970, p. 96), if not earlier. Even if it had not 
been, such firm-specific standards would probably have been politically 
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unacceptable. Firms would have perceived them as 4unequal treatment', 
since (again in Figure 8-2) the area hcs that the Low firm would pay in 
control costs would be much more, with the curves as drawn, than the res 
that the High firm would pay-" Transferring a lump sum of nder (=hcdn) 
from the High to the Low firm could solve this problem, but only if the 
authority has the political will to combine financial transfers with a 
regulatory system, as well as the information necessary to calculate such 
transfers correctly. 
So either information costs or unresolved equity problems typically ruled 
out, and would continue to rule out, efficient standards. The alternative 
efficient system, namely market mechanisms, was also ruled out at the time, 
partly due to ignorance or ideological resistance to the idea of treating the 
environment as a commodity (Oates 1994), partly due to scepticism about 
the information costs of making a market mechanism work, and partly due 
to existing polluters' self-interest in retaining standards (Buchanan and 
Tullock, 1975). Control systems therefore were based on inefficient 
standards (although, as noted above, not necessarily uniform standards). 
This reality, together with reduced ignorance of and ideological resistance 
to market mechanisms over the last twenty years or so, provides a clearer 
rationale for wanting to introduce market mechanisms than some writers 
such as Baron (1985, p229) have allowed for. " But the reality of 
" The caveat "with the curves as drawn" is needed because if sgc is sharply 
convex to the origin instead of linear, area hcs could be smaller than area res. Such 
an outcome seems unlikely, but only measurement of individual firm's control cost 
curves could confin-n this. 
14 Closer attention to the extensive literature on regulation under asymmetric 
information (such as that stemming for example from Baron and Myerson 1982) 
would pay some rewards here, but this is another topic left for further work. 
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information costs also forces us to recognise three important qualifications 
to our findings about market mechanisms. 
Firstly, control by price (charge- subsidies) and control by quantity 
(MEPs) will no longer generally be equivalent means of implementing the 
win-win-win mechanism. For as is well known (Baumol and Oates 1988, 
Chapter 5; Tisato 1994), uncertainty about the location of the industry's 
marginal control cost curve generally means that either control by price is 
superior to control by quantity, or vice versa. 
Secondly, information costs may make it politically impossible for either 
a win-win or a win-win-win mechanism to reach marginal social optimality 
of the conventional, potential Pareto kind (not that I claimed such optimality 
as a virtue of the mechanisms in the first place, though). Consider Figure 
8.1 again. If the marginal damage cost curve is the dashed line FA, both 
the win-win mechanism at F and the win-win-win mechanism at D are also 
socially optimal at the margin. But if the damage curve is actually CBA, 
a move to the marginally optimal point C would impose a net cost on 
industry, since here KCGN > GAS. One could in theory avoid this by 
taxing away part of the environmental users' total benefit KCAN and 
transferring it to industry, still leaving environmental users with a 'win' 
overall. However, unless environmental users are either remarkably few in 
number or remarkably homogeneous, it could well be prohibitively 
expensive to estimate both the total benefit and its distribution among 
possibly millions of environmental users. And without such information, 
taxing the benefit in order to move to the potentially Pareto-optimal emission 
level OK would often be politically impossible. 
Thirdly, even for the move to the win-win-win point D, any formal 
emission rights will still incur a more or less fixed cost to administer (as 
244 Chapter 8 
already noted in footnote 12), both initially to distribute rights, and 
thereafter to enforce them. Whether or not this fixed information cost is 
outweighed by the efficiency savings GAS will vary from case to case. For 
example, emission rights are likely to be vastly more expensive to 
administer in an industry with millions of separate small polluters, such as 
road transport, than in a concentrated industry such as electricity generation 
from fossil fuels. 
8.7 THE EXAMPLE OF THE USA'SS02 TRADING PROGRAM 
The above analysis is applied here to the recently started program to use 
marketable allowances for S02 control in the USA, as described by Rico 
(1993). The 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act set a limit for total 
S02 emissions in the USA at about 60% of 1980 levels, to be achieved by 
2010 using a program of transferableS02 'allowances' (which are not quite 
marketable emission permits, as discussed below) in two phases, starting in 
1995 and 2000. Only electric utilities, which account for about 70 % of US 
emissions of S02, are compulsorily included in the program. They are 
given free allowances in advance, for 1995 and thereafter, at a level based 
on about half of their historic (1980) emissions. New utility boilers are not 
allocated allowances, but must buy them from existing utilities. Industrial 
sources can ignore the program, but if they wish they can opt into it, be 
given allowances based on all of their historic emissions, reduce their 
emissions, and then sell their spare allowances to a utility. Each year about 
3% of existing allowances are compulsorily put on open sale (mainly at 
auction, but some at fixed prices) by the authority (the E. P. A. ), which then 
returns the proceeds to the utilities from whom the allowances are 
requisitioned. The purpose of this is to lubricate the allowance market in 
two ways: by providing a guaranteed source of allowances for new utilities 
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that need them, in case existing utilities try to hoard their allowances; and 
for the early auctions, by providing a signal on allowance prices to the 
market. The allowance market is nationwide, but subject to local limits 
which stop pollution 'hotspots' developing. 
Ignoring the dynamic and geographic aspects of the scheme and of the 
acid rain damage it is designed to curb, I suggest the following stationary, 
qualitative interpretation of it using Figure 8.5. One can suppose that the 
industry marginal control cost curve is SHA under standards, and that the 
policymakers' perception used to be that marginal damages from total S02 
emissions were QH. Optimal emissions under standards were thus OR, with 
associated total control costs of RHS. New scientific information on acid 
rain damage then shifted the perception of the marginal damage curve up to 
something like FA or CA (the precise slope does not matter). To respond 
to this by moving to A and cutting the standards total to ON, the new 
optimum under standards, would make utilities incur extra total control costs 
of NAHR. 
Instead of this , the newS02 allowance program can 
be seen as creating 
and giving away OM marketable allowances, where OM happens to equal 
about half of utilities' total emissions in 1980. This lowers the utilities' 
overall control cost curve from SHA to the efficient curve SJGFC, and their 
total emissions to OM. Their extra control costs are then (MFJR-JHS), 
which on Figure 8.5 happens to be much lower than the NAHR incurred 
under standards. Environmental users are better off because emissions fall 
by MN. The scheme is thus a revenue-neutral, win-win market mechanism, 
because both utilities and environmental users gain. According to Rico 
(1993), this was crucial in gaining acceptance for the scheme: "This political 
calculus ensured environmental support for the stringent emissions goal, and 
economic support for a sizable test of economic principles to reduce the 
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costs of environmental control. " It also happens to conform to the Standard 
Polluter Pays Principle, as defined by Pezzey (1988, p208), although Rico 
did not mention this as an advantage. 
The scheme is not win-win-win, because taxpayers gain nothing, but in 
theory they could have - If the E. P. A- had given away only an intermediate 
amount OL of allowances, and auctioned off the remainder LM, then 
utilities would be paying the E. P. A. (and hence taxpayers) a flow of LDFM 
in revenue. Yet, since GAS > LDFGN in the Figure as drawn, utilities 
would still benefit from the market mechanism, compared to how much 
tighter standards at A would have collectively cost them. The benefit to 
environmental users would remain unchanged, giving a win-win-win 
mechanism overall. One obvious way to have achieved this would simply 
have been for the E. P. A. to pass the revenue raised from the 3% annual 
forced sale of allowances on to taxpayers, rather than return it to the 
utilities. 
However, Rico (1994) suggested that proposing to raise revenue from the 
program would have been politically impossible, even when the original 
legislation was being drafted, because of the political perception that it 
would be unfair to force the utilities to pay a new tax as well as reduce their 
emissions. To me, this suggests in turn one of three possibilities. Either 
(i) the curves were such that MFGN > GAS (unlike in Figure 8.5), so that 
the utilities as a group were already going to lose out as a whole from the 
program, and were thus in a strong position to resist any transfer to 
taxpayers; or (ii) the utilities would benefit from the program, but many 
influential 'average' utilities would not, and mounted a powerful opposition 
to any transfers; or (iii) almost all utilities would benefit from the market 
flexibility which the program gives them, but nevertheless they mounted a 
powerful public relations campaign to give the impression that they would 
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not, thus deterring any transfers. One can only speculate which of these 
was true, and whether or not it would have remained true if the more 
expensive alternative of tightening standards had been seriously proposed as 
the alternative to a win-win-win distribution. But it does show that, even 
in a country with such a huge budget deficit, a 'win' for the taxpayer is still 
a fairly weak player in the political poker game. 
As flagged above, S02 allowances do not quite correspond to theoretical 
marketable emission permits, since the legislation specifically states that the 
allowances are not property rights, continuing a trend noted by Hahn (1989, 
p101). For example, opted-in industrial firms can sell spare allowances only 
if they have maintained the same output of their product; and emission 
reductions as a result of reduced output (or even a complete shutdown) are 
not considered saleable. According to Rico (1994), the main reason why 
allowances are not property rights is because of uncertainty about whether 
the 40% reduction in total emissions by 2010 will achieve its stated 
envirom-nental goal. If it does not, and allowances were property rights, the 
state would then need to spend large amounts of money buying them back 
in order to protect the environment. The economic inefficiencies created by 
allowances not being full property rights were considered to be a price 
worth paying to avoid the risk of such a future drain on state revenues. 
However, I suggest that this understandable difficulty could perhaps be 
overcome in a more efficient way, by mimicking the commercial property 
market and creating emission rights as long leases, rather than as freeholds 
in perpetuity. 
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8.8 CONCLUSIONS 
Political will can sometimes push through economic reform against the 
opposition of powerful interest groups who are harmed by it. But if reform 
can be redesigned so that Powerful groups are not harmed, without 
sacrificing the very efficiency gains that it is to meant to achieve, then it is 
surely more likely to happen. My main conclusion here is that, at least in 
a simple competitive model with perfect information, market mechanisms 
of pollution control can be redesigned in such a way. A win-win-win 
outcome is possible, with taxpayers, a polluting industry, and the users of 
the environment it pollutes, all getting a positive slice of the full efficiency 
gains of market-based control. 
The key to retaining full (i. e. long as well as short run) efficiency is to 
treat the emission baselines that are embodied in any market mechanism as 
full property rights. Firms entering the industry should receive no 
baselines, and firms leaving the industry should not have their baselines 
confiscated. Such ownership of the environment may cause uncomfortable 
reflections on the scale of human encroachment on the planet's once vast 
wildernesses, and so should probably be downplayed as far as possible in 
the political process. Given, however, that such encroachment has 
occurred, environmental ownership is necessary to prevent excessive 
industry growth, and to allow charge- subsidies to achieve long run 
efficiency and thus be a useful alternative to marketable emission permits. 
The key to achieving a win-win-win division of the efficiency gains is to 
accept that, to be politically realistic, emission baselines under a market 
mechanism can rarely if ever be zero, but can be set at less than current 
emissions. Setting baselines so that the efficiency gains of market-based 
control are divided between envirom-nental users and industry is already at 
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the heart of the USA's recent S02 trading program, and such a win-win 
approach to policymaking is clearly fruitful. Less recognised, and the 
central message of this paper, is that a three- rather than two-fold division 
of these gains is possible, and perhaps desirable: taxpayers can receive some 
but not all of industry's share of the efficiency gains, without harming 
marginal efficiency. With marketable permits, the state could give away a 
majority of the permits issued, sell the remainder (thus raising revenue for 
reducing taxes or the government deficit), and yet still leave industry better 
off. Equivalently, with charge- subsidies, the baselines which divide charges 
from subsidies could be set low enough to yield a small revenue for the 
taxpayer, but high enough again to leave industry better off. 
However, these results about the win-win-win mechanism are in practice 
subject to a number of political and informational limitations. Unless 
baselines are redistributed in an unequal way, the mechanism can-not 
guarantee net gains for all firms. If the control authority has poor 
information about control costs, either the charge-subsidy form of the 
mechanism will be preferable to the marketable permit form, or vice versa. 
It may be politically impossible to reach the marginally optimal level of 
emissions in a purely win-win-win way, that is, without having to ask 
environmental users to pay higher taxes in return for some of their gains 
from reduced emissions. If the pure administration cost of market 
mechanisms based on emission rights is too high, then some flexible 
regulatory system may be preferable overall. And if future environmental 
damage is unknown, property rights to the environment may need to be in 
the form of long leases rather than freeholds in perpetuity. Yet further 
complications are likely to arise with imperfect competition, multiple 
pollutants, and local variations in environmental quality, all of which have 
been ignored here. Finally, since politics is an art rather than a science, 
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there is not even a guarantee that ensuring that taxpayers , industry and 
environmental users all get a positive share of the efficiency gains improves 
the likelihood of market mechanisms being adopted. But this seems to be 
a useful working hypothesis, worthy of serious consideration by economists 
and policymakers alike. 
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Figure 8.1 A win-win-win market mechanism 
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Figure 8.3 A case where the identity of the average firm changes at 








Figure 8.4 A case where a pure market mechanism is of net benefit 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS TO PART 11 
Many theoretical analyses - including Part I of this thesis - 
automatically assume that it is possible to solve environmental and/or 
sustainability problems using a per unit tax or charge on the use of 
environmental resources; and by implication, given well-known symmetry 
results, that marketable permits, rather than a tax instrument, would also 
work. By studying the political and practical reality of such market 
mechanisms, Part II has shown that their applicability is limited by 
important political and informational factors. 
The basic conclusions, which may be unpalatable to some, were that 
firstly, if the environment is scarce and is to be used optimally, it needs to 
be owned, like any other scarce resource. The choice between emission 
control by price (using emission charges) and control by quantity (using 
marketable emission permits) is then of secondary importance. Chapter 7 
showed that the conventional view, that control by price is not symmetric 
to control by quantity in terms of long run efficiency, is based on an 
asymmetric (and often unstated) assumption that marketable permits are 
treated as property rights when a firm enters or exits the industry, whereas 
subsidies are not. When subsidies are also treated as property rights, a 
simple symmetry emerges between marketable permits and 
charges/ subsidies. If each instrument embodies exactly the same quantity 
and quality of emission rights, their short and long run economic effects will 
be identical, given a number of simplifying assumptions about perfect 
competition and information. 
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Secondly, Chapter 8 argued that a move towards economic efficiency via 
environmental ownership can and should (if it is to be politically attractive) 
be done in a way which gives gwins' (net economic benefits) to all the main 
interest groups who shape environmental policy: environmental users, 
industry and taxpayers. However, to draw this conclusion alone would be 
somewhat simplistic. The chapter also showed that firms with near-average 
emissions will probably lose out from this 'win-win-win' mechanism, and 
that information costs are a pervasive constraint on policy, and help to 
explain why inefficient standards formed the original basis of pollution 
control policy - Information costs mean that a move towards market 
mechanisms will still face practical problems, even if the policymakers' 
psychological resistance to the mechanisms is less than it used to be, and 
even if the political economy of the move is managed in the 'win-win-win' 
way suggested. 
The implications of these findings for further research fall under the two 
broad headings of political economy and informational economy. Firstly, 
we need a better understanding of the politics of distributing the efficiency 
gains from market mechanisms. For any particular case, what are the de 
facto emission rights of existing polluters? How should they be redistributed 
among taxpayers and environmental users in order to win the most political 
support for a move to efficient market mechanisms? And why is the 'equal 
treatment' argument used (if unwittingly) to resist the establishment of 
emission rights for control by price, but not for control by quantity? (Most 
policymakers assume that any emission reduction subsidy must, to give 
6 equal treatment' to firms, be made available to new as well as existing 
polluters, but do not make the equivalent assumption that marketable 
emission permits should be given free to new as well as existing polluters. 
) 
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Secondly, we need more information about information. For any 
particular case, how much would it cost to administer the ownership of 
emission rights? How much extra monitoring and compliance costs will a 
market mechanism require? How big is the inefficiency of the existing 
regulatory system in comparison to these information costs? Only if both 
these two lines of enquiry are pursued will the full potential of market 
mechanisms of pollution control be appraised realistically, and achieved in 
practice. 
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STANDARD NOTATION AND TERMINOLOGY USED 
NOTATION 
Like most mathematical economists, I have found the finiteness of the 
Graeco-Roman alphabet set, and the excess demand for letters such as p (for 
price, profit, progress or pollution) and t (for time, tax or technology) to be 
a great source of frustration. The following assignment could no doubt be 
improved upon, but I hope it will have some mnemonic power, and intended 
alliterative allusions are noted. (2), (3), etc after the definition means that 
it is used in Chapter 2, Chapter 3, etc. 
is defined as 
OC+ is proportional to and has the same sign as [used when cancelling out 
common positive factors during algebraic manipulation] 
end of proof, Q. E. D. 
denotes first time derivative, d1dt 
denotes second time derivative, dIdt' 
denotes socially PV-optimal solution which maximises social PV 
t denotes sustainable solution in (2), but PV-optimal sustainable 
(opsustimal) solution in (3) 
t denotes socially PV-optimal sustainable solution (2) 
A denotes privately PV-optimal response to policy intervention (2/3/4) 
denotes asymptotic steady state (2) 
# denotes transition (3) 
0 denotes at time zero (passim) 
- denotes exogenous parameter (1) // average for whole population (4) 
a age of individual in overlapping generations model 
(1) 
a denotes asexual 
(4) 
A exogenous technical productivity factor (2) 
b constant (2) 
b denotes baseline effluent right 
(7/8) 
B value (benefit) of family sustainabilitY (4) 
c per capita consumption (2) 
269 Notation / Terminology 
total Consumption (2/3) // cost function (7) 
C denotes alaC, or connected with Consumption 
D utility Discount factor (in 2-period model) (4) 
es denotes (individually) externally sustainable (4) 
E Effective stock of resource (1) // Effluent emitted by a firm (7/8) 
f resource-intensive form of production function (2/3) // particular 
family (4) 
F production Function (2/3) 
g growth function of resource stock (1) // propensity to consume out of 
cake resource ('greed') (4) 
G denotes historically given initial value (3) 
h constant (2) 
H Hamiltonian (3) 
H denotes connected with Hartwick's Rule (3) 
i denotes individually sustainable (2, Appendices) 
is denotes (individually) internally sustainable (4) 
J sustainability Jump function (4) 
K total capital (2/3) 
K denotes alaK, or connected with capital (2/3) 
L total quantity of Labour (2/3) 
M ratio of marginal cost between two firms (8) 
M t denotes maximin solution available at time t (2/3) 
M marginal control cost at industry level (8) 
N number of periods that an individual lives (1) 
P prices of all capital and resource stocks in terms of consumption (3) 
P denotes connected with the Peak time of a PV-optimal path 
(3) 
PV Present Value of utility (2/3/4) 
Pvt current PV = PV of a utility path from time t onwards (2) 
PVC Present Value of Consumption (3) 
Q total Quantity of output (of consumption good) (2) 
r rate of interest (2/3) 
R rate of Resource extraction (2/3) 
R denotes alaR, or connected with 
Resource stock and flow (2) 
SS denotes socially sustainable (4) 
270 Notation / Terminology 
S per capita stock of resource (2) // time variable in integral (3) 
S total Stock of exhaustible resource (2) 
S denotes alaS, or connected with resource Stock (2) 
t time (passim) 
T upper 711me limit of integration, transition Time (3) 
U net benefit to society at a particular time (1) // instantaneous Utility of 
representative, infinitely -lived agent (2/3/4) 
V lifetime utility of an individual (1) // aggregate consumption wealth (3) 
// effluent charge rate (7/8) 
W intergenerational social welfare function (ISWF) (1) // overall 
intertemporal Welfare of a parent (4) 
X time subscript (1) // KIR (2/3) 
X 
denotes connected with x (2/3) 
X bequest which child's mate brings (unknown to parents) (4) 
Y propensity to consume of child's family (unknown to parents) (4) 
Y net national product C+p. t (3) 
z small number (2) 
z net national welfare U+7r. t (3) 
U elasticity of capital (but not resources) in production (2/3) 
0 QIK (2) 
ly exogenous parameter (1) // RIS (2) 
IP exogenous technical or biological growth factor (4) 
6 utility discount rate (2/3) 
E environmental preference parameter (2) 
-ýIS in See 3.3 (2) 
n elasticity of marginal utility of consumption (2/3) 
0 resource depletion rate in socially PV-optimal cake-eating model (2) 
0 algebraic expression (3) 
K 7-v/(P+c-) (2, Appendix) 
Lagrange multiplier (2) // general utility discount factor 
(3) 
instantaneous utility of finitely-lived agent in overlapping generations 
framework (1) // small number (3, Appendix) 
denotes free market solution path (2/4) 
271 Notation / Tenninology 
P material values parameter (2) 
k1K in Sec 3.4 (2) 
current value price of capital or resource stock in terms of utility (2/3) 
current value prices of all capital and resource stocks in terms of 
utility (3) 
H production possibility set (3) 
P asymptotic f' (3) 
P denotes perturbed path (2, Appendix) // denotes reference level (4) 
a elasticity of substitution between capital and resources (2/3) 
E vector of all capital and resource stocks (3) 
E denotes resource conservation incentive in steady state case (2) 
7" rate of exogenous, exponential technical progress (2) 
0 tax (fee) rate on particular variable (2/3/4) 
(D strength of tax policy (2) 
(DC -ýcl(l+q)c) (2) 
I& (D - (ýR + OSYA (2) Rf IOR 
(DX (1)R - OKORIA (2) 
arbitrary time exponent (2) // price of consumption in utility terms (3) 
t 
Nk aggregate wealth = Z(0)16 + 
fo 
-x. E (3) 
CO exponent of labour (2) small number (3, Appendices) 
Q lump sum refunds (2) gross wealth (3) 
272 Notation / Terminology 
TERMINOLOGY 
aggregate investment (3) 7r. ý: the total value of net investment in all 
capita stocks and 
resource stocks 
aggregate wealth (3) 
current maximin (3) 
depletion of all 
integral of aggregate investment over time 
maximum constant level (of consumption or 
utility) that is attainable, given current 
assets, from the current time onwards 
current PV (3) PV of utility path from current time t 
onwards 
Dasgupta-Heal economy (3) a Weitzman economy whose only productive 
inputs are one type of capital and one 
type of non-renewable resource 
DH74 (3) Dasgupta and Heal (1974), "The Optimal 
Depletion of Exhaustible Resources" 
DH79 (3) Dasgupta and Heal (1979), Economic Theory 
and Exhaustible Resources 
free market path (2/4) path that a private PV-maximising individual 
follows, given the absence of any policy 
intervention 
individual sustainedness non-declining utility achieved by one agent, 
(2/4) when all others may have declining utility 
ISWF (2) intergenerational social welfare function 
net national product (3) consumption, plus aggregate investment 
measured at consumption prices 
NNP (3) net national product 
net national welfare (3) utility plus aggregate investment measured at 
utility prices 
NDU (1/2/3/4) non-declining instantaneous utility of a 
representative person 
policy path (2/3/4) path that a private PV-maximising individual 
follows, given the existence of policy 
intervention 
PV (1/2/3/4) present value of utility 
PVC (3) present value of consumption 
273 Notation / Terminology 
SD (1/2/3/4) sustainable development = NDU forever 
SSCI (1) Social Science Citations Index 
sustainability (1/2/3/4) the ability to achieve NDU forever 
sustainedness (1/2/3/4) NDU forever 
unsustainability (2/3/4) the inability to achieve NDU forever 
Weitzman economy (3) an economy with a smooth and convex 
production possibilities set, utility 
dependent only on (scalar) consumption, 
and no technical progress 
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